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Abstract
Hybrid automata are an extension of finite automata obtained by augmenting
them with a set of real-valued variables. Hybrid automata are a natural model for
hybrid systems, i.e., systems that exhibit both discrete and continuous behaviour.
Such systems naturally arise when studying the interaction of a digital controller
with an analogue plant. In this thesis we study the problem of optimal controller
synthesis for such systems. The goal is to design a control program that will en-
sure that a system behaves optimally regardless of some uncontrollable external
factors. We study this problem from the perspective of two-player games on hybrid
automata.
In this thesis two variants of hybrid automata are being considered: single-
clock timed automata and hybrid automata with strong resets. The first model
allows us to capture the passage of time between discrete events, and the other
model allows us to capture the more complex dynamics the hybrid systems.
The controller synthesis problem is modelled as follows. There are two play-
ers: the controller and the adversarial environment. Their interaction is viewed as
a multi-stage process, in which the two players interact to create an execution of
the hybrid automaton. The problem of synthesising an optimal controller is: given
a certain optimisation objective, compute an “optimal” strategy for the controller
player. Executions of the hybrid automaton are assigned two quantities: the price
and the reward. Two optimisation objectives are considered: price-per-reward ra-
tio of an infinite execution and the price of reaching a certain state of the hybrid
automaton (reachability-price).
In this thesis we prove that optimal controllers for the reachability-price ob-
jective can be synthesised on single-clock timed automata in EXPTIME. Further-
more, we prove that optimal controllers for reachability-price and average-price-per-
reward objectives can be synthesised on hybrid automata with strong resets.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis we study games for optimal controller synthesis on hybrid automata. In
particular we study average-price-per-reward and reachability-price games on hybrid
automata with strong resets, and reachability-price games on single-clock timed
automata. We start this chapter with a gentle introduction to hybrid automata
and games for controller synthesis. Next, we provide a brief survey of the related
literature, and we then discuss the contributions of this thesis. We conclude this
chapter with an outline of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Hybrid systems are systems that exhibit both continuous and discrete behaviour.
Such systems naturally arise when modelling an interaction of a digital controller
with an analogue environment [NOSY93; ACHH93; Hen96; HKPP98]. There are
various examples of hybrid systems, e.g., audio protocols [HWT95], industrial steam
boilers [HWT96], semi-automated vehicles [ADG97], aircraft landing systems [TMBO03],
and user interfaces [OMBT03].
A very basic example of a hybrid system is a thermostat controlling a boiler.
The discrete component of the system is its mode of operation, which is either
1
Heating Cooling
When the temperature reaches
86.4◦C the boiler switches off.
When the temperature drops to 50◦C
the boiler switches back on.
Figure 1.1: Basic rules of the boiler’s operation. The invariant is that the tempera-
ture of the water never drops below zero, and never exceeds 86.4◦C.
heating or cooling, and the continuous component of the system is its temperature.
The mode of operation together with the current temperature form the state of this
hybrid system. A change of mode is guided by the current temperature of the water
stored. The mode of operation together with the current temperature determine the
state of this hybrid system. Figure 1.1 provides a schematic description of the boiler.
When in heating mode, once the water reaches the temperature of 86.4◦C the boiler
switches off, and enters the cooling mode. When in the cooling mode, on the other
hand, once the temperature of the water drops to 50◦C the boiler goes back to the
heating mode. The heater in the boiler can heat the water to a maximum 86.4◦C,
and the water never freezes. The heating and cooling characteristics of the boiler,
i.e., the laws according to which the temperature changes can be seen in Figure 1.2.
If the boiler is in the heating mode, and the initial temperature of the water is 0◦C
then it takes 120 minutes for the water to reach its maximum temperature of 86.4◦C.
In this thesis we study the problem of optimal controller synthesis for hybrid
systems. The goal is to design a control program that will ensure that the system
behaves optimally regardless of some uncontrollable external factors. For example,
consider a battery-powered portable device with a hard drive. Operations which re-
quire accessing the hard drive consume a lot of energy, which is a valuable resource.
In this case optimisation would mean ensuring that, regardless of the users actions,
2
time [min]
temp [◦C]
time [min]
temp [◦C]
86.4
(0, 0) (0, 0)
50
120 2800
Heating Cooling
42 670
Figure 1.2: Heating and cooling specification of the boiler.
the disk operations are executed by the controller in such a way that the energy
consumption is minimised. In this thesis we will be considering worst-case opti-
misation. That is, we will want to ensure optimal performance when the external
factor plays to our disadvantage.
In our approach, a hybrid system is modelled using a hybrid automaton. Hy-
brid automata are an extension of finite automata, obtained by augmenting them
with a set of real-valued variables. The finite automaton models the discrete compo-
nent, and the real-valued variables model the continuous component. In this thesis,
we will be considering two variants of hybrid automata: single-clock timed automata
and hybrid automata with strong resets. The first model allows to capture the pas-
sage of time between discrete events, and the other model allows to capture more
complex dynamics present in hybrid systems. However, in the latter model, the
continuous component of the automaton’s state has to be reset after each discrete
event.
We model the controller synthesis problem as a two player game. There
are two players, the controller and the adversarial environment. The worst-case
scenario approach is captured by the fact that we are considering zero-sum games,
i.e., games in which the winnings of one player are equal to the losses of the other.
We view players’ interaction as a multi-stage process, in which the two players
create an execution of the hybrid automaton. Every execution of the automaton
3
will be assigned two quantities, its price and its reward. Given a certain optimisation
objective, to synthesise an optimal controller will mean to compute an “optimal”
strategy for the controller. A strategy can be viewed as a rule that tells the player
how to interact with the other player at every stage of the process.
We will be considering two optimisation objectives. Firstly, we will focus our
attention to the average-price-per-reward objective, i.e., the limit ratio of accumu-
lated price and accumulated reward of the execution will be optimised. In this case
we are dealing with recurring behaviour and optimising average performance. Con-
sider the following example. There is a production plant which, once started, can
operate for long periods of time. The plant operates in production cycles. In every
production cycle, fuel for the plant has to be bought so that the plant can manu-
facture. The manufactured products are sold by the company owning the plant and
bring revenue. However, the revenue is diminished by the cost of the fuel needed by
the plant. Fuel consumption and the sale price of the manufactured product may
vary over time, but we would like to ensure that on average, the cost of fuel used by
the plant is relatively small compared to the sale price of the product, i.e., that the
profit of the company is as high as possible. It is natural to model this situation as
a game with average-price-per-reward objective. The controller wants to minimise
the limit ratio of the total cost of fuel used over the total revenue obtained. The
fact that the plant operates over long periods of time is reflected by the fact that
we are considering infinite executions.
Secondly, we will direct our attention to the reachability-price objective, i.e.,
the price of reaching a certain state will be optimised. In this case we are optimising
a single execution of the system. Consider the following example. A plane is flying
from one city to another. The main cost of such a journey is the cost of the fuel
used. There are various weather factors that affect the duration of the journey, and
hence the amount of fuel consumed. The exposure to the weather factors depends
on the route taken; sometimes avoiding this exposure may result in taking an overly
4
long route. We want to design an autopilot (controller) which chooses a flight plan
that minimises the fuel consumption. Such a situation is naturally modelled by a
game with a reachability-price objective. In this case the price of an execution is
the amount of fuel used. Notice that in this case we are not interested in the reward
of an execution.
In the examples above, the optimisation objective was to minimise a certain
quantity. However, the framework of zero-sum games is equally suitable for opti-
misation objectives where one wants to maximise that quantity. In particular, we
could consider average-price-per-reward and reachability-price objectives where the
goal would be to maximise those quantities.
In this thesis we prove that optimal controllers for reachability-price can be
synthesised on single-clock timed and hybrid automata with strong resets. Fur-
thermore, we prove that optimal controllers for average-price-per-reward can be
synthesised on hybrid automata with strong resets.
1.2 Literature review
In this section we survey the literature related to the subject of games for optimal
controller synthesis for hybrid systems. This review is by no means exhaustive.
We concentrate on results that are of relevance to the problems considered in this
thesis. The purpose of this review is to get the reader familiar with different sub-
classes of hybrid systems. In particular, we want the reader to understand how
timed automata and o-minimal hybrid automata fit in the general theory of hybrid
automata. This will enable the reader to appreciate how our results contribute to
that theory.
We start this section with a summary of our approach to controller syn-
thesis, then we proceed to present the various subclasses of hybrid automata, and
conclude with a survey of results. This survey should provide the understanding of
5
the differences between the different subclasses of hybrid automata.
Hybrid automata. Hybrid systems are systems that exhibit both continuous and
discrete behaviours. Alur et al. [ACHH93] and Nicolin at al. [NOSY93], indepen-
dently, proposed hybrid automata as a model for such systems. A hybrid automaton
is an extension of a finite automaton obtained by augmenting it with a set of real-
valued variables. In this context, the finite automaton is referred to as a control
graph. A vertex of the automaton, referred to as the control location, models the
state of the digital controller and the valuation of the variables models the state of
the analogue environment. Together, this pair forms the state of the hybrid automa-
ton. A flow predicate describes the admissible changes (flows, trajectories) to the
value of the variables within a given control location. Changes of control locations
are governed by edges of the control graph, referred to as control actions. Availabil-
ity of a given control action depends on the valuation of the real-valued variables,
and is specified by the jump predicate.
Alur et al. and Nicolin et al. proposed transition semantics for this model.
A state of the transition system is a pair consisting of the current control location
and the current valuation of the real-valued variables. There are two kinds of tran-
sitions. Discrete transitions, which correspond to changes of the current control
locations, are instantaneous and are labelled with the corresponding control action.
Continuous transitions, which correspond to the changes to the current valuation of
the real-valued variables, span over time and are labelled with their time duration.
A transition results in a change to the current state of the transition system. The
behaviour (execution) of a hybrid system is thus modelled by a run of the transition
system.
Controller synthesis. The goal of the controller synthesis problem is to synthe-
sise a control program that restricts the systems behaviour in such a way that its
every execution satisfies certain properties [Chu62; RW89]. The controller synthesis
6
problem was first posed by Church [Chu62], and later considered by both computer
scientists [Tho95; GTW02; dA03] and control theorists [RW89; FV97]. Ramadge
and Wonham [RW89; Tho95] proposed modelling this problem using a two-player
game on a graph.
In this setting, the game is played on a transition system by two players: Min
and Max, who model the controller and the adversarial environment, respectively.
The game is played in rounds and in each round both players interact to deter-
mine the next transition to be executed by the transition system [RW89; HHM99;
dAFH+03]. A game is said to be turn-based, if the states of the transition system
are partitioned between the two players, and in every state the owner of that state
determines the next transition to execute [GTW02; AG11].
A play of the game is a (possibly infinite) sequence of transitions. A payoff
function assigns a value to every such play — an amount of player Max’s winnings,
which is equal to the player Min’s losses. These kind of games are called zero-sum
games. This approach models the situation in which the controller is facing an
adversarial environment, i.e., the worst case analysis [AdAF05].
A strategy of a player is a rule which guides the player in the game, i.e., tells
the player what choices to make when interacting with the other player. The value
of the strategy is the value of the winnings which this strategy guarantees. The
lower value of the game is the value of the “best” strategy for player Max. Intu-
itively, the lower value is the amount of winnings which player Max can guarantee
regardless, of the behaviour of player Min. The upper value is defined similarly in
terms of the “best” strategy of player Min. If the lower and upper values are equal
then we say that the game is determined and it has a value. Not all games are
determined [dAFH+03].
To synthesise a controller means to compute an (almost) optimal strategy for
the player who models the controller. The goal of controller synthesis is to synthe-
sise real control programs, therefore the computed strategies have to be physically
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meaningful [CHR02; dAFH+03; AdAF05; BHPR07]. Zeno runs are an example of
runs that can be valid executions of the hybrid automaton, but have no physical
meaning [dAFH+03]. A Zeno-run is a run consisting of infinitely many discrete
transitions whose overall duration is finite, i.e., the accumulated time of all the
transitions converges. There are examples of games, where one of the players, to
achieve optimality, may have to enforce a Zeno run [dAFH+03; AdAF05; BHPR07].
De Alfaro et al. [dAFH+03] and Brihaye et al. [BHPR07] considered games where
players are not allowed to cause Zeno runs. However, in this setting the games are
not always determined. Unfortunately, even if we restrict the players to use only
strategies that do not cause Zeno runs, some of these strategies may not be im-
plementable. Cassez et al. [CHR02] gave an example of a controller which has to
execute control actions after times (0, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, . . . , 1/n, . . .). Such a controller
does not cause Zeno behaviour, yet its behaviour is not implementable. As a solu-
tion, the authors propose using discrete time, i.e., the controller can execute discrete
actions only at integer time points.
1.2.1 Models
In this section we briefly review the different subclasses of hybrid automata that are
of relevance to this thesis.
Timed automata. Timed automata were introduced by Alur and Dill [AD94].
This class of automata is characterised by two restrictions regarding the flow and
jump predicates. Firstly, the real-valued variables change at the same rate as real
time — that is why, in this context, the variables are referred to as clocks. Secondly,
the predicate controlling the availability of a control action is constructed using
conjunctions of the following atoms x 6 k and x− y 6 k, where x and y are clocks,
and k is a integer constant. Moreover, the only effect of a control action on the
values of the clocks is that a subset of the clocks has its values reset to 0.
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Linear hybrid automata Linear hybrid automata were introduced by Alur et
al. [ACHH93]. Linear hybrid automata generalise timed automata by placing less
restrictions on the flow and jump predicates. In this class, the jump and flow
predicates are defined using linear formulae over the set of the real-valued variables.
A linear formula is a boolean combination of inequalities between linear terms and
integer constants, where a linear term is a linear combination of the real-valued
variables and integer constants.
Rectangular hybrid automata. Rectangular hybrid automata were proposed
by Alur et al. [AHH96]. Rectangular hybrid automata are more restrictive than lin-
ear hybrid automata — their flow and jump predicates are specified using rectangles,
i.e., Cartesian products of intervals, rather than using arbitrary linear expressions.
Rectangular hybrid automata generalise timed automata by placing less restrictions
on the flow predicate, which specifies how the real-valued variables change over time;
recall that in timed automata, the variables changed at a constant and uniform rate.
Firstly, the rates of continuous change may vary between different variables and dif-
ferent control locations. Secondly, instead of a single rate per variable and location
a rectangular bound, i.e., an upper and lower bound on the rate of change, is given
— a one dimensional rectangle.
O-minimal hybrid automata O-minimal hybrid automata were was first pro-
posed by Lafferriere et al. [LPS00]. Their distinguishing property is that the flow
and jump predicates are defined using first-order sentences over an o-minimal struc-
ture. O-minimal structures have the property that every first-order definable subset
of the domain is a finite union of intervals [vdD98]. As opposed to timed, linear
and rectangular hybrid automata, o-minimal hybrid automata allow for very com-
plex flow specifications, but at the cost of strong restrictions placed on the jump
predicate. The jump predicate is restricted in the following way: as a result of a
discrete transition, the values of all the variables have to be non-deterministically
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reinitialised to a value from a predefined set that is specific to the control action
associated with the transition. We call this property the strong reset property.
Vladimerou et al. [VPVD08] proposed an extension of o-minimal hybrid au-
tomata, the so-called STORMED hybrid automata. In this new model, it is not
required that the automaton has the strong reset property. However, a different
set of technical restrictions is enforced: 1) the frequency of discrete transitions is
bounded from above; 2) in every location and for every valuation of the real-valued
variables there is only one admissible trajectory; 3) the changes to the values of the
variables, which are triggered by a transition, satisfy certain monotonicity criteria;
4) the jump predicate satisfies certain boundedness criteria.
Not all the results regarding o-minimal hybrid automata are effective. Their
effectiveness depends on the decidability of the first-order o-minimal theory under-
lying the definition of the automaton [LPS00; BM05]. Recall that given an algebraic
structure, its first-order theory is the set of all sentences that are true. A theory is
said to be decidable if there exists an algorithm that given a sentence in that theory
decides whether it is true.
Examples of o-minimal structures include the ordered field of reals, and
the ordered group of rationals [LPS00]. In particular, by Tarski’s well known re-
sult [Tar51], the first-order theory of the ordered field or reals is decidable.
1.2.2 Qualitative analysis
We survey the results regarding controller synthesis for reachability on hybrid au-
tomata. The problems considered are qualitative, i.e., there is no optimisation
involved.
Reachability
The reachability problem is defined as follows: given an initial state of a hybrid
automaton and a set of goal states, decide whether there exists a run starting in
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the initial state that visits a state from the set of goal states. We assume that the
controller has total control over the system.
Timed automata. Alur and Dill [AD94] proved that this problem is PSPACE-
complete for timed automata. To show PSPACE membership they used a finite
equivalence relation on the state space of the automaton — known as the region
equivalence — which is exponential in the size of the automaton (constants are
encoded in binary). Their proof of PSPACE-hardness used a reduction from the
halting problem of a linear-space Turing machine with a word of length n on input,
to the reachability problem of a timed automaton with 2n + 1 clocks. Courcou-
betis and Yannakakis [CY92] sharpened the result by showing that the problem
is PSPACE-hard for timed automata with at least three clocks. Laroussinie et
al. [LMS04] have shown that for single-clock timed automata the reachability prob-
lem is NLOGSPACE-complete. The complexity of the problem for two-clock timed
automata remains open.
Linear hybrid automata. Alur et al. [ACHH93] have shown that the reachabil-
ity problem is undecidable already for two-rate linear hybrid automata with three
variables. A two-rate linear automaton is a linear hybrid automaton that is re-
stricted in the following way: there are two rates and in every location the valuation
of every variable changes at one of those two rates. The proof is by a reduction from
the halting problem of two-counter machines. The value n of a counter is encoded
as the value 12n of a real-valued variable. The encoding of counter increments and
decrements is facilitated by the fact that, in the definition of the jump predicate,
the values of variables with different rates can be compared.
Alur et al. [ACH+95] show decidability of the reachability problem on multi-
rate linear hybrid automata with the jump predicate restricted to boolean combi-
nations of inequalities that involve a single variable and an integer constant. The
result is obtained through a polynomial-time reduction to the reachability-problem
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on timed-automata. Hence the problem is PSPACE-complete.
Rectangular hybrid automata. Puri and Varaiya [PV94] show that for a re-
stricted subclass of rectangular hybrid automata the reachability problem is decid-
able. The restrictions are twofold: 1) the jump predicate is specified using boolean
combinations of inequalities in which a value of the variable is compared against an
integer constant; 2) if a discrete transition can occur at a non-integer time-point,
the jump predicate guarantees reinitialisation of every variable whose flow changes.
Henzinger et al. [HKPP98] consider a different subclass of rectangular hybrid
automata, referred to as the initialised rectangular hybrid automata, and show that
the reachability problem for this class is PSPACE-complete. PSPACE-completeness
follows from a polynomial-time reduction from an initialised rectangular hybrid au-
tomaton with n variables to a timed automaton with 2n+1 variables. The reduction
consists of an intermediate reduction to a multi-rate linear automaton with 2n+ 1
variables. Every variable of the original initialised hybrid automaton is encoded
using two variables of the multi-rate linear hybrid automaton. Intuitively, the two
variables “keep track” of the upper and lower bounds on the value of the variable
in the original initialised rectangular hybrid automaton. The two restrictions nec-
essary for the result to hold are as follows: 1) values of two variables with different
flows are never compared; 2) whenever the flow of a variable changes the value of
that variable is reinitialised (reset). The authors also prove that if any of the two
restrictions are removed then the reachability-problem becomes undecidable.
O-minimal hybrid automata. The reachability related results consist of estab-
lishing the existence of a special finite equivalence relation, referred to as a finite
bisimulation, on the state space of the o-minimal hybrid automaton [LPS00; BM05;
VPVD08]. The fact that such a finite bisimulation exists does not automatically
imply decidability of the reachability problem because the construction of the postu-
lated finite bisimulation is not necessarily effective [LPS00; BM05]. If a finite bisim-
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ulation can be constructed the decidability of the reachability-problem is obtained
through a reduction to the reachability problem on a finite graph. The effective-
ness of the bisimulation construction depends on the decidability of the underlying
o-minimal theory [LPS00; BMRT04; BM05; Gen05; VPVD08].
Lafferriere et al. [LPS00] prove that there exists a finite bisimulation for
every o-minimal hybrid automaton. The result is obtained under the assumption
that in every location and for every valuation of the real-variables, there is only one
admissible trajectory. The crucial observation is that due to the restrictions placed
on the jump predicate, one can decouple the discrete and continuous dynamics of
an o-minimal hybrid automaton. The authors use this observation to construct a
finite bisimulation for the continuous system in every location independently. It is
the o-minimality property that facilitates the construction of a finite bisimulation.
Brihaye et al. [BMRT04; BM05] extend on the results of Lafferriere et al. by
relaxing the assumption on uniqueness of trajectories — their construction allows
for self intersecting trajectories. To construct the bisimulation they use the so-called
“word encoding” technique. In this technique, given a finite partition of the set of
all possible variable values, a trajectory is abstracted by a word, which is an ordered
sequence of elements of the partition (in the order they are visited by the trajectory).
The o-minimality property is used to prove that every trajectory is abstracted by a
finite word, and that the set of all such abstractions is finite. The elements of this
set of words are in fact used to construct the finite bisimulation.
Gentilini [Gen05] considered two extensions to the model of o-minimal hy-
brid automata and showed that in both cases finite bisimulations exist. Firstly,
relaxed o-minimal hybrid automata are obtained by allowing the real-valued vari-
ables to retain their value upon a discrete transition, provided that in every cycle
of control locations there is a transition that resets all of their values at the same
time. Secondly, MasterSlave o-minimal hybrid automata are obtained by allowing
one variable, referred to as the master variable, to retain its value upon a discrete
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transition as long as its flow does not change. The flow of the master variable is
independent of the other variables, referred to as the slave variables, which have to
be reset on every discrete transition. Additionally, it is required that there exists
an upper bound on the frequency of discrete transitions.
Vladimerou et al. [VPVD08] study the reachability problem on STORMED
hybrid automata, an extension of o-minimal hybrid automata, and show how to
construct a bisimulation for such an automaton.
Reachability games
In reachability-games the goal of player Min, who models the controller, is to reach
a certain designated set of goal locations, and the goal of player Max, who models
the adversarial environment, is to prevent that from happening. To solve the game
means to compute the set of states from which player Min can win, and to synthesise
a controller for reachability means to compute a strategy for player Min that ensures
winning. The decision problem associated with reachability games is formulated as
follows: given a state, decide if player Min can win from that state.
Timed automata. The controller synthesis problem for timed automata was first
introduced by Hoffman and Wong-Toi [WTH92a; WTH92b]. They have established
decidability of the controller synthesis problem for timed automata by adapting
the approach of Ramadge and Wonham [RW89] to the region abstraction of timed
automata. In their approach the players interact by independently choosing their
moves, an actual transition of the automaton is determined by those choices.
Asarin et al. [AMP95] further studied the problem of controller synthesis
for reachability and provided a symbolic algorithm. Their approach improved on
the approach of the predecessors by avoiding the explicit construction of the region
abstraction.
Henzinger and Kopke [HK99] established that the problem of synthesising
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a controller for reachability on timed automata is EXPTIME-complete. Jurdzin´ski
and Trivedi [JT07] sharpened that result by showing the problem to be EXPTIME-
complete for timed automata with at least two clocks.
De Alfaro et al. [dAFH+03] adopt a different approach to reachability games
in which players may surprise each other with their actions. In their work, players
interact in the flowing way: at every state, both players choose a time delay (a con-
tinuous transition) and an action (discrete transition) to perform once the requested
time elapses. The system executes the choice (a pair consisting of a continuous and
discrete transitions) with the shorter delay. A natural problem that arises is that
players, to attain their objective, may attempt to stop time (Zeno behaviour), i.e.,
make their choices in such a way that infinitely many discrete transitions occur
in finite time. Such behaviours are undesirable as they are not physically meaning-
ful [dAFH+03]. The authors propose a method for eliminating such behaviours, and
show that in this setting the problem of synthesising a controller for reachability is
EXPTIME-complete. Eliminating Zeno-behaviour comes at the cost of non-uniform
determinacy, i.e., from some states neither player can win.
Rectangular hybrid automata. Henzinger and Kopke [HK99] studied reacha-
bility games on rectangular hybrid automata. They considered a model in which the
continuous transitions are under the control of the environment, and the discrete
transitions are under the control of the controller. Additionally, the time is discrete,
i.e., the controller can execute discrete transitions only at integer time points. They
provide an algorithm for synthesising controllers for reachability and show that the
problem is EXPTIME-complete.
Henzinger et al. [HHM99] consider controller synthesis for reachability in the
context of rectangular hybrid games. The approach differs form the one presented
by Henzinger and Kopke [HK99] in that it does not distinguish between the dis-
crete controller and continuous environment — the environment and the controller
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can both perform continuous and discrete transitions. In this setting, both play-
ers choose their transitions independently and one of them is nondeterministically
chosen to be executed. The authors prove that controller synthesis for reachability
in rectangular hybrid games is EXPTIME-complete. De Alfaro et al. [dAHM01]
proposed a symbolic algorithm for synthesising controllers for reachability in rect-
angular hybrid games.
O-minimal hybrid automata. Bouyer et al. [BBC10; BBC06] study controller
synthesis for reachability in the context of o-minimal hybrid automata. They con-
sider an asymmetric setting in which the environment is the more powerful player.
The approach bears similarities with the “element of surprise” approach introduced
by de Alfaro [dAFH+03], however here the environment makes their choice knowing
the choice of the controller, i.e., the controller can not surprise the environment.
Under the assumption that the underlying o-minimal theory is decidable, Bouyer et
al. prove that the controller synthesis problem for reachability on o-minimal hybrid
automata is decidable, and provide an algorithm for synthesising such a controller.
They employ the so-called “suffix word encoding” abstraction technique, which gen-
eralises the “word encoding” abstraction [BMRT04; BM05] to the game setting.
Vladimerou et al. [VPVD09] generalise the results of Bouyer et al. to the
setting of reachability games on STORMED hybrid automata.
1.2.3 Quantitative analysis
In the previous section, we have surveyed problems with qualitative objectives; in
this section we consider problems with quantitative objectives. Firstly, we discuss
the reachability-price optimisation and average-price-per-reward ratio optimisation
on hybrid automata. Secondly, we discuss controller synthesis for the aforementioned
problems.
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Optimal reachability-price
The reachability-price problem is defined on a weighted transition system, in which
every transition bears a price: given an initial state, a set of goal states, and a
constant c, determine whether there exists a run starting in the initial state that
visits a state from the set of goal states, and whose accumulated price of transitions
is at most c. A special case of this problem, referred to as reachability-time problem,
occurs when the price of every discrete transitions is 0, and the price of every
continuous transition is equal to its duration.
Timed automata. Weighted timed automata were introduced independently by
Alur et al. [ALP01] and Behrmann et al. [BFH+01]. In this model every transition
bears a price. The price of a continuous transition is equal to its duration multiplied
by a control-location-specific integer constant, and the price of a discrete transition
is equal to a control-action-specific integer constant. Such automata are referred to
as linearly-priced automata.
The reachability-time problem for timed automata was shown to be decidable
by Courcoubetis and Yannakakis [CY92], and Alur et al. [ACH97] have shown that
the problem is PSPACE-complete.
Alur et al. [ATP04] proposed an EXPTIME algorithm for solving the reach-
ability-price problem on linearly-priced timed automata. Their method used a non-
trivial extension of the region abstraction.
When restricted to corner states, i.e., states in which all clock values are inte-
ger, Bouyer et al. [BBBR07] proved that the reachability-price problem for linearly-
priced timed automata is PSPACE-complete. PSPACE-completeness is shown us-
ing the corner-point abstraction, a refinement of the region abstraction. The key
observation behind the proof is that to achieve optimality for corner states, it is
sufficient to consider only runs that go through (or very close to) corner states.
PSPACE-hardness follows from the complexity of the reachability-problem for timed
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automata [AD94]. For single-clock timed automata the reachability-price problem
is NLOGSPACE-complete [LMS04].
Jurdzin´ski and Trivedi [JT08b] generalise the results of Bouyer et al. and
show that the reachability-price problem is PSPACE-complete for all initial states,
not just the corner states. They use an abstraction technique, known as boundary-
region abstraction, which generalises the corner-point abstraction.
O-minimal hybrid automata. Gentilini [Gen05] studied the reachability-time
problem for o-minimal hybrid automata. She proved that the problem is decidable,
provided that the underlying o-minimal theory is decidable. Brihaye et al. [BBC09;
BBC07] extended this result to the the reachability-price setting under the assump-
tion that all prices are positive. In both works, the crucial observation is that it
is sufficient to consider runs of bounded length. This is because the automaton is
defined using an o-minimal theory, and because upon every discrete transition all of
the real-valued variables are reinitialised.
Optimal price-per-reward
The price-per-reward problem is defined for doubly-weighted transition systems. Ev-
ery transition bears two weights, a price and a reward, and we want to optimise
the limit ratio of the accumulated price and reward in an infinite run. The price-
per-reward problem is defined as follows: given an initial state and a constant c,
determine whether there exists an infinite run whose limit ration of the accumulated
price and reward is at most c.
Timed automata. Bouyer at al. [BBL04] introduced the price-per-reward prob-
lem for doubly-weighted timed automata. In their considerations the automata
were linearly-priced and linearly-rewarded. Using the aforementioned corner-point
abstraction, they showed the problem to be PSPACE-complete for all corner states.
The key observation is the same as in the context of the reachability-price prob-
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lem [BBBR07], i.e., that it is sufficient to consider runs visiting only corner states
or states that are sufficiently close to corner states.
Jurdzin´ski and Trivedi [JT08b] extend the results of Bouyer et al. to all states
of the automaton. They use a generalisation of the corner point-abstraction, known
as the boundary-region abstraction, to show that the problem is PSPACE-complete.
Reachability-price games
Reachability-price games are played on weighted transition systems. The goal of
player Min, who models the controller, is to assure that a goal state is reached,
and if that is possible, to minimise the accumulated price of doing so. The goal of
player Max, who models the adversarial environment, is to prevent player Min from
reaching the goal state, and if that is not possible, to maximise the accumulated
price of reaching a goal state. To solve the game means to compute the value of
the game. To synthesise a controller means to compute a strategy for player Min
that can ensure an almost optimal execution of the system. Finally, the decision
problem associated with reachability-price games is as follows: given a state of the
automaton and a constant c, decide if the value of the reachability-price game from
that state is at most c.
Timed automata. Asarin and Maler [AM99] were the first to study reachability-
time games on timed automata. They have proposed an algorithm which computes
the uniform solution to the reachability-price game, i.e., it computes a function
that given a state returns the upper value of a reachability-price game. They use a
value iteration approach, which iteratively computes a solution to a certain set of
equations whose solutions coincide with the upper values. The iterative procedure
is guaranteed to terminate only on timed automata that are structurally non-Zeno,
i.e., a sequence of transitions that results in a control cycle takes at least one unit
of time.
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Jurdzin´ski and Trivedi [JT07] proved that reachability-time games are de-
termined. Firstly, they characterise the game values using a set of equations, the
so-called optimality equations. Secondly, they proposed a symbolic strategy im-
provement algorithm for computing the solution to these equations. In their ap-
proach, a strategy is a mapping from an element of the region abstraction to a
function that maps each state in the region to an actual move of a player. In each
iteration, the strategy improvement evaluates the strategies (assigns a value) and
attempts to improve them (increase their value). The algorithm terminates when
no improvement is possible. Jurdzin´ski and Trivedi argue that the set of such sym-
bolic strategies is finite for both players and that in each iteration the value of
the strategy increases. Hence the strategy improvement procedure is guaranteed to
terminate. Additionally, they establish that the reachability-price game problem is
EXPTIME-complete for timed automata with at least two clocks.
Brihaye et al. [BHPR07] adopt the approach of games with an “element of
surprise”, first introduced by [dAFH+03]. In the reachability-time game setting, as
was the case with reachability games, players play by choosing a time delay and
action to perform after the chosen time elapses; the action with a shorter time
delay is executed. To avoid Zeno behaviours, the strategies available to players are
restricted. It is known that in this restricted setting the game does not have to be
determined [dAFH+03], however, Brihaye et al. provide an algorithm for computing
the upper value of the game.
La Torre et al. [LTMM02] study reachability-price games on a restricted class
of linearly-priced timed automata. They consider linearly-priced timed automata
whose control graph does not contain cycles. In this restricted setting, they give a
doubly-exponential algorithm for solving reachability-price games.
Reachability-price games on arbitrary linearly-priced timed automata were
studied independently by Alur et al. [ABP04] and Bouyer et al. [BCFL04]. In both
cases, the authors proposed a semi-algorithm for solving reachability-price games
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on timed automata. These two algorithms are guaranteed to terminate on timed
automata in which the price of every control cycle is strictly positive.
Alur et al. [ABP04] provide an algorithm for solving bounded reachability-
price games, i.e., games in which the players are trying to optimise the price of
reaching the goal state in a given finite number of steps. To solve this bounded
variant of reachability-price games they use a refinement of the region abstraction.
Additionally, they provide examples that show that the size of this refined abstrac-
tion grows exponentially with the number of steps.
Brihaye at al. [BBR05] show that deciding whether an optimal strategy exists
in a reachability-price game on an automaton with at least five clocks is undecidable.
The proof is by a reduction from the halting problem of a two-counter machine.
Bouyer at al. [BBM06] sharpened this result by providing a reduction from the
halting problem of a two-counter machine to a timed automaton with at least three
clocks.
Bouyer at al. [BLMR06] studied reachability-price games on single-clock
timed automata, and proposed a triply-exponential algorithm for solving them.
They show that the problem can be reduced to a problem on a very simple sub-
class of single-clock timed automata and they provide an algorithm that solves the
problem for this subclass. The algorithm is recursive with respect to the number
of control locations in the automaton, and it is built around a very involved un-
derstanding of the structure of the solution. The exact complexity of the problem
remains open.
O-minimal hybrid automata. Vladimerou et al. [VPVD09] study reachability-
price games on STORMED hybrid automata, a generalisation of o-minimal hybrid
automata. They propose a reduction from the reachability-price game decision
problem on linearly-priced STORMED hybrid automata to the reachability game
decision problem on STORMED hybrid automata. The reduction is based on the
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following idea: provided that the STORMED hybrid automaton is linearly-priced,
the price of a run can be encoded in an auxiliary variable, that is never reini-
tialised. The reachability-game decision problem is decidable for STORMED hybrid
automata [VPVD09].
Average-price-per-reward games
In average-price-per-reward games the goal of player Min, who models the controller,
is to minimise the limit ratio of the accumulated price and reward in an infinite run.
The goal of player Max, who models the environment, is to maximise this ratio.
To solve the game means to compute the value of the game, and to synthesise a
controller means to compute a strategy that guarantees an almost optimal execution
of the system. The associated decision problem is as follows: given a state and a
constant c, decide whether the value of the average-price-per-reward game from that
state is at most c.
Timed automata. Jurdzin´ski and Trivedi [JT08a] consider average-time-per-
transition games on timed-automata and prove that they are determined. They
reduce the problem of computing the value of the game to the problem of com-
puting the value of a finite average-price game. Additionally, they prove that the
decision version of the problem is EXPTIME-complete for timed automata with at
least two clocks.
Adler et al. [AdAF05] consider average-price-per-time games on timed au-
tomata with discrete time. The authors adopt the setting of games with an “element
of surprise” [dAFH+03; BHPR07], i.e., players choose time delays and actions to
execute after the chosen time elapses and the system executes the action which oc-
curs first. However, in this case the time is discrete and players can choose to wait
either 1 or 0 units of time only. Additionally, as it was the case with reachability
games with an element of surprise [dAFH+03] and reachability-time games with an
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element of surprise [BHPR07], players are forbidden to block time. The authors
show that the games are not determined in this setting, and provide a NP∩coNP
algorithm for computing the upper and lower values.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis we consider reachability-price and price-per-reward games on three
different models: single-clock timed automata, price-reward game graphs, and hybrid
systems with strong resets. In each case, we prove that the games are positionally
determined, and that almost optimal controllers can be synthesised. Below, we
briefly discuss the contributions and the organisation of the thesis.
Single clock timed automata. In Chapter 3 we introduce single-clock timed
automata and study turn-based reachability-price games on this model. The work
presented in that Chapter extends the work of Bouyer et al. [BLMR06].
Firstly, we study cost functions, a class of piecewise-affine functions from
bounded intervals to the set of reals augmented with the positive infinity. We
prove several important properties of functions in this class that are instrumental
in establishing the results regarding reachability-price games on single-clock timed
automata. We believe that these results are interesting in their own right. Secondly,
we show an EXPTIME algorithm for computing the value of a reachability-price
game. As in Bouyer’s et al. [BLMR06] approach, the algorithm does the computation
through a recursive procedure, with respect to the number of control locations of
the timed automaton. Again, as in the work of Bouyer’s et al., in each recursive call
we single out a control location that minimises the price rate. Control locations are
assigned to players and handling of a control location by the algorithm depends on
its ownership. In the case of control locations of player Max, our algorithm behaves
exactly like the original, however, when it comes to handling control locations of
player Min we improve over the predecessor. The original algorithm would proceed
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to recursively solve two subproblems, which resulted in an additional exponential
blowup. The algorithm presented in this thesis, as in the case of control locations
of player Max, employs an iterative procedure which prevents this blowup. The
approach is similar in spirit to that used in handling locations of player Max but
the technical details are different.
Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, we provide an algorithm that improves
the complexity of computing the value of reachability-price games on single-clock
timed automata. We show the reachability-price game problem on single-clock timed
automata is in EXPTIME, whereas the previously known best upper bound was
3EXPTIME [BLMR06]. Secondly, we provide results regarding cost functions, which
are interesting in their own right, and are instrumental in establishing the correctness
and complexity of the algorithm. Thirdly, we provide a rigorous analysis, previously
absent in the literature, of the operations necessary to implement the algorithm.
This work was published in the paper titled “Two-Player Reachability-Price
Games on Single-Clock Timed Automata” in the proceedings of the Ninth Workshop
on Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages QAPL’11 [Rut11].
Price-reward game graphs. In Chapter 4, we introduce the notion of a price-
reward game graph. Price-reward game graphs are an extension of doubly-weighted
graphs (graphs in which every edge is assigned two weights: the price and the
reward), where the price and the reward of an edge are dynamic, i.e., determined
in the course of the game. In contrast to doubly-weighted graphs, a player’s move
not only consists of choosing the next edge to traverse, but also of choosing edge-
specific, inputs. This choice of inputs, made by both players, determines the price
and reward of the traversed edge.
Firstly, we consider average-price-per-reward games, on infinite price-reward
game graphs and for this model we formulate a special set of equations, the so-
called optimality equations. We show that the solutions to these equations coincide
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with game values. Secondly, we consider price-reward game graphs where the set of
states and edges are finite. Note that there is no such restriction on the sets of edge
inputs. In this setting we prove that average-price-per-reward games are determined
and that almost optimal controllers can be synthesised.
To obtain the results, we first consider graphs of out-degree one, where play-
ers’ actions consist of choosing edge inputs only. We obtain determinacy and syn-
thesizability of almost-optimal controllers by showing that solutions to optimality
equations, in this restricted setting, indeed exist. We use the technique of strat-
egy improvement to lift this result first to a single-player setting and then to the
two-player setting.
Notice that when both players choose their positional strategies, i.e., which
edges to traverse from every state, they in fact choose a certain graph of out-degree
one. This, and the result for graphs of out-degree one allow us to apply strategy im-
provement. Since the sets of positional strategies are finite, the algorithm terminates
and the solution to the optimality equations in the finial graph of out-degree one is
the solution to the optimality equations for the whole game. It is worth noting that
although in the actual game a player’s strategy consists of choosing edges to tra-
verse as well as choosing inputs for every traversed edge, the strategy improvement
procedure operates only on the “edge choosing” components of players’ strategies.
To the best of our knowledge price-reward game graphs have not been con-
sidered previously. Therefore, both the model and the results are novel. The results
were first published by Marcin Jurdzin´ski, Ranko Lazic´ and myself in the paper
titled “Average-price-per-rewards games on hybrid automata with strong resets” in
the proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Verification, Model Check-
ing, and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI’09) [JLR09], and later appeared in the
special issue of the International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
committed to the best papers submitted to the aforementioned conference [RLJ10].
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Hybrid systems with strong resets. In Chapter 5 we introduce hybrid au-
tomata with strong resets and define the notion of a two-player zero-sum game
on this model. In our definition of the game we adopt the approach of Bouyer et
al. [BBC10; BBC06], i.e., we are considering an asymmetric setting in which player
Max is the more powerful player. The approach bears similarities with the “element
of surprise” approach introduced by de Alfaro [dAFH+03] however here, player Max
makes their choice knowing the choice made by player Min, i.e., player Min can not
surprise player Max.
We show that average-price-per-reward and reachability-price hybrid games
with strong resets are positionally determined, and that positional almost optimal
controllers can be synthesised. To obtain these results, we introduce an equivalence
relation on the state space of the hybrid automaton that enables us to construct a
respective “finite game” whose game values correspond to those of the original hybrid
game. For both the hybrid and finite games we introduce a special set of equations,
the so-called optimality equations, and prove that the solutions to those equations
coincide with the game values. We use this optimality equation characterisation
to prove that the values of the finite game coincide with the values of the original
hybrid game.
In the asymmetric setting, the two players choose a transition in three steps.
Every step is hybrid in nature, i.e., consists of choosing a discrete and a continuous
component. Twice the choice consists of choosing an action (discrete) and a time
(continuous), and once of choosing a state, which can be viewed as choosing an
equivalence class (discrete) and then a state in that class (continuous). The afore-
mentioned equivalence relation equates two states if they admit the same discrete
interaction of both players. We use its equivalence classes as building blocks to cre-
ate a finite graph in which the discrete choices made by both players, during their
interaction, are encoded in the choices of edges to traverse. In case of average-price
and reachability-price games we can disregard the continuous components, and the
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“finite graph” we build is in fact a doubly-weighted finite graph. On the other hand,
in case of average-price-per-reward games, we need to account for the continuous
components, and the “finite graph” we build is in fact a price-reward game graph (as
introduced in Chapter 4), where the continuous choices are encoded in the choices
of the edge inputs.
Hybrid systems with strong resets were first introduced as o-minimal hybrid
systems [LPS00; BM05]. The name stemmed from the fact that the flow, guard,
and reset predicates were first-order definable over an o-minimal structure. The
crucial property of the o-minimal structure was that every first-order definable sub-
set of the domain was a finite union of intervals. This, together with the strong
reset assumption, allowed for encoding the systems executions using words of finite
length. This encoding was instrumental in establishing decidability of the reachabil-
ity problem [LPS00; BM05], and in computing the upper value of reachability-price
games [BBC07].
In our considerations we have restricted the structure, over which the sets
are defined, to the field of reals. We chose this structure due to the existence of
Tarski’s quantifier elimination procedure [Tar51], which facilities the computational
results. Although this structure is o-minimal, we chose to change the name of the
model to hybrid automata with strong resets because the strong reset property is
the property that is crucial to establishing our results. Determinacy and existence
of almost optimal controllers hold regardless of the structure chosen.
Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, we consider average-price-per-reward
games, which were not considered before, and we improve the reachability-price
game results by removing the requirement that the price function is positive (as was
required in [BBC07]). Secondly, we introduce a novel equivalence relation, which
does not require o-minimality of the underlying structure. Thirdly, we extensively
use optimality equations, which were not used in this context before.
The equivalence relation, and the results regarding average-price games and
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reachability-price games were first published by Patricia Bouyer-Decitre, Thomas
Brihaye, Marcin Jurdzin´ski, Ranko Lazic´, and myself in the paper titled “Average-
price and reachability-price games on hybrid automata with strong resets” that ap-
peared in the proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Formal Modelling
and Analysis of Timed Systems (FORMATS’08) [BBJ+08]. The results regarding
average-price-per-reward games were first published by Marcin Jurdzin´ski, Ranko
Lazic´ and myself in the paper titled “Average-price-per-rewards games on hybrid
systems with strong resets” in the proceedings of the Tenth International Conference
on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI’09) [JLR09],
and later appeared in the special issue of the International Journal on Software
Tools for Technology Transfer [RLJ10].
1.4 Organisation
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.
In Chapter 2 we provide a technical introduction. Firstly, we formally in-
troduce the notion of definability, which will be used to finitely represent infinite
structures (Section 2.1). Secondly, we introduce the notion of zero-sum games (Sec-
tion 2.2). We consider two forms of representation for such games: strategic form
and graph form (games on transitions systems). Two instances of zero-sum games on
graphs are discussed in more detail: reachability-price and average-price-per-reward
games — these are the games we will be considering in this thesis. In the conclu-
sion of this chapter we formally introduce the notion of hybrid automata and their
transition semantics (Section 2.3). Two classes of hybrid automata are discussed in
more detail: timed automata and hybrid automata with strong resets — the two
classes that we will focus on in this thesis. We also briefly explain how we define
games on hybrid automata.
In Chapter 3 we study turn-based reachability-price games on single-clock
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timed automata. We prove that the reachability-price game problem for this model
is in EXPTIME. This result improves on the result of Bouyer et al. [BLMR06], which
established a triply-exponential algorithm for this problem. The exact complexity
of the problem remains open.
In Chapter 4 we introduce price-reward game graphs and study average-
price-per-reward games on this model. Price-reward game graphs are an extension
of doubly-weighted graphs, where the two weights of an edge, the price and the
reward, are dynamic, i.e., determined by the choices made by both players. We
show that average-price-per-reward games on finite price-reward game graphs are
determined and that almost optimal controllers can be synthesised. In Chapter 5
the problem of solving average-price-per-reward games on hybrid automata with
strong resets will be reduced to the analogous problem on finite price-reward game
graphs.
In Chapter 5 we introduce hybrid automata with strong resets and define
games on this model. Firstly, we introduce average-price-per-reward games and
reachability-price games on hybrid automata with strong resets. Secondly, we prove
that the problem of solving (synthesising controllers for) average-price-per-reward
games and reachability-price games on hybrid systems with strong resets can be
reduced to the analogous problem on finite price-reward game graphs and finite
weighted graphs, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a technical introduction and to put the
results, presented in this thesis, in the broader context of the field. We introduce
concepts such as definability, zero-sum games, and hybrid automata.
Firstly, we introduce means for representing infinite structures — the notion
of logical definability. We also discuss how this concept can be used to obtain
algorithmic results.
Secondly, we introduce zero-sum games, a variant of two-player games. De-
pending on the formalisation of the game play, we have different representations of
zero-sum games. In Section 2.2.1 we formally introduce the concept of zero-sum
games in strategic form, whereas, in Section 2.2.2, we introduce zero-sum games
on graphs. To complete the introduction to zero-sum games on graphs, we discuss
two instances of zero-sum games on graphs, namely average-price-per-reward and
reachability-price games.
Thirdly, in Section 2.3 we formally define hybrid automata and their tran-
sition semantics, and then proceed to discuss two of their subclasses, of interest to
this thesis: hybrid automata with strong resets (Section 2.3.1) and timed automata
(Section 2.3.2). The first subclass is characterised by complex continuous transi-
tions, at the cost of restrictions placed on the discrete ones. The second subclass,
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on the other hand, places little restrictions on discrete transitions, but the continu-
ous transitions are limited to changes to the variable values that occur at a constant
and uniform rate. Finally, in Section 2.3.3 we explain how to define zero-sum games
on hybrid automata using the notion of a game on a transition system.
2.1 Definability and decidability
In this thesis the algorithmic results concern models that have potentially infi-
nite structures. In order to formulate those results we need to have a framework
for representing finitely and reasoning about the infinite structures involved. For
that purpose we are going to use the notion of logical definability. To be more
precise, to represent infinite sets, we are going to use first-order formulae over
M = 〈R, 0, 1,+, ·,6〉, the ordered field of reals (A general reference for first-order
logic is the work of Hodges [Hod97]).
Example 2.1. The intersection of the set [1, 2]2 with the set of points satisfying the
equation y = x2 can be defined using the following formula:
Φ(x, y) = (x 6 2) ∧ (x > 1) ∧ (y 6 2) ∧ (y > 1) ∧ (y = x · x),
where 2 is a shorthand for 1+1, formula a = b can be expressed as (a 6 b)∧(b 6 a),
and the formula a > b can be expressed as ¬(a 6 b) ∨ (a = b).
Definition 2.2 (Definibility). A set X ⊆ Rn is said to be first-order definable (for
short, definable) iff there exists a first-order formula φ(z), with one free variable z,
over the structure M = 〈R, 0, 1,+, ·,6〉 such that x ∈ X iff M |= φ(x).
The first-order theory of M is the set of all first-order sentences that are
true in M. We chose structure M because, by Tarski’s well-known result [Tar51],
its first-order theory is decidable.
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Using definability we can finitely represent sets and relations on real numbers
and hence also real functions. We argue that we can approximate the values of such
functions on rational arguments. We restrict our considerations only to rational
arguments, as they have an obvious finite representation.
Let A be a finite set. We say that (a, x) ∈ A×Rn is rational if x is rational.
This reflects the hybrid nature of the models considered. For instance, a transition
in a hybrid automaton consists of two components: a label drawn from a finite set,
and a duration, which is a real number.
Let us consider a partial function f : X → R which is defined on a set
D ⊆ X ⊆ A × Rn. We can now introduce two key definitions that deal with
computational issues.
Definition 2.3 (Decidable value). Function f : X → R is said to have decidable
value if the following problem is decidable: given rationals x ∈ D and a c ∈ Q,
decide whether f(x) 6 c.
Definition 2.4 (Approximate computability). Function f : X → R is said to be
approximately computable if there exists an algorithm that, for every rational x ∈ D
and every rational ε > 0, computes a y ∈ Q, such that |y − f(x)| < ε.
The following three propositions establish a relation between definability and
computability.
Proposition 2.5. If a real partial function is definable in M, then it has decidable
value.
Proof. Let f : X → R be a partial function which is defined on D ⊆ X. If f is
definable then, for every rational x ∈ D and rational c, f(x) 6 c is a first-order
sentence in M, hence by the result of Tarski [Tar51], we can decide whether it is
true, which leads to decidability of f .
Proposition 2.6. If a function has decidable value then it is approximately com-
putable.
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Proof. If a function has decidable value, we can identify its over and under approx-
imations. Using binary search, we can get arbitrarily close approximations.
Proposition 2.7. If a set X is definable and contains a rational element x, then
some rational element of X can be computed.
Proof. If a set X ⊆ A×Rn is definable, then its characteristic function is definable,
and decidable. The latter follows from Proposition 2.5.
To compute an element of X, it is sufficient to enumerate all rational ele-
ments, and test for containment — decide whether the value of the characteristic
function, of X, is less or equal 1/2. Since the set contains a rational element, the
procedure has to terminate.
The purpose of the above definitions and results is to enable us to state
conclusions of our definability results. They should not be treated as a formalisation
of computation over the reals. For models of computing over the reals, we refer the
reader to [Wei00; MM97; BSS89].
2.2 Zero-sum games
In this section we introduce the concept of zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game there
are two players: Min and Max. The zero-sum name comes from the fact that the
losses of the first player are the second player’s gains, i.e., the sum of both players’
winnings is always zero. The games discussed in this thesis, i.e., reachability-price
and average-price-per-reward games, are zero-sum.
Zero-sum games admit different representations. We start this section by dis-
cussing the strategic-form representation. We formulate the fundamental concepts
such as value of a game, determinacy, and optimal strategies. Further on in the
section, we introduce another representations of zero-sum games, games on transi-
tion systems (see Section 2.2.2). We lift the concepts of game value, determinacy
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and optimal strategies to this new setting. Additionally, in this context we discuss
the notions of optimality equations and strategy improvement algorithms, which
are instrumental to obtaining the results discussed in this thesis. We conclude the
introduction to games transition systems by focusing on average-price-per-reward
and reachability-price games.
Note that although the results presented in this thesis concern games on hy-
brid automata, the notion of a game in strategic form will be important throughout
Chapters 3–5.
2.2.1 Games in strategic form
There are various ways of representing zero-sum games. One of them is to specify
the set of available strategies for each player. A payoff function takes as arguments
two strategies, one for each player, and returns the value of player Max’s payoff, i.e,
his winnings; by negating this value we get the payoff of player Min. This form of
representation is called the strategic form.
Definition 2.8 (Strategic form). A zero-sum game in strategic form is given by
a =
〈
ΣMin,ΣMax,P
〉
, where:
• ΣMin,ΣMax are the sets of strategies for players Min and Max respectively,
• P : ΣMin ×ΣMax → R is the payoff function, i.e. the payoff function of player
Max.
In such a game, the players choose their strategies simultaneously and inde-
pendently. Based on their choices, the payoff function P assigns the payoff. The
objective of player Min is to minimise that value, whereas that of player Max is to
maximise it.
As discussed in Section 2.1 we will use the concept of definability to represent
potentially infinite objects. We say that a is definable if all its components are
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definable. Recall that definability of a component implicitly implies that it is a
subset of Rn.
A fundamental concept for zero-sum games is that of game value. Intuitively,
this is the payoff that both players can guarantee, i.e., player Max can guarantee
that the payoff will be no less then the game value, and player Min can guarantee
that the payoff will not exceed the game value. Not all games have game values. If
a game has a game value then we say that it is determined.
To define the concept of game value formally, we need to introduce some
auxiliary concepts, such as best response, and lower and upper values.
Consider a situation in which player Max declares the strategy that he is
going to play. This reduces the game to a minimisation problem, namely that of
choosing an optimal1 strategy for player Min. Such a strategy (of player Min) will
be referred to as a best response. The value of player Max’s strategy is that of
the payoff when Max plays that strategy, and Min plays a best response. Formally,
given a game a, the value of strategy χ ∈ ΣMax is defined as follows:
Valχ(a) = inf
µ∈ΣMin
P(µ, χ).
Obviously, player Max is interested in declaring a strategy χ ∈ ΣMax that
maximises the strategy value. The value of Max’s optimal strategy is referred to as
the lower value:
Val∗(a) = sup
χ∈ΣMax
Valχ(a) = sup
χ∈ΣMax
inf
µ∈ΣMin
P(µ, χ).
We can interpret the lower value as the guaranteed payoff for player Max, assuming
his rational behaviour.
Similarly, if player Min declares her strategy, we define the value of that
1 In general such strategies do not exist. However, for now we assume that they do exist — this
will aid the clarity of exposition. We will deal with this problem later in this chapter, using the
concept of ε-optimality.
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strategy in terms of player Max’s best response. For a game a and a strategy
µ ∈ ΣMin we define:
Valµ(a) = sup
χ∈ΣMax
P(µ, χ).
The counterpart of the lower value is called the upper value:
Val∗(a) = inf
µ∈ΣMin
Valµ(a) = inf
µ∈ΣMin
sup
χ∈ΣMax
P(µ, χ).
Definition 2.9 (Determinacy). A game a in strategic form is said to be determined
if
Val∗(a) = sup
χ∈ΣMax
inf
µ∈ΣMin
P(µ, χ) = inf
µ∈ΣMin
sup
χ∈ΣMax
P(µ, χ) = Val∗(a).
For a determined game we write Val(a) to denote the value of the game, which is
equal to both its lower and upper values.
Note that Val∗(a) 6 Val∗(a) holds for every game a, so to prove determinacy
one needs to prove the opposite inequality only.
When introducing the lower and upper values, we have assumed the existence
of optimal strategies. This is not always the case; there are two possible reasons:
strategy values diverge to infinity, or strategy values converge but the limit value
is never attained. The games we are considering in this thesis have bounded payoff
functions, hence we need to handle only the latter reason for the non-existence of
optimal strategies. We deal with this problem through the concept of ε-optimality.
Definition 2.10 (ε-optimality). For ε > 0, we say that µ ∈ ΣMin is ε-optimal if
we have that:
Valµ(a) = sup
χ∈ΣMax
P(µ, χ) 6 inf
µ∈ΣMin
sup
χ∈ΣMax
P(µ, χ) + ε = Val∗(a) + ε.
We define ε-optimality of Max’s strategies analogously, that is χ ∈ ΣMax is said to
be ε-optimal if Valχ(a) > Val∗(a)− ε.
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Remark 2.11. There are cases in which the desired payoff function is only partially
defined. To remedy this, a lower
P∗ : ΣMin × ΣMax → R
and an upper
P∗ : ΣMin × ΣMax → R
payoff functions are used. It is required that P∗ 6 P∗. With this generalisation, the
lower (resp. upper) value, and the value of player Max’s (resp. Min’s) strategy are
defined using the lower (resp. upper) payoff.
2.2.2 Games on graphs
We will be considering turn-based games on doubly-weighted labelled transition
systems. A labelled transition system is a (possibly infinite) graph with labels
assigned to edges. In this context, vertices are referred to as states, edges are referred
to as transitions, and the set of edges is referred to as the labelled transition relation.
The two weight functions assign real numbers to every transition, and are referred
to as the price and reward functions.
To define turn-based games on labelled transition systems, we need a notion
of a game graph. We obtain a game graph from a doubly-weighted transition system
by introducing a partitioning of its set of states between the two players, Min and
Max. Intuitively the game is played by moving a token along the transitions, from
one state to another. Every move incurs a price and a reward. The owner of the
state decides along which transition to move the token.
A game graph can be seen as an alternative to the strategic form represen-
tation of a zero-sum game. In this context a payoff function determines how the
prices (rewards) of individual moves contribute to the overall value of a particular
play.
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Transition systems. We will first introduce a doubly-weighted labelled transition
system, then we will explain how to define a game graph, and finally we will define
the notion of a game.
Definition 2.12 (Doubly-weighed labeled transition system). A doubly-weighted
labelled transition system, or simply a transition system, T = 〈S,Λ,−→, pi, ρ〉 con-
sists of the following components:
State space. A (possibly infinite) set S.
Transition relation. A (possibly infinite) set of transition labels Λ and a ternary
transition relation −→ ⊆ S × Λ × S. An element of −→ will be referred to as
a transition, and we will write s λ−→ s′ to denote the transition (s, λ, s′) ∈ −→.
Note that −→ induces a binary relation λ−→ ⊆ S× S for every label λ ∈ Λ.
Weight functions Two weight functions pi, ρ : S × Λ × S → R that assign a real
number to every transition. The functions pi and ρ are referred to as the price
and reward functions.
We say that the transition system T is deterministic if, for every λ ∈ Λ, the binary
relation λ−→ is in fact a partial function λ−→: S→ S.
Remark 2.13. In reachability-price games the reward information is not taken
into account, and hence the ρ function will be omitted from the specification in this
context.
We now briefly recall the standard notions related to transition systems and
their executions, also called as runs. Given a state s, a run of the transition system
from s is a (possibly infinite) sequence of transitions ω = s0
λ1−→ s1 λ2−→ s2 · · · , where
s = s0. If two runs ω = s0
λ1−→ · · · λk−→ sk and ω′ = s′0
λ′1−→ · · · are such that
sk = s′0 then, ωω′ denotes the run s0
λ1−→ · · · λk−→ sk
λ′1−→ · · · . Given a finite run
ω, Len(ω) will denote its length, i.e., the total number of transitions, Last(ω) will
denote the final state of ω, i.e., sLen(ω), and ωn will denote the prefix of ω of length
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n, where n 6 Len(ω). The set of all runs of T is denoted by Runs. The set of all
finite runs of T is denoted by Runsfin. Note that Runsfin ⊆ Runs. We will also
write Runs(s) (Runsfin(s)) to denote the set of all runs (all finite runs) starting in
a state s. Whenever the transition system T is not clear from the context, we will
use a superscript T , e.g., we will write RunsTfin to denote the set of finite runs of the
transition system T .
Given a finite run ω ∈ Runsfin, its price is the accumulated price of all the
transitions, i.e.:
Price(ω) =
Len(ω)∑
i=1
pi(λi),
and its reward is the accumulated reward of all of its transitions, i.e.:
Reward(ω) =
Len(ω)∑
i=1
ρ(λi).
Games. We will now define games on doubly-weighted labelled transition systems,
together with the standard concepts such as strategies and game value. In order to
define the notion of a zero-sum game on a weighted labelled transition system we
need to define a game graph, which is obtained by partitioning of the state space
between the two players, Min and Max. The following definition formalises this
concept.
Definition 2.14 (Doubly-weighted game graph). A doubly-weighted game-graph on
a transition system Γ =
〈T ,SMin, SMax〉 consists of
• a transition system T , and
• a partition of its state space S = SMin ∪ SMax.
A particular game is defined when a payoff function P is provided. The
following definition formalises the concept of a game.
Definition 2.15 (Doubly-weighted game). A doubly-weighted game is a pair 〈Γ,P〉
where:
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• Γ is a doubly-weighted game graph, and
• P : Runs→ R is a payoff function.
We will abuse notation and when the payoff function is clear from the context
we will write Γ to denote the game. In this context, a transition s λ−→ s′ will often
be referred to as a move.
Assumption 2.16. When considering games on transition systems, we will be con-
sidering deterministic weighted labelled transition systems.
The results regarding games on finite transition systems presented in this
section will refer to deterministic transition systems. Games on doubly-weighted
transition systems will be used to define games on single-clock timed automata
(introduced in Chapter 3), which yield deterministic transition systems. Hybrid
automata with strong resets (introduced in Chapter 5) yield transition systems that
are potentially non-deterministic, but in that case the games are defined differently
without referring to the concepts presented here. In this context, the restriction
made in Assumption 2.16 does not apply. We place this restriction because it allows
for simpler definitions, e.g., we rely on this restriction when defining the notion of
a run induced by the players’ strategies.
We now introduce the standard game-related definitions. A strategy of player
Min is a partial function µ : Runsfin → Λ such that for every finite run ω ending in
a state of the player Min, Last(ω)
µ(ω)−−−→ s′. We say that µ, a strategy of player Min,
is positional if for every two runs ω, ω′ ∈ Runsfin, if ω and ω′ end in the same state
then µ(ω) = µ(ω′), i.e., it can be viewed as a function µ : S → Λ. We will write
ΣMin for the set of all strategies of player Min, and ΠMin for the subset of all of her
positional strategies. The sets of strategies of player Max is defined analogously.
Given a run ω′ ending in a state s0, and a pair of strategies σ ∈ ΣMin and
χ ∈ ΣMax, we write Run(ω′, µ, χ) to denote the unique run ω ∈ Runs(s0) satisfying:
if si
λi+1−−−→ si+1 is the (i+1)-th transition (recall that we are considering deterministic
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transition systems only) of ω then µ(ω′ωi) = λi if si ∈ SMin, otherwise, χ(ω′ωi) = λi.
Note that if µ and χ are positional then Run(ω′, µ, χ) = Run(Last(ω′), µ, χ).
Determinacy. We conclude by introducing the concept of game value. Firstly,
we introduce the notion of the value of a game from a state. We do this by defining
a zero-sum game in strategic form (see Section 2.2.1), which is specific for the given
state. Secondly, we introduce the notion of game value as a function that assigns
the value of the state-specific game to every state. Note that the game value is in
fact a partial function from states to reals.
Given a state s, let as =
〈
ΣMin,ΣMax,P(Run(s, ·, ·))〉 be a zero-sum game in
strategic form. We say that the game Γ is determined for state s if as is determined,
i.e., Val∗(as) = Val∗(as), and positionally determined if:
Val(as) = inf
µ∈ΠMin
Valµ(as) = sup
χ∈ΠMax
Valχ(as).
We say that a game Γ is determined if it is determined from every state. For
simplicity, we will write Val(s) rather than Val(as) in this context. Hence, Val can
be viewed as a partial function S→ R.
Definition 2.17 (Game value decidability). We will say that a game Γ is decidable
if the partial function Val : S→ R has decidable value.
In the definition above we have emphasised that Val is a partial function
because Γ does not have to be determined from every state.
Games on finite graphs
We will now focus on games on finite doubly-weighted game graphs. A finite doubly-
weighted game graph is a game graph of a finite doubly-weighted labelled transition
system with the property that every transition label uniquely determines the tran-
sition. This means that, given a state, choosing a transition amounts to choosing
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the next state. Such transition systems are clearly deterministic. In this context we
will be using the term “edge” rather than “transition”.
We start by introducing the definition of a finite doubly-weighted game graph,
and showing how this definition relates to that of a game graph on a doubly-weighted
labelled transition system. Then we proceed to discuss two techniques used in the
context of games on finite doubly-weighed game graphs, which are relevant to this
thesis.
Definition 2.18 (Finite doubly-weighted game graph). A finite double-weighted
game graph, or simply a finite game graph is given by Γ =
〈
SMin, SMax,E, pi, ρ
〉
,
where:
• SMin ∩ SMax = ∅ are the sets of states for players Min and Max respectively,
• 〈SMin ∪ SMax,E〉 is a finite directed graph,
• pi : E→ R is the price function,
• ρ : E→ R is the reward function.
Remark 2.19. If Γ was to be viewed as a doubly-weighed labelled transition system,
then the transition relation could be defined as s
(s,s′)−−−→ s′ for every (s, s′) ∈ E.
The notion of a run is similar to the notion of a run of a doubly-weighted
transition system, with the only difference that there are no labels (they are omitted
as they are redundant). We write s → s′ to denote a move, where e = (s, s′) ∈ E.
The price of the move is pi(e) and the reward is ρ(e). A run is a (possibly infinite)
sequence of moves ω = s0 → s1 → s2 · · · .
The definitions of players’ strategies differ slightly. In this context a strategy,
rather than choosing a label of the next transition, chooses the next edge (transition)
to traverse. Thus, a strategy of player Min is a function µ : Runsfin → E, that is
defined for all finite runs ending in a state s ∈ SMin. A strategy of player Max is
defined similarly. The notions of positional strategies and runs induced by strategies
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naturally follow. Note that this definition is in fact equivalent to the original, but
better reflects the syntax of finite doubly-weighted game graphs (Remark 2.19)
Optimality equations. We want to capture global optimality of player’s strate-
gies using local conditions. For that purpose, we introduce the notion of optimality
equations [Bel57; Ber01], sometimes referred to as Bellman equations. A solution to
these equations can be seen as a witness for existence of positional optimal strategies
for both players.
Optimality equations will be discussed in more detail, later in this section,
in the context of finite average-price-per-reward games and finite reachability-price
games. Below, we present only the basic idea behind the concept. Moreover, we
explain how optimality equations are being used to obtain the results presented in
this thesis.
We say that a function f : S → R is a solution to the optimality equations
for a game Γ, denoted by f |= Opt(Γ), if the following equations are satisfied:
f(s) = min
(s,s′)∈E
expr(s, s′, f(s′)),
for every state s ∈ SMin, and:
f(s) = max
(s,s′)∈E
expr(s, s′, f(s′)),
for every state s ∈ SMax, where expr(s, s′, f(s′)) is an algebraic expression involving
s, s′, and f(s′).
The actual form of expr(s, s′, f(s′)) depends on the game Γ, and needs to be
chosen in such a way that we can formulate and prove a theorem of the following
form:
Given a finite game Γ, if a function f : S → R is such that f |= Opt(Γ)
then Val(s) = f(s) for every s ∈ S.
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The proof of the theorem is typically established by proving the following
two inequalities:
f(s) > Val∗(s)− ε,
f(s) 6 Val∗(s) + ε,
for every s ∈ S and ε > 0. To prove the first inequality we construct a positional
strategy µε for player Min in such a way that for every counter strategy χ we have
P (Run(s, µε, χ)) 6 f(s) + ε for every s ∈ S. The construction is based on the
following principle: in every state s ∈ SMin player Min can choose a state s′ such
that:
f(s) > expr(s, s′, f(s′))− ε,
and if s ∈ SMax, the above inequality holds for all states s′, such that (s, s′) ∈ E.
Similarly, the second inequality is proved by constructing an appropriate strategy
for player Max.
The strategy constructed in the proofs of the inequalities is an ε-optimal
positional strategy for a given player. Notice that a solution to the optimality equa-
tions establishes local optimality constraints, and that the strategy is constructed
in such a way that these constraints are being satisfied. In this sense, the solution
to the optimality equations can be seen as a witness for the existence of ε-optimal
positional strategies for both players.
To summarise, optimality equations will be used as a characterisation of
game values, and their solutions as a witness for existence of ε-optimal positional
strategies. In Chapter 4 we will use this characterisation to prove that certain
games are indeed determined, and in Chapter 5 we will use it to show that a certain
reduction is correct. In the latter case, we will be dealing with a complex and a
simple game. In both cases we will establish an optimality equation characterisation
of game values, and then prove that the solutions to those two sets of optimality
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equations are related to one another.
Strategy improvement. In the previous paragraph we have introduced the con-
cept of optimality equations, and explained how to prove that if a solution to those
equations exists then the game is determined and both players have ε-optimal posi-
tional strategies. We will use the concept of strategy improvement to prove that the
solutions indeed exist. Strategy improvement is a technique that is used to compute
ε-optimal positional strategies by applying local improvements.
We introduce the basic idea behind strategy improvement and its connection
to optimality equations. Furthermore, we explain how it will be used in this thesis.
Strategy improvement will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, in the context
of average-price-per-reward games.
The algorithm relies on two assumptions. First, that in a single player game
we can compute an positional optimal strategy for the distinguished player, i.e.,
given a positional strategy of one player, we can compute a positional best response
strategy for the other player. Second, that when two positional strategies are fixed,
and hence we are dealing with a zero-player game, a solution to the optimality
equations exists.
Given a finite game Γ, a strategy improvement algorithm proceeds according
to the following scheme:
1. Arbitrarily choose a strategy µ ∈ ΠMin.
2. Compute the best response strategy χ ∈ ΠMax.
3. Compute a solution f to the optimality equations Opt(Γµχ). Positional strate-
gies µ and χ induce a sub-game Γµχ, a game in which every state has only one
successor, i.e., the state that is chosen by the relevant strategy.
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4. If for some s ∈ SMin there exists s′ such that (s, s′) ∈ E and
f(s) > expr(s, s′, f(s′)),
then set µ(s) = s′ and go to Step 2, otherwise terminate and output the
functions f , µ, and χ.
Upon termination, the algorithm outputs the solution to the optimality equa-
tions Opt(Γ), i.e., the function f and the ε-optimal positional strategies µ and χ for
players Min and Max, respectively.
In Step 4, we are myopically improving the strategy of player Min. We are
using the solution to the optimality equations for the zero-player game as an indi-
cator of where the improvement should be made. The strategy χ is a best response
strategy of player Max to µ, a strategy of player Min. Therefore, the solution f to
Opt(Γµχ) is such that for every s ∈ SMax, we have f(s) > expr(s, χ(s), f(χ(s)))− ε.
If this was not true, we would have a contradiction to the fact that χ is a best
response, since f is a witness to the existence of an ε-optimal positional strategy.
If no improvement is possible then µ, and hence χ, are ε-optimal. Moreover,
they are exactly the kind of strategies that would have been construed in the proof of
the theorem that establishes that optimality equations characterise the game values,
as discussed in the previous paragraph.
Given a strategy µ of player Min and a strategy χ, the best response of
player Max, the solution to Opt(Γµχ) can be seen as a valuation of strategy µ in
every state. The sets of positional strategies for both players are finite. To prove
termination of the strategy improvement algorithm it suffices to prove that after
every iteration of the strategy improvement algorithm the new strategy of player
Min in every state has a valuation that is not higher than the valuation of the
previous strategy. Formally, to establish termination and correctness of a strategy
improvement algorithm, it suffices to prove a theorem of the following type:
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Let µ be a positional strategy of player Min, let χ be a positional best
response strategy of player Max, and let f be a solution to the optimality
equations for the zero-player game induced by those strategies. If µ′ is
an improvement of µ, as described in Step 4, χ′ is the respective best
response, and f ′ is the respective solution to the optimality equations,
then the following holds for all s ∈ S:
f ′(s) 6 f(s)
and the inequality is strict for some s ∈ S.
In Chapter 4 strategy improvement, together with optimality equations, will
be used to prove determinacy of average-price-per-reward games on an extension of
the finite doubly-weighted game graphs.
Average-price-per-reward games
In this section we introduce average-price-per-reward games on doubly-weighted
labelled transition systems. We will focus on a variant of those games, referred to as
finite average-price-per-reward games, which are played on finite game graphs. We
will provide a characterisation of game values using a set of equations, referred to as
average-price-per-reward optimality equations. The aim of this section is to provide
the intuition for average-price-per-reward games, and why average-price-per-reward
optimality equations indeed characterise game values. This intuition will be helpful
when presenting the results in Chapters 4–5.
An average-price-per-reward game is played on a game graph Γ. In the
reminder of this section we will abuse the notation, as explained earlier, and simply
write Γ without specifying the payoff functions, to denote the average-price-per-
reward game.
The goal of player Min in an average-price-per-reward game Γ is to minimise
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the average price-over-reward ratio in a run, and the goal of player Max is to max-
imise it. As explained in Chapter 1, average-price-per-reward games are used in the
context of recurrent-behaviour optimisation.
We define the upper and lower payoff functions in the following way:
A∗(ω) = lim sup
n→∞
Price(ωn)
Reward(ωn)
and
A∗(ω) = lim inf
n→∞
Price(ωn)
Reward(ωn)
Note that A∗ 6 A∗, as required in Remark 2.11, where the concept of upper and
lower payoffs is discussed.
Remark 2.20. For the lower and upper average-price-per-reward payoffs to be well
defined, the reward function has to be such that for every infinite run, only finitely
many of its finite prefixes admit a zero reward. For the rest of this section, we
implicitly assume that this is the case. One way of assuring that this condition is
satisfied is to require that the reward function attains positive values only.
Example 2.21 illustrates that we need to resort to lower and upper payoff
functions to properly define an average-price-per-reward game. This is not a prob-
lem, as strategy and game values for a state of Γ are defined using the framework
of zero-sum games in strategic form.
Example 2.21. Let us consider a very simple game graph consisting of one state
belonging to player Max and two edges. One of these edges bears a price of 0, and
the other one the price of 1; both edges bear a reward of 1.
If we use the average-price-per-reward payoff functions, as introduced in this
section, and consider an infinite run ω of the form (we only highlight the prices of
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the subsequent moves):
10︸︷︷︸
2·20
1100︸︷︷︸
2·21
11110000︸ ︷︷ ︸
2·22
. . .
one can see, after a brief calculation, that A∗(ω) = 1/2 which is not equal to A∗(ω) =
2/3. Namely, if we consider subsequences of ω that end on the last 0, just before
a 1, their price-per-reward ratio is equal to 12 — this gives us the value of A∗(ω).
Conversely, we obtain the value of A∗(ω) by considering subsequences of ω that end
on the last 1, just before a 0, whose price-per-reward ration converges to 23 . In
particular, this proves that a single payoff function is not sufficient.
The following example should help establish an intuition behind average-
price-per-reward games.
Example 2.22. Figure 2.1 illustrates a game graph that models a simple production
process. At the start of each production cycle, the manager faces two choices. He
can either proceed to produce immediately, or choose to first store electricity, in case
of an emergency.
Production costs 8, and storing incurs an additional cost of 4. After the
production process has ended, the factory proceeds to sell the produced goods, which
results in a reward. Unfortunately, the heavy use of the electricity generator, during
the production phase, makes it prone to failures. If no failure occurs then the reward
is 32, and it is 24 if the manager decided to store electricity. If a failure does
occur, then the rewards are 24 in both cases. Storing electricity, or a failure when
no electricity was stored, result in the goods being delivered late, hence the lower
reward. Repairs costs 8, and if there is no stored electricity then it has to be bought
at a premium of 8.
The states in which the manager makes a choice are assigned to the Min
player (denoted using circles). Remaining states, which are not controllable by the
manager, model the adversarial environment and are assigned to player Max (de-
noted by squares).
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OK Failure
Store 12
5
6
Produce 14 1
Table 2.1: Price-per-reward ratios for a single production cycle of Figure 2.1.
Consider a single production cycle starting in the “Start” state. Lets assume
that the manager decides to proceed to the “Store” state, and that a failure occurs,
modelled by the environment choosing to go to the “Repair” state. After the five
steps, when the process has finished, the price-per-reward ratio is:
4 + 8 + 8
24
=
20
24
=
5
6
.
Table 2.1 summarises all achievable price-per-reward ratios of one production cycle.
One can see that, although choosing to produce immediately may result in the lowest
ratio, choosing to store first is better in the worst case.
In fact, if from every state the players play indefinitely and optimally, the
price-per-reward average will converge to 5/6. This means that 5/6 is the value of
the average-price-per-reward game in every state.
Optimality equations for finite average-price-per-reward games. We now
introduce optimality equations that characterise the values of average-price-per-
reward games on finite game graphs, and discuss methods for computing their solu-
tions. This formulation differs from that seen earlier in this section, where we used
a simpler form to assure a clearer exposition of the concept.
Consider two functions G,B : S→ R. We will refer to these functions as gain
and bias respectively. We will formulate a special set of equations, called average-
price-per-reward optimality equations, which will have the property that if gain and
bias functions satisfy those equations, then G(s) = Val(s) for all s ∈ S.
As explained earlier, optimality equations can be seen as a characterisation of
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Start
Store Produce
Produce
Sale
Sale
Repair
4 8
8
32
24
8
8
24
24
Figure 2.1: A simplified game graph that models a production process in a factory.
Each edge has a price (written above the edge) and a reward (written below the
edge); we have omitted those that are equal to zero. Circular vertices belong to
player Min; the remaining vertices belong to player Max.
game values, and their solutions, if they exist, as witnesses to existence of positional
optimal strategies for both players. Variants of these equations were used in the
setting of discounted Markov decision processes [Put94], concurrent average-price
games [FV97], and hybrid average-price-per-reward games [RLJ10].
Let G,B : S → R. We say that a pair of functions (G,B) is a solu-
tion of average-price-per-reward optimality equations for Γ, denoted by (G,B) |=
OptAvgPR(Γ), if the following conditions hold for all states s ∈ SMin:
G(s) = min{G(s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E}, (2.1)
B(s) = min{pi((s, s′))− ρ((s, s′)) ·G(s) +B(s′) :
(s, s′) ∈ E and G(s) = G(s′)}, (2.2)
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and for all states s ∈ SMax:
G(s) = max{G(s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E}, (2.3)
B(s) = max{pi((s, s′))− ρ((s, s′)) ·G(s) +B(s′) :
(s, s′) ∈ E and G(s) = G(s′)}. (2.4)
The following example aims to establish an intuition behind the optimality
equations.
Example 2.23. Recall Example 2.22 and the production model it introduced. Fig-
ure 2.2 depicts the same model together with the solution to the optimality equations.
Each state has been annotated with its bias, and the gain for every state is 56 .
Consider restricting the model to the following cycle “Start”, “Store”, “Pro-
duce”, “Sale”, “Repair”, and “Start” again. The average price-per-reward of this
cycle is 56 . If we formulate the optimality equations for this simple model, then the
gain of every state has to be equal — this is because the states are on a cycle. If we
denote its value by g, then bias equations have the following form:
B(Start) = 4− 0 · g +B(Store)
B(Store) = 8− 0 · g +B(Produce)
B(Produce) = 0− 0 · g +B(Sale)
B(Sale) = 0− 24 · g +B(Repair)
B(Repair) = 8− 0 · g +B(Start)
After summing up the five equalities, we obtain the following:
4 + 8 + 8
24
=
5
6
= g.
Indeed the gain of each state coincides with the value of the average-price-per-reward
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Start
Store Produce
Produce
Sale
Sale
Repair
4 8
8
32
24
8
8
24
24
0 = 4− 0 · 56 − 4
8− 0 · 56 + 0 = 8
0− 24 · 56 + 8 = −12
0− 0 · 56 − 12 = −12
8− 0 · 56 − 12 = −4
8− 24 · 56 + 8 = −8
0 + 0 · 56 − 8 = 8
Figure 2.2: Production model from Figure 2.1. Each state is annotated with the
value of its bias, under the assumption that the gain of all vertices is 56 . Bias of a
state is computed based on the bias of the successor state. When choice of successors
was available, the solid line highlights the choice made.
game from that state.
Note that the solution to the optimality equations is not necessarily unique,
however, the gain of each state is uniquely determined. The one depicted in Fig-
ure 2.2 was obtained by arbitrarily setting the bias of the “Start” state to 0.
The following theorem formally establishes the properties of optimality equa-
tions for average-price-per reward games.
Theorem 2.24. If (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ) then for every state s, the finite average-
price-per-reward game Γ from s is determined and we have Val(s) = G(s). Moreover,
positional optimal strategies exist for both players.
A more general formulation of this theorem, together with the proof, can be
found in Section 4.1.2.
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Average-price games are a special case of average-price-per-reward games,
where a reward of each edge is equal to 1 for every edge. In average-price games,
we are optimising the average price of a move.
The problem of computing the game values for finite average-price games
has been extensively studied in the literature [FV97; ZP96; BV07], and strategy
improvement algorithms have been proposed [Put94; FV97; BV07]. The complexity
lies in the intersection of NP and coNP; pseudo-polynomial [FV97] and strongly sub-
exponential [BV07] algorithms exist. These algorithms can be used to compute the
solutions to the average-price optimality equations, and can be adapted to compute
the solutions to average-price-per-reward optimality equations. A detailed algorithm
description can be found in Section 4.2.
Reachability-price games
In this section, we introduce reachability-price games on weighted labelled transition
systems — in this setting we disregard the reward information. We will focus on
a variant of those games, referred to as finite reachability-price games, which are
played on finite game graphs. We will provide a characterisation of game values
using a set of equations, referred to as reachability-price optimality equations. The
aim of this section is to provide the intuition for reachability-price games, and to
explain why reachability-price optimality equations indeed characterise game values.
This intuition will be helpful when presenting the results in Chapter 5.
A reachability-price game is played on a game graph Γ (be it a finite game
graph, or a game graph defined on a weighted labelled transition system). In this
section, we once again abuse the notation and simply write Γ, without specifying the
payoff functions, to denote a reachability-price game. As explained in Remark 2.13,
in the context of reachability-price games we disregard the reward information of Γ.
In a reachability-price game, player Min wants to assure that a state in a
certain designated set of goal states is reached, whereas player Max wants to prevent
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it from happening. If player Min can guarantee that a goal state is reached, then he
wants to minimise the total cost of doing so; player Max, on the other hand, wants
to maximise it. In contrast to average-price-per-reward games, reachability-price
games are used in the context of optimising a single execution of a system.
A reachability-price game (Γ,F) consists of a finite game graph Γ and a set
of final states F ⊆ S. For a run ω ∈ Runs, we define:
Stop(ω) = inf
n
{sn : sn ∈ F},
i.e., the index of the first state along the run ω that belongs to one of the goal
states. This allows us to complete the definition a of a game, by introducing the
reachability-price payoff function that is defined as follows:
P(ω) =

Price(ωStop(ω)) if Stop(ω) <∞,
∞ otherwise.
The following example should establish an intuition behind the reachability-
price games.
Example 2.25. Figure 2.3 represents a simple model of a production process. In
contrast to Example 2.22, we are focusing on modelling a single execution rather
than recurring behaviour.
As in Example 2.22, the production process starts in the “Start” state, and
the manager faces two choices. He can either proceed to produce immediately, or
choose to first store electricity, in case of an emergency. When the production has
finished, the manager may be allowed to sell immediately, or the electricity generator
can fail. If no electricity has been stored, the manager has no emergency power to
pack the products, and can not sell in time — the production process ends in total
failure. If, on the other hand, the manager decided to store electricity, he manages
to pack the products and deliver them on time. He does, however, incur an extra
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OK Failure Invent
Store −12 −4 −∞
Produce −24 +∞ —
Table 2.2: Costs of reaching the “Sale” state from the “Start” state in the game
graph of Figure 2.3.
cost related to repairing the generator. There is a third possible outcome of the
production stage. If the manager decided to store electricity and no failure occurred,
the stored electricity can miraculously shortcircut the production system, so that it
“invents” and assembles a “golden-egg-laying hen”. If that happens, the manager
can choose to capitalise on this “invention”, for as long as he chooses too, before
deciding to sell. The ultimate goal of the manager is to sell the produced goods,
and if this is possible, to minimise the price of doing so. The “prices” of individual
steps are shown in Figure 2.3. Positive prices correspond to expenditure, whereas
the negative ones to income.
Consider the possible production scenarios starting in the “Start” state. Ta-
ble 2.25 summarises the cost of reaching “Sale” state depending on the choices of
both players.
Notice that −∞ as a value of a strategy, denotes the fact that player Min can
ensure an arbitrarily negative payoff. The actual value is not attainable. If player
Min chose to stay forever in the “Invent” state, the resulting play would never visit
the designated goal location, and hence the payoff would be +∞.
Optimality equations for finite reachability-price games. We introduce op-
timality equations for finite reachability-price games, which characterise values of
reachability-price games on finite game graphs, and discuss methods for computing
their solutions. This formulation differs from that seen earlier in this section, where
we used a simpler form, to assure a clearer exposition of the concept.
Consider two functions P : S → R and D : S → N. We will refer to
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Start
Store Produce
Produce Sale
Repair4
8
8
Failure
Total
Failure
−24
Invent
−1
40
−32
8
-24
-24
Figure 2.3: A simple game graph that models a single iteration of a production
process. The production process starts in the “Start” state, and if all goes well,
finishes in the “Sale” state. Edges are annotated with their prices, unless it is equal
to zero; the rewards have been omitted. Circle states belong to player Min, and the
remaining states belong to player Max. The “Sale” state is the goal state only.
these functions as price and distance, respectively. We will formulate a special
set of equations, called reachability-price optimality equations, which will have the
property that if price and distance functions satisfy those equations, then P (s) =
Val(s) for all s ∈ S.
Let P : S → R and D : S → N. We say that (P,D) is a solution of
the reachability-price optimality equations for (Γ,F), which is denoted by (P,D) |=
OptReach(Γ,F), if the following conditions hold for all states s ∈ S. If s ∈ F then
P (v) = D(v) = 0; if s ∈ SMin \ F then:
P (s) = min
{
pi(s, s′) + P (s′) and (s, s′) ∈ E
}
,
D(s) = min
{
1 +D(s′) : P (s) = pi(s, s′) + P (s′) and (s, s′) ∈ E
}
;
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and if s ∈ SMax \ F then:
P (s) = max
{
pi(s, s′) + P (s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E
}
,
D(s) = max
{
1 +D(s′) : P (s) = pi(s, s′) + P (s′) and (s, s′) ∈ E
}
;
Intuitively, in the equations above P (s) and D(s) capture “optimal price to reach
a final state” and “optimal number of steps to reach a final state with optimal price”
from state s ∈ S, respectively. The distance equation, which is not strictly necessary
for capturing the “optimal price to reach a final state”, will be used to construct
almost optimal strategies for both players.
As shown in Example 2.25, in a reachability-price game some states do not
admit finite values. The value of negative infinity means that player Min can guar-
antee an arbitrarily small payoff, whereas the value of positive infinity means that
player Max can prevent player Min from reaching a goal state. The reachability-
price optimality equations, however, are applicable to the states that admit finite
values only. To address this problem, we explain how to determine which states do
not admit finite values, and how to restrict the game (Γ,F) to the states that do.
Firstly, we need to determine the set of non-goal states from which player
Max can prevent reaching goal. We will denote this set by WMax ⊆ S. In order to
compute WMax, one has to compute the winning set of player Max in a reachability-
game, which can can be easily done in time O(|S|+ |E|) for a finite game graph Γ.
Secondly, we need to determine the set of non-goal states from which player
Min can guarantee reaching a goal state, and at the same time can guarantee a
negative value in an average-price game. We will denote this set by WMin ⊆ S \
WMax. We can compute WMin by first removing all states in WMax from Γ, and
then computing the values of an average-price-per-reward game on modified Γ.
It is easy to argue that for all s ∈ WMax, we have Val(s) = +∞, and for all
s ∈ WMin we have Val(s) = −∞. In the first case, by definition of WMax, player
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Max can guarantee that no run from s ever visits a goal state. In the second case,
the definition of WMin implies that a family of cycles with a negative total cost is
reachable from s. Moreover, player Min can ensure that a cycle in this family is
reached and traversed, and that a goal state is reachable form every state on that
cycle. Given an arbitrary negative number, in order to assure that the payoff of a
run does not exceed it, player Min needs to enforce sufficiently many visits to the
aforementioned cycles, and then proceed to the goal state. Notice that, in this case
positional strategies are not sufficient. Namely, the strategy needs history to know
that the cycle was visited sufficiently many times, and that now it should proceed
to the goal state.
The following example should establish the intuition behind the sets WMax
and WMin, and the reachability-price optimality equations.
Example 2.26. Figure 2.4 depicts the game graph that was seen in Example 2.25.
The “Produce” and “Total Failure” states in the lower part of the game graph
have been marked as belonging to the WMax set. Indeed, from those states player
Max has a strategy that results in a play that never visits the designated goal location.
The “Invent” state is in the WMin set. If player Min chooses a strategy that
always re-enters the “Invent” state, she will be able to achieve a negative average-
price of an infinite play that starts in this state. Notice that being able to achieve a
negative average-price and to guarantee reaching the designated goal state coincides
with the ability of player Min to reach the designated goal state at an arbitrarily
small cost.
The “Start” state belongs to S \ (WMax ∪WMin). We will see that the opti-
mality equations indeed characterise the game values. Figure 2.4 gives the values of
the price and distance functions, P and D respectively, which are a solution to the
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reachability-price optimality equations. The following equalities hold for P :
P (“Start”) = 4 + P (“Store”),
P (“Store”) = 8 + P (“Produce”),
P (“Produce”) = P (“Failure”),
P (“Failure”) = P (“Repair”),
P (“Repair”) = −24 + P (“Sale”),
P (“Sale”) = 0
and the following hold for D:
D(“Start”) = 1 +D(“Store”),
D(“Store”) = 1 +D(“Produce”),
D(“Produce”) = 1 +D(“Failure”),
D(“Failure”) = 1 +D(“Repair”),
D(“Repair”) = 1 +D(“Sale”).
D(“Sale”) = 0
If we add up, and simplify the equalities we will see that P (“Start”) = −4 and
D(“Start”) = 5. Moreover, recall that according to Table 2.25 this value is at-
tained when player Min chooses “Store” in the “Start” state and player Max chooses
“Failure” in the “Produce” state. Notice that this coincides with the fact that
P (“Start”) = P (“Store”) and P (“Produce”) = P (“Failure”) (when augmented with
+1 on the left hand side, the same equalities hold for D).
Let Sfin = S \ (WMax ∪ WMin) and let Γfin be the weighted game graph
obtained from Γ by restricting to the set of states Sfin. The following theorem
establishes that reachability-price optimality equations characterise the values of a
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Figure 2.4: The game graph of Figure 2.3. The states are partitioned into the sets
WMax, WMin, and S \ (WMax ∪WMin). The states in the S \ (WMax ∪WMin) are
annotated with the values of the P and D functions, which satisfy the reachability-
price optimality equations.
61
reachability-price game (Γfin,F).
Theorem 2.27. For every finite game graph Γ, there is a pair of functions P :
Sfin → R and D : Sfin → N, such that (P,D) |= OptReach(Γfin,F), and for every state
s ∈ Sfin, the reachability-price game Γ from s is determined and Val(s) = P (s).
A more general formulation of this theorem, together with the proof, can be
found in Section 5.1.2. Strategy improvement algorithms [Put94; FV97; JT07] can
be used to compute the solutions to the reachability-price optimality equations.
2.3 Hybrid automata
The purpose of this section is to introduce hybrid automata and their semantics.
This background will be used to informally define the hybrid automata related
concepts that are of interest to this thesis: hybrid-automata with strong resets,
timed automata, and hybrid games.
Hybrid automata, an extension of finite automata, are a formalism for mod-
elling hybrid systems. The discrete component of the system is modelled by a finite
control graph, whereas the continuous one is modelled by a set of continuous vari-
ables. The changes to the continuous variable values are governed by a flow function,
which in turn depends on the state of the control graph. The state of the hybrid
automaton comprises of the state of the underlying control graph and the values of
the continuous variables.
Firstly, we introduce the general definition of a hybrid automaton and its
semantics, and show a simple example. Secondly, we proceed to introduce the two
subclasses of hybrid automata: hybrid automata with strong resets (Section 2.3.1)
and timed automata (Section 2.3.2) that will be considered in this thesis. The
former class admits complex continuous dynamics at the cost of strong assumptions
on the discrete changes, and the latter captures only simple continuous behaviours
but does not place such strong restriction on the discrete changes. We conclude this
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section with an introduction to games on hybrid automata (Section 2.3.3).
We will now present the classical definition of a hybrid automaton and its
semantics, as found in the literature [Hen96]. Our definition differs slightly from the
one broadly used, as we do not distinguish initial states, and we do not assign labels
to control actions. These elements have been omitted since they are not important
for our considerations.
Definition 2.28 (Hybrid Automaton). A hybrid automaton H consists of:
Continuous variables A finite set X = {x1, . . . , xn} of real-valued variables. The
number n is called the dimension of H. The set X˙ = {x˙1, . . . , x˙n} denotes the
set of first derivatives of elements of X during the continuous change. Finally,
we write X′ for the set {x′1, . . . , x′n} of primed variables, which represent values
at the conclusion of a discrete change.
Control graph A finite directed graph (L,A). The locations in L are called control
modes. The actions in A are called control actions.
Invariant and flow conditions Two vertex-labelling functions inv and flow that
assign to each control mode l ∈ L two predicates. Each invariant condition
inv(l) is a predicate whose free variables are from X. Each flow condition
flow(l) is a predicate whose free variables are from X ∪ X˙.
Jump conditions An action-labelling function jump that assigns to each control
switch a ∈ A a predicate. Each jump condition jump(a) is a predicate whose
free variables are from X ∪ X′.
The following example illustrates the definition of a hybrid automaton.
Example 2.29. Recall the example of a boiler with a thermostat that was introduced
in the beginning of Section 1.1. The physical properties of the boiler are as follows:
the water never freezes, and the heater can not heat the water above 86.4◦C. For the
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sake of simplicity, we approximate the heating and cooling behaviour of the boiler,
as shown in Figure 1.2, using quadratic functions.
The function h : R>0 → R>0 captures how the temperature changes over
time:
h(t) =

− 6·t21000 + 36·t25 if t 6 120,
86.4 if t > 120.
If the boiler is in the cooling mode and the temperature of the water is 86.4◦C then it
takes just over 48 hours, i.e., 2800 minutes, for it to cool down to 0◦C. The function
c : R>0 → R>0 captures how the temperature changes over time:
c(t) =

− 27·t2245000 + 54·t175 + 86.4 if t 6 2800,
0 if t > 2800.
We will now show how to model this simple hybrid system using hybrid au-
tomata. We will use a single automaton that has two control locations that model
the two modes of operation, and one continuous variable that models the tempera-
ture. The control actions will correspond to changes in the mode of operation. The
automaton is defined as follows:
• X = {x} is the finite set of real-valued variables. It contains a single variable
(temperature).
• 〈L,A〉 is the control graph. There are two control locations {ON,OFF}, and
two control actions {(ON,OFF), (OFF,ON)}. The control locations corre-
spond to the modes of operation, i.e., heating and cooling, respectively. The
control actions correspond to the changes of operation mode, i.e., switching off
and switching on, respectively.
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ON OFF
x = 86.4
x = 50
0 6 x 6 86.4 0 6 x 6 86.4
Figure 2.5: Hybrid automaton that models the boiler.
• The invariant condition is given as:
inv(ON) = inv(OFF) = 0 6 x 6 86.4.
It ensures that the physical properties of the boiler are taken into account.
• The flow conditions are defined as follows:
flow(ON)(x, x˙) =
(∃t.x = h(t) ∧ x˙ = h′(t)) ,
flow(OFF)(x, x˙) =
(∃t.x = c(t) ∧ x˙ = c′(t)) ,
where the functions h and c are defined as in the beginning of this example.
The flow conditions capture the changes to the water temperature.
• The jump condition is given as:
jump((ON,OFF)) =
(
x = 86.4 ∧ x = x′) ,
and
jump((OFF,ON)) =
(
x = 50 ∧ x = x′) .
The jump conditions capture the changes to the boiler’s mode of operation.
Figure 2.5 depicts the hybrid automaton we have just defined.
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The semantics of a hybrid automaton will be given in terms of a doubly-
weighted labelled transition system (see Definition 2.12). The state of the transition
system will consist of the current control location and the current valuation of
the real-valued variables. There will be two types of transitions: continuous and
discrete. A continuous transition results in a change of the valuation of the real-
valued variables, and a discrete transition results in a change of the current control
location. The admissible continuous transitions are specified by the flow and inv
conditions, and the admissible discrete transitions are specified by the jump and
inv predicates. An execution of a hybrid automaton H is modelled by a run of its
transition system TH. When talking about behaviours of a hybrid automaton, we
will, in fact, be referring to the behaviours of its transition system. In particular, we
will often refer to a state of a hybrid automaton, or to a run of a hybrid automaton,
but in fact we will be referring to its transition system.
Remark 2.30. We will write T = R>0 to denote the set of all time durations, when
referring to the duration of a continuous transition.
Definition 2.31 (Transition semantics of hybrid automata). The transition seman-
tics of a hybrid automaton H is given by a labelled transition system TH consisting
of:
• the set of states SH ⊆ L× Rn such that: (`, x) ∈ SH iff inv(`)[X := x] is true.
• the set of transition labels ΛH ⊆ A ∪ T, and the transition relation defined as
follows:
Continuous transition for every t ∈ T, there is a transition (`, x) t−→ (`′, x′)
iff ` = `′ and there is a differentiable function f : [0, t] → Rn, with the
first derivative f˙ : (0, t)→ Rn, such that (1) f(0) = x and f(t) = x′, and
(2) for all t′ ∈ (0, t) both inv(`)[X := f(t′)] and flow(`)[X, X˙ := f(t′), f˙(t′)]
are true. The function f will be referred to as a witness to the transition
(`, x) t−→ (`′, x′).
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Discrete transition for every a ∈ A, there is a transition (`, x) a−→ (`′, x′)
iff there is a control action (`, `′) ∈ A such that jump(a)[X,X′ := x, x′] is
true.
Remark 2.32. In Definition 2.31 we have omitted the definition of the two weight
functions, which are an integral part of a doubly-weighted labelled transition sys-
tem. The definition of these function will vary, depending on the subclass of hybrid
automata considered, and the purpose of Definition 2.31 was to give a preliminary
understanding. In Chapters 3 and 5, the definitions of those functions will be pro-
vided.
Remark 2.33. We only allow runs that admit only finitely many consecutive timed
transitions. Note that this requirement does not exclude Zeno runs, i.e., runs that
admit infinitely many discrete transitions, but are of finite duration.
The following example will show how, given a hybrid automaton, to construct
its transition system.
Example 2.34. Given the hybrid automaton from Example 2.29, which models a
boiler, we will construct its transition system. Lets assume that: the reward of all
transitions is zero; the price of discrete transitions is zero; the cost of heating is
10 cents per minute, i.e., linear in time; the cost of cooling is zero. If functions
h, c : T → R are defined as in Example 2.29, then the transition system is defined
as follows.
• The state space is equal to S = {ON,OFF} × [0, 86.4].
• The set of transition labels is equal to Λ = {(ON,OFF), (OFF,ON)}∪T. The
transition relation is defined as follows.
Continuous transition. Given t ∈ T, a continuous transition (ON, x1) t−→
(OFF, x2) is feasible if (ON, x1), (ON, x2) ∈ S, and there exists t1 ∈ T
such that h(t1) = x1 and h(t1 + t) = x2. If this is the case, then the
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function f : [0, t]→ R, the requested witness to the transition, is given as
f(t′) = h(t1 + t′); f is differentiable over (0, t) because h is differentiable
over its whole domain.
Given t ∈ T, a continuous transition (OFF, x1) t−→ (OFF, x2) is feasible
if (OFF, x1), (OFF, x2) ∈ S, and there exists t1 ∈ T such that c(t1) = x1
and c(t1 + t) = x2. If this is the case, then the function f : [0, t] → R,
the requested witness to the transition, is given as f(t′) = c(t1 + t′); f is
differentiable over (0, t) because c is differentiable over its whole domain.
Discrete transition. There are only two feasible discrete transitions. These
are:
(ON, 86.4)
(ON,OFF)−−−−−−→ (OFF, 86.4) and (OFF, 50) (OFF,ON)−−−−−−→ (ON, 50).
• For every transition s λ−→ s′ the price function is defined as
pi(s, λ, s′) =

10 · λ if s = (ON, x) and λ ∈ T
0 otherwise.
and the reward function is defined as ρ(s, λ, s′) = 0.
Consider the state s = (ON, 0), a possible run from that state could look like this:
(ON, 0) 30−→ (ON, 37.8) 90−→ (ON, 86.4) (ON,OFF)−−−−−−→ (OFF, 86.4) 670−−→
(OFF, 50)
(OFF,ON)−−−−−−→ (ON, 50) 78−→ (ON, 86.4) · · ·
In case of the first continuous transition, the requested t1 is equal to 0, and the
witness is exactly the h function introduced in Example 2.29. In case of the second
continuous transition, the requested t1 is equal to 30, and the witness is f(t′) =
h(t′+30). For example, the prices of the first and second transitions are 10·30 = 300
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and 90 · 10 = 900, respectively, but the prices of the third and fourth transitions are
equal 0.
2.3.1 Hybrid automata with strong resets
Hybrid automata with strong resets are a subclass of hybrid automata [LPS00;
BM05; BBC09]. The name comes from the strong assumption on the definition
of the jump predicate. Although complex flow predicates are allowed, a discrete
transition results in the values of all continuous variables being non-deterministically
“reset”.
Suppose that the hybrid automatonH has the property that, for all actions a,
the values of x, x′ ∈ Rn satisfying the predicate jump(a) are mutually independent,
and depend only on a. More formally, for every edge a, there exist two sets G(a) ⊆
Rn and R(a) ⊆ Rn such that, jump(a)[X,X′ := x, x′] is true iff x ∈ G(a) and
x′ ∈ R(a). The two sets are referred to as the guard and reset sets of an edge,
respectively, the property is referred to as the strong resets property, and a hybrid
automaton satisfying it is referred to as a hybrid automaton with strong resets.
We now define hybrid automata with strong resets. In this section we present
the classical definition so that the reader can clearly see how the class of hybrid au-
tomata with strong resets relates to other classes of hybrid automata. In Chapter 5
we will provide a less typical definition. The definition presented there has been tai-
lored to allow for cleaner exposition of our results. This is achieved through “hiding”
the flow condition of the automaton in the definition of the guard predicates.
Definition 2.35 (Hybrid automaton with strong resets). An automaton with strong
resets H consists of the following components:
• X is the finite set of real-valued variables,
• (L,A) is the finite control graph,
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• flow and inv are two-location labelling functions that assign to each control
location a predicate whose free variables are from X ∪ X˙ and X, respectively.
• G and R are two action-labelling functions that assign to each control action
two predicates whose free variables are in from X and X′ respectively.
The semantics for a hybrid automaton with strong resets is given in terms of a
doubly-weighted transition system. The transition system differs from the transition
system of the general hybrid automaton in the way discrete transitions are defined.
As we have done before, we omit the specification of the price and reward functions.
The details of how these functions are defined can be found in Chapter 5.
Definition 2.36 (Transition semantics of hybrid automata with strong resets). The
transition semantics of a hybrid automaton with strong resets H is given by a labelled
transition system TH, consisting of:
• the set of states SH ⊆ L× Rn such that: (`, x) ∈ S iff inv(`)[X := x] is true.
• the set of transition labels ΛH ⊆ A ∪ T, and the transition relation defined as
follows:
Continuous transition for every t ∈ T, there is a transition (`, x) t−→ (`′, x′)
iff ` = `′ and there is a differentiable function f : [0, t]→ Rn with the first
derivative f˙ : (0, t)→ Rn, such that (1) f(0) = x and f(t) = x′, and (2)
for all t′ ∈ (0, t) both inv(`)[X := f(t′)] and flow(`)[X, X˙ := f(t′), f˙(t′)]
are true. The function f will be referred to as a witness to the transition
(`, x) t−→ (`′, x′).
Discrete transition for every a ∈ A, there is a transition (`, x) a−→ (`′, x′) iff
there is a control action (`, `′) ∈ A such that G(a)[X := x] and R(a)[X′ :=
x′] are true.
The following example illustrates the definition of hybrid automata with
strong resets.
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Example 2.37. We will now show how to model the boiler, introduced in Exam-
ple 2.29, using hybrid automata with strong resets. The key difference, with respect
to the automaton defined in Example 2.29, will be in the definition of the jump pred-
icate. Instead of the jump predicate we will be using the aforementioned G and R
sets. The sets are defined as follows:
• For the control action (ON,OFF) the guard and reset sets are equal to:
G((ON,OFF)) = {86.4} and R((ON,OFF)) = {86.4},
respectively.
• For the control action (OFF,ON) the guard and reset sets are equal to:
G((OFF,ON)) = {50} and R((OFF,ON)) = {50},
respectively. The guard and reset sets specify the jump condition of the classical
hybrid automaton. It would have been defined as jump(a)[X,X′ := x, x′] iff
x ∈ G(a) and x′ ∈ R(a).
Figure 2.6 depicts the hybrid automaton we have just defined.
The transition system induced by the hybrid automaton with strong resets we
have defined is the same as the one induced by the hybrid automaton from Exam-
ple 2.29, i.e., the transition system defined in Example 2.34.
2.3.2 Timed automata
Rather than placing strong restrictions on discrete transitions, we can restrict the
continuous behaviour of the automaton. Timed automata, first introduced by Alur
and Dill [AD94], are a subclass of hybrid automata that admit continuous transitions
occurring at a uniform and fixed constant rate only.
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ON OFF
x = 86.4
x = 50
0 6 x 6 86.4 0 6 x 6 86.4
x := 86.4
x := 50
Figure 2.6: A graphical representation of the hybrid automaton with strong resets
that models the boiler, as introduced in Example 2.37.
In a timed automaton, the continuous variables admit non-negative values
only, and are referred to as clocks. Their values change uniformly at a fixed and
constant rate of 1, i.e., for all locations ` ∈ L and x ∈ R>0, the closed predicate
flow(`)[X, X˙ := x, x˙] is true iff x˙i = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Given a transition
(`, x) t−→ (`, x′), for some t ∈ R>0, the function f : [0, t] → Rn that is a witness
to this continuous transition is defined as f(t′) = (x1 + t′, . . . , xn + t′), i.e., it is a
linear function. Therefore, the flow condition will be omitted from the definition of
a timed automaton, as it is given implicitly.
The distinguishing feature of timed automata is a certain type of continuous
dynamics, however they also place restrictions on the discrete transitions. Namely,
the sets of clock values, satisfying the jump(a) predicate, form closed and convex
sets, and as such, can be described using conjunctions of inequalities that compare
clock values to integers.
Given a set of clocks X, consider predicates of the form xi ./ c and xi−xj ./ c,
where c is a non-negative integer constant, ./ is one of the following relation symbols
{=,6,>, <,>}, and xi and xj are clocks, with i, j ranging over {1, . . . , |X|}. These
predicates are referred to as clock constraints. We will write B(X) to denoted set of
all clock constraints over the set of clocks X.
The jump predicate is not explicitly stated in the classical definitions of timed
automata. Instead, an action a is a tuple (`, g, Z, `′), where ` and `′ are locations,
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Z ⊆ X is referred to as the reset set, and g is the guard that is specified by a
conjunction of clock constraints. The reset set specifies which clocks are to be reset
to the value of 0 after the discrete transition corresponding to a occurs, the values
of the remaining clocks do not change. We can define a predicate reset, whose free
variables are from X ∪ X′, such that the closed predicate reset(a)[X,X′ := x, x′] is
true iff
x′i =

0 if xi ∈ Z,
xi otherwise,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, denoted by X′ = X[Z := 0]. In a hybrid automaton the action
(`, g, Z, `′) would have been represented by an action a = (`, `′) and a predicate
jump(a) = g(a) ∧ reset(a).
We now present the formal definition of a timed automaton. Unlike the gen-
eral definition of a hybrid automaton presented at the beginning of this section,
our definition of a timed automaton will feature a price information — it will be
a weighted timed automaton. This is the model we will be considering in Chap-
ter 3, where we will be considering reachability-price games on single-clock timed
automata (recall that in reachability-price games, only price information is being
taken into account). We also introduce the notion of an urgent location, i.e., control
location in which no continuous transitions can occur. In a general hybrid automa-
ton, one did not have explicitly distinguish such locations as they could be specified
using the flow predicate. In timed automata the flow predicate is absent, and hence,
to indicate which locations are urgent, we use the notion of an urgency mapping.
Definition 2.38 (Timed automaton). A weighted timed automaton, or simply a
timed automaton A consists of the following components:
• X, the finite set of real-valued variables, referred to as clocks,
• L, the finite set of control locations,
• A ⊆ L× B(X)× 2X × L, the finite set of control actions,
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• inv : L→ B(X), the invariant condition,
• urg : L→ {0, 1}, the urgency mapping,
• pi : L ∪ A→ N, the price function.
The semantics of a timed automaton is given in terms of a transition system.
In this case it will be a weighted transition system, as the timed automaton features
only a price function.
Definition 2.39 (Transition semantics of timed automata). The transition seman-
tics of a weighted timed automaton A is given by a weighted labelled transitions
system TA, defined as follows:
• SA ⊆ L × R|X|>0 is the state space such that inv(`)[X := x] is true, for every
(`, x) ∈ SA,
• ΛA ⊆ A ∪ T is the set of labels. For a label λ ∈ ΛA, there is a transition
(`, x) λ−→ (`′, x′) iff one of the following is true:
Continuous transition λ = t ∈ T, urg(`) = 0, i.e., the location is non-
urgent, for every t′ ∈ (0, t) we have inv[X := x + t′] is true, ` = `′, and
x′ = x+ t.
Discrete transition λ = (`, g, Z, `′) ∈ A, g[X := x] holds, and x′ = x[Z :=
0].
• piA : SA × ΛA × SA → R is the price function defined as follows:
piA((`, x)
λ−→ (`′, x′)) =

pi(λ) if λ ∈ A,
λ · pi(`) if λ ∈ T.
We now give an example that demonstrates how timed automata differ from
general hybrid automata.
74
Example 2.40. Recall the hybrid automaton from Example 2.29, which modelled
the boiler. We will now show how to model the boiler using a timed automaton. The
continuous variable, i.e., the clock, will be used to keep track of time in the boiler’s
cycle of operation. There will be a direct correspondence between the clock value and
the temperature of the water in the boiler. We have to “encode” the temperature
in this way because timed automata do not provide the means to directly model the
complex continuous dynamics.
To construct the timed automaton, we will use three rather than two control
locations. The first location will correspond to the boiler being in the heating mode,
and the temperature being at most 50◦C.The boiler is in this state only in the very
beginning, and after the maximum temperature is reached, the temperature never
falls below that threshold. The second control location will correspond to the heating
mode of operation, and the temperature being at least 50◦C. The third and last
location will correspond to the cooling mode. Once we complete the definition of the
automaton, we will explain how to retrieve the state of the boiler from the state of
the automaton. The timed automaton is defined as follows.
• X = {x} is the finite set of clocks. It contains a single clock.
• L = {Start,ON,OFF} is the finite set of control locations. The three con-
trol locations correspond to the boiler’s modes of operation,i.e., heating (the
temperature is up to to 50◦C), heating (the temperature is at least 50◦C), and
cooling, respectively.
• The finite set of control actions is equal to:
A =
{
(Start, {x}, x = 42,ON),
(ON, ∅, x = 78,OFF), (OFF, {x}, x = 748,ON)
}
The three control actions correspond to the changes of operation mode, i.e.,
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switching on and off.
• The invariant condition for the Start location is given as:
inv(Start) = (x > 0) ∧ (x 6 42);
for the ON location the invariant condition is given as:
inv(ON) = (x > 0) ∧ (x 6 78);
for the OFF location the invariant condition is given as:
inv(OFF) = (x > 78) ∧ (x 6 748).
• All control locations are non-urgent, i.e., urg(`) = 0 for every ` ∈ L.
• The price function is defined as follows:
pi(x) =

10 if x = Start or x = ON,
0 if x = OFF or x ∈ A.
Figure 2.7 depicts the timed automaton we have just defined. We will now define
the transition system induced by this automaton.
• The state space is equal to:
S = ({Start} × [0, 42]) ∪ ({ON} × [0, 78]) ∪ ({OFF} × [78, 748])
• The set of transition labels is equal to Λ = A ∪ T.
Continuous transition. There are three kinds of continuous transitions, and
the feasible transitions are as follows. Given t ∈ T, a continuous transi-
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tion (Start, x) t−→ (Start, x+ t) is feasible iff x, x+ t ∈ [0, 42].
Given t ∈ T, a continuous transition (ON, x) t−→ (ON, x+ t) is feasible iff
x, x+ t ∈ [0, 78].
Given t ∈ T, a continuous transition (OFF, x) t−→ (OFF, x+ t) is feasible
iff x, x+ t ∈ [78, 748].
Discrete transition. There are three discrete transitions, and they are:
(Start, 42)
(Start,{x},x=42,ON)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (ON, 0)
(ON, 78)
(ON,∅,x=78,OFF)−−−−−−−−−−−→ (OFF, 78)
(OFF, 748)
(OFF,{x},x=678,ON)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (ON, 0)
• pi : S× Λ× S→ R is the price function defined as follows:
pi((`, x) λ−→ (`′, x′)) =

0 if λ ∈ A,
0 if ` = OFF,
λ · 10 otherwise.
Recall the definitions of the functions h and c, which characterised the heating
and cooling properties of the boiler, introduced in Example 2.29. We now explain
how the states of the timed automaton, defined in this example, correspond to states
of the hybrid automaton defined in Example 2.29. A state (Start, x) corresponds to
the state (ON, h(x)) in the hybrid automaton, The state (ON, x) corresponds to the
state (ON, h(x+ 42)) in the hybrid automaton, and the state (OFF, x) corresponds
to a state (OFF, c(x− 78)) in the hybrid automaton.
Consider the state s = (ON, 0), an example run of the timed automaton could
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{x}
x = 78
∅
x = 748
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0 6 x 6 42 0 6 x 6 78 78 6 x 6 678
Figure 2.7: Timed automaton that models the boiler.
be as follows:
(Start, 0) 30−→ (Start, 30) 12−→ (Start, 42) (Start,{x},x=42,ON)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (ON, 0) 78−→
(ON, 78)
(ON,∅,x=78,OFF)−−−−−−−−−−−→ (OFF, 78) 670−−→ (OFF, 748) (OFF,{x},x=748,ON)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(ON, 0) 78−→ (ON, 78) · · ·
Notice that this run corresponds to the following run, in the hybrid automaton defined
in Example 2.34:
(ON, 0) 30−→ (ON, 37.8) 12−→ (ON, 50) 78−→
(ON, 86.4)
(ON,OFF)−−−−−−→ (OFF, 86.4) 670−−→ (OFF, 50) (OFF,ON)−−−−−−→
(ON, 50) 78−→ (ON, 86.4) · · ·
The correspondence goes further. The accumulated price of corresponding finite
prefixes in both runs are equal to each other.
2.3.3 Games on hybrid automata
To define games on hybrid automata we will use the concept of a game on a doubly-
weighted labelled transition system, as introduced in Section 2.2.2. We will present
two approaches to defining those games: turn based games, and quasi-concurrent
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games. In the first approach, we partition the set of control locations between
players, and this partition naturally induces a game graph on the transition system.
In the second approach, it is the set of control actions which is partitioned between
players; there is no need to define a game graph structure. In this setting the game
is played in rounds; each round results in a transition being taken. A round is a
sequential protocol, in which both players indicate their intended transition, and
the transition taken is the one which occurs earlier.
In this section, we refer to an arbitrary hybrid automaton H and its doubly-
weighted labelled transition system TH. Its exact definition is not important, and
therefore it will not be formally introduced.
Turn-based games. Turn based game are played on a game graph defined over
the transition system of the hybrid automaton. The game graph is induced by a
partition of the set of control locations between the two players, Min and Max.
Given a partition of the set of control locations L = LMin ∪ LMax of the
hybrid automaton H and the transition system TH, we define the game graph ΓH =〈TH, SMinH ,SMaxH 〉 as follows:
• SMin = S ∩ (LMin × Rn), and
• SMax = S ∩ (LMax × Rn) = S \ SMin.
By providing a payoff function P, we obtain an actual game.
Quasi-concurrent games. Turn based games do not model the concurrent in-
teraction between the controller and the environment that we would like to capture.
We are looking for means to model the following type of interaction: both play-
ers, independently, choose how long to stay in the current control location and
what control action to execute afterwards; the transition system changes its state
according to the choice with a shorter stay. Quasi-concurrent games are a gener-
alisation of turn based games and are a broadly used attempt at more accurate
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modelling of the concurrent interaction between the controller and the environ-
ment [BBC06; BBC07; BBC09; BBJ+08; JLR09; BBC10]. We use the qualifier
“quasi” because, although we are modelling concurrent interaction, the approach is
in fact sequential.
To formally define the quasi-concurrent approach we need the notion a timed
action. A timed action (a, t), an element of A × R>0, is admissible from state s iff
s
t−→ s′′ a−→ s′ is a finite run of the transition system. We will write s a−→t s′ for short.
A quasi-concurrent game on a hybrid automaton is given by a partition of
the A set into the sets AMin and AMax. This models the fact that players are in
control of control actions, rather than the states of the automaton. Let s be the
current state of the transition system. A quasi-concurrent game is played in rounds.
In every round, the players proceed as follows:
1. player Min, who models the controller, chooses an admissible timed action
(a, t) such that a ∈ AMin;
2. player Max, who models the environment, chooses an admissible timed action
(a′, t′) such that (a′, t′) = (a, t), or a ∈ AMax and t′ 6 t;
3. player Max chooses a state s′ such that s a
′−→t′ s′; state s′ becomes the current
state.
In concurrent interaction, both players make their time-action choices inde-
pendently, whereas, in the quasi-concurrent setting, the choices are made sequen-
tially. In effect, player Max has perfect information on the intentions of player Min,
and cannot be surprised by his choice of a timed action. If we choose to view the
choice of the systems next behaviour as a game between the two players, then the
quasi-concurrent approach is similar in spirit to the upper value analysis for a game
in strategic form (recall Section 2.2.1). In a truly concurrent setting the players’
interaction resembles a game in strategic form, i.e., players make their choices si-
multaneously and independently. In this context issues such as preventing Zeno
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behaviour arise, and although there are methods of alleviating this problem, they
come at a cost of uniform determinacy [dAFH+03].
Notice that the quasi-concurrent game is not played on a game graph, as was
the case for turn-based games. However, as it will be explained in Chapter 5, one
can construct a special game graph, and define a turn-based game on this graph,
that simulates the quasi-concurrent game as defined here.
Remark 2.41. Notice that in the quasi-concurrent game setting we are implicitly
restricting the semantics of the hybrid automaton. Admissible executions are in
fact alternating sequences of continuous and discrete transitions. This change of
semantics is a consequence of using the notion of a timed action.
The following example illustrates the comment made in Remark 2.41.
Example 2.42. Consider the diagram a) in Figure 2.8. The two functions, f1, f2 :
T→ R model the admissible flows in a location `. Assume there is a control action
a admissible from every state (`, x), for x ∈ Rn. The following two are possible
executions of the hybrid automaton from the state (`, y3):
(`, y3)
x1−→ (`, y1) x2−x1−−−−→ (`, y2) a−→ . . .
and
(`, y3)
x1−→ (`, y1) x2−x1−−−−→ (`, y0) a−→ . . .
In timed action semantics, there would be only one possible kind of execution:
(`, y3)
t−→ (`, f1(t)) a−→ . . .
In particular, with timed action semantics in place, the state (`, y2) would not be
reachable from (`, y2) through continuous transitions only.
The flow predicate can be viewed as a specification of admissible trajectories
for the evolution of the values of the variables during a continuous transition. In a
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(0, 0) x2x1
y0
y1
y3
time
value
a)
(0, 0)
time
value
b)
y = x
y = f1(x)
y = f2(x)
y2
Figure 2.8: Hybrid automaton with multiple trajectories (diagram a)) and with a
single trajectory (diagram b)).
single continuous transition the evolution follows a single trajectory. In timed action
semantics there is exactly one continuous transition between two consecutive discrete
transitions. In the general semantics, there may be several continuous transitions
between two consecutive discrete transitions, and for each of these transitions the
evolution of continuous variables may follow a different trajectory — this affects the
set of reachable states. When the flow predicate specifies only one trajectory then
the timed action semantics is not restrictive. This is the case for timed automata.
Diagram b) in Figure 2.8 shows the admissible trajectories of timed automata.
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Chapter 3
Games on single-clock timed
automata
Timed automata are a subclass of hybrid automata with strong restrictions on ad-
missible continuous changes to the values of the real-valued variables. As we have
explained in Sections 2.3 and 2.3.2, in timed automata the values of the variables
change at a constant and uniform rate and they are commonly referred to as clocks.
In this chapter we will focus on timed automata restricted to a single clock only,
and referred to as single-clock timed automata. The main goal of this chapter is to
show that reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata are positionally
determined, and that they are decidable in EXPTIME.
We start this chapter by defining the notion of a reachability-price game
on a single clock-timed automaton and the notion of a cost function (Section 3.1).
We adopt the approach introduced in Section 2.3.3. However, we introduce some
technical modifications which will aid presentation — namely, aided by the notion
of a cost function, the modifications will simplify dividing the problem of computing
the game value into simpler subproblems. We conclude by discussing simplifying
restrictions to the model (Section 3.1.1), and some basic algebraic operations, which
we will be applying to the simplified single-clock timed automata (Section 3.1.2).
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The key result is that by restricting our consideration to the simplified single-clock
timed automata we do not lose generality (Theorem 3.10).
In Section 3.2 we study the properties of cost functions. Cost functions are
piecewise-affine functions that are continuous and non-increasing. These functions
naturally arise when one tries to compute the game value of a reachability-price
game on a single-clock timed automaton. The theory of cost functions, which we
develop in Section 3.2, will be instrumental in establishing the main results of this
chapter.
We conclude this chapter with the results section (Section 3.3). First we
present an EXPTIME algorithm for deciding the value of a reachability-price game
on a single-clock timed automaton (Section 3.3.1). This algorithm extends the work
of Bouyer et al. [BBM06], who have provided the first algorithm for this problem
that was argued to run in triply-exponential time. In Section 3.3.1 we prove that
reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata are positionally determined,
and then, in Section 3.3.2, we establish that the algorithm is correct and that its
running time is at most exponential.
3.1 Timed automata and reachability-price games
Our goal is to define the notion of turn-based reachability-price games on single-clock
timed automata. In short, this will be done by defining a game on the transition
system of the automaton. The main problem studied in this chapter is the com-
plexity of deciding the value of the reachability-price game on a single-clock timed
automaton (see Definition 2.17), which can be stated as follows:
Given a reachability-price game on a single-clock timed automaton, a
state of the automaton, and a constant c, decide whether the value of
the game from the given state is at most c.
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Reachability-price games on transition systems. For technical reasons, our
definition of a reachability-price game differs slightly from the one found in Chapter 2
(see Section 2.2.2). In the definition presented in this chapter, entering a goal state
comes at an additional price, not related to the price of the transition taken. This
extension is helpful in the following situation. Suppose the value of the reachability-
price has been computed for some subset of states; we can then modify the game so
that those states become goal states, with the entry price equal to the game value
of that state, and compute the game value for the remaining states, by computing
it in the modified game. We will use this approach, both in the algorithm, and in
the proofs.
We now define reachability-price games on a transition system. The approach
is similar to that presented in Section 2.2.2, however, we account for prices in goal
states.
In order to define a reachability-price game,
〈
Γ,F, piF
〉
, we need to provide a
weighted game graph Γ (see Definition 2.14), a set of designated goal states F ⊆ S,
and goal price function piF : F→ R>0, an assignment of prices to goal states.
We now define the modified reachability-price payoff function P, which ac-
counts for prices in goal states. Given a reachability price game Γ and a run ω, we
define P as follows:
P(ω) =

piF(Last(ωStop(ω))) + Price(ωStop(ω)) if Stop(ω) <∞,
∞ otherwise.
The definitions of the Price and Stop functions can be found in Section 2.2.2.
Cost functions. We now introduce the notions of a cost function and a quasi-cost
function that will be used to define reachability-price games on timed automata. A
reachability-price game on a timed automaton will be defined as a reachability-
price game on its transition system. An assignment of quasi-cost functions to goal
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locations of the automaton will be used to define the goal price function in the
transition system.
We will be dealing with the ordered set of real numbers augmented with
the greatest element, positive infinity denoted by ∞. For that purpose we need to
extend the +, min and max operators in a natural way. For a ∈ R ∪ {∞} we have
a+∞ =∞, max(a,∞) =∞ and min(a,∞) = a.
We now introduce the definition of a cost function.
Definition 3.1 (Cost function). A function f : I → R ∪ {∞} that is continuous,
non-increasing, and piecewise-affine, where I is a bounded interval, is said to be a
cost function. We will write CF(I) ⊆ [I → R ∪ {∞}] to denote the set of all cost
functions with the domain I.
Remark 3.2. Notice that if f ∈ CF(I), and f(x) =∞ for some x ∈ I, then f ≡ ∞
over I.
To define reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata we will
need to weaken the notion of a cost function. Thus, we define the notion of a
quasi-cost function.
Definition 3.3 (Quasi-cost function). Given an interval I = [0,M ], where M ∈ N,
a function f : [0,M ] → R is said to be a quasi-cost function if f restricted to the
interval (i, i+ 1) is a cost function, for every integer i ∈ {0,M − 1}. We will write
QCF(I) ⊆ [I → R ∪ {∞}] to denote the set of all quasi-cost functions with the
domain I.
Reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata. We will be con-
sidering turn-based reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata. For
the definition of a reachability-price game see Section 2.2.2, and for the definitions
of timed automata and turn-based games see Section 2.3. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.3.3, the game on a timed automaton will in fact be played on its transition
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system, and the partition of states between players will be induced by a partition of
the set of control locations. The definition of the reachability-price game, presented
here, accounts for the prices in goal states.
As the name suggests, single-clock timed automata are a special case of
timed automata, where the set of real-valued variables, i.e., clocks is a singleton set.
This class is of special interest when considered in the context of reachability-price
games. Determining the existence of optimal strategies in reachability-price games
on timed automata with at least three clocks was shown to be undecidable by Bouyer
et al. [BBM06], whereas for single-clock timed automata, a triply-exponential time
algorithm was proposed by Bouyer et al. [BLMR06]. The decidability of this problem
for two-clock timed automata remains open. In this chapter we extend the work
initiated by Bouyer et al., and present an exponential time algorithm.
In Section 2.2.2 we have mentioned that timed automata yield deterministic
transition systems. Indeed, a move of a player consists of either: choosing to delay
for a certain time t ∈ T, which corresponds to choosing a continuous transition
labelled with t, or to change the control location, which corresponds to choosing
a discrete transition labelled with the chosen control action a ∈ A. In every state
both choices have a unique outcome so, the transition system is indeed deterministic.
This enables us to use the framework introduced in Section 2.2.2.
We will place the following assumption on the single-clock timed automata
considered.
Assumption 3.4. We assume (without loss of generality [BFH+01]) that A is
clock-bounded, i.e., there exists a positive constant M such that the inv(l)[X := x]
predicate is true only if x 6M , for every control location l. The variable x denotes
the single clock of the automaton .
Remark 3.5. In a bounded single-clock timed automaton a clock constraint specifies
a bounded interval, a subset of the set of non-negative reals. Throughout this chapter
we will use such intervals to denote clock constraints.
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To define a reachability-price game on a timed automaton A, we use the
game graph ΓA (see Section 2.3.3) and use the reachability-price payoff function, as
defined earlier in this section. To complete the definition, we need to specify the set
of goal states, and a goal price function, which assigns price to the goal states. We
will define the set of goal states by specifying a set of goal locations LF. The goal
price function, on the other hand, will be given in terms of quasi-cost function:
CFF : LF → [[0,M ]→ R ∪ {∞}] ,
where M is the clock-bound mentioned in Assumption 3.4.
The following definition formalises the notion of a reachability-price game on
a single-clock timed automaton.
Definition 3.6 (Reachability-price game). Given a single-clock timed automaton A,
a partition of its set of control locations L = LMin ∪ LMax, a designated set of goal
locations LF ⊆ L, and a function CFF : LF → QCF([0,M ]), which assigns a quasi-
cost function to every goal location, the reachability-price game on a single-clock
timed automaton is given by a reachability-price game
〈
ΓA,F, piF
〉
on the transition
system TA where:
• ΓA is the weighted game graph,
• F = (LF × V) ∩ SA is the set of goal states, and
• piF : F→ R>0 is the goal price function defined
piF((`, x)) = CFF(`)(x),
for s = (`, x) ∈ F.
We use the reachability-price payoff function P as defined earlier in this section.
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The size of the automaton, denoted by |A|, is the total number of bits needed
to represent all of its components. The size of the reachability-price game Γ, denoted
by |Γ|, is equal to the size of the automaton A and the total number of bits necessary
to encode the remaining components. All constants are encoded in binary.
Remark 3.7. Game graphs, as considered in this chapter, admit only positive
prices on transitions. As a consequence, both the lower and the upper value of a
reachability-price game are bounded by zero from below.
3.1.1 Simplifications
In this section we are going to place some simplifying restrictions on the structure of
timed automata, which will allow us to concentrate on the essence of the problem.
We will also explain why these restrictions can be made without losing generality.
In the remainder of this chapter we will be assuming that we are dealing with the
restricted timed automata.
The restrictions and simplifications discussed in this section are not new, and
were considered previously by Bouyer et al. in their work regarding reachability-
price games on single-clock timed automata [BLMR06]. In particular, their com-
plexity results are stated only for the restricted automata. The constructions, which
allow us to restrict our considerations to the class of automata that do not have clock-
resetting control actions, and whose control actions have zero prices, are the same
as in [BLMR06]. We include them, and sketch the proof of their correctness, for
the sake of completeness. The constructive proof that restricting to [0, 1]-bounded
single-clock timed automata can be done without losing generality is different form
the one found in [BLMR06], as it does not involve an exponential blowup in the size
of the automaton. The proof is new, but it bears similarities with the construction
presented in the work of Laroussinie et al. [LMS04], with the only difference that
our construction accounts for prices.
We start by defining the notion of a simple timed automaton, then proceed
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to prove that by restricting to this model we do not lose generality, and conclude
this section, with a discussion on syntactical simplifications.
Consider an interval I. We will write AI , for some I-bounded timed automa-
ton, i.e., an automaton whose transition system has the state space restricted to
L× I, and for every `, the invariant is inv(`) ∩ I.
Definition 3.8 (Simple timed automata). We say that a single-clock timed au-
tomaton A is simple if it is [0, 1]-bounded, for every control action the reseting set
is empty, and the price is zero, i.e., for every a = (`, g, Z, `′) ∈ A we have Z = ∅,
and pi(a) = 0.
The most important property of simple timed automata is as follows.
Remark 3.9. In simple timed-automata time always progresses, i.e., if (`, x) σ−→
(`′, x′) is a transition in a simple timed automaton’s transition system, then x′ > x.
We will call this property the time progression property.
We have the following result regarding simple timed automata.
Theorem 3.10. The problem of deciding the value of a reachability-price game on
single-clock timed automata is exponential time Turing-reducible to the analogous
problem on simple single-clock timed automata.
Theorem 3.10, restricted to [0, 1]-bounded single-clock timed automata, was
first proved by Bouyer et al. [BLMR06]. One can extend their proof to the general
single-clock setting by using the polynomial encoding of bounded single-clock timed
automata using [0, 1]-bounded single-clock timed automata proposed Laroussinie et
al. [LMS04], which can be easily adapted to the weighted setting. The detailed proof
of Theorem 3.10 can be found in Appendix A.
To further simplify the model, we assume that the simple timed automaton
is defined using closed clock constraints only. Once again, we make this assumptions
to simplify our reasoning, but it is done without loss of generality. Theorem 3.25
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can be easily adapted to produce ε-optimal strategies that respect open guards (it
would involve a construction similar to the one found in the proof of Theorem 5.14).
This is possible because the Val function, as computed by the algorithm presented in
Section 3.3, is uniformly continuous over the interval [0, 1], in every control location.
Simple timed automata, defined using closed clock constraints, admit three
possible control action guards, namely [0, 0], [1, 1], and [0, 1]. The first kind does not
allow for a continuous transition prior to the discrete one, and it is satisfied only by
finitely many states. As it will be visible in the proofs of Section 3.3, the value of the
Val function for such states, due to the time progression property of simple timed
automata, does not “affect” the values for the other states. Transitions with guards
of this kind can be dealt with, in polynomial time, during post-processing. The
effect of a discrete transition, featuring a guard of the second kind, can be encoded
using additional goal cost functions. Once again, proofs in Section 3.3 explain how
this can be done. It is only the third kind of guards that can not be dealt with by
such simple means. In light of this, and to simplify the presentation, we assume that
all transition guards are true. A similar approach was used in the work of Bouyer
et al. [BLMR06].
Remark 3.11. In the light of the assumptions made, it is natural to think of the
simple timed automaton, as given by A = 〈X, L,A,urg, pi〉, where
• X = {x} is the set containing a single real-valued variable, referred to as the
clock,
• L is the finite set of control locations,
• A ⊆ L× L is the finite set of control actions,
• urg : L→ {0, 1} is the urgency mapping,
• pi : L→ N is the price function.
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Notice that in this definition a control action (`, `′) corresponds to (`, true, ∅, `′) in
the original definition.
Additionally, notice that in the definition of a reachability-price game on a
simple timed-automaton, the function CFF assigns cost functions to locations (rather
than quasi-cost functions).
Assumption 3.12. We assume that the upper value of the reachability-price game
on a simple timed automaton is finite.
In light of Remark 3.11, the Assumption 3.12 can be made without loss of
generality; one can determine the set of states from which player Max can prevent
reaching goal by determining the appropriate set of control locations, which can be
done in polynomial time. The real complexity lies in determining the value of a
reachability-price game, given that player Min can ensure it.
3.1.2 Operations
We will now define some simple algebraic operations that we will be performing
on cost functions and reachability-price games on simple timed automata. These
operations will be used in the algorithm, presented in Section 3.3.1.
The first operation is the override operation [BJSV10]. This operation allows
to combine two functions, with possibly intersecting domains, into a new function,
whose domain is the union of the domains of the two original functions. The name
stems from the fact, that the first of the two functions overrides the values of the
second, i.e., the new function behaves like the first, on the domains’ intersection.
Formally, given two functions h : I1 → R and g : I2 → R, we will write f . g to
denote the override operation on these two functions, defined as
(h . g)(x) =

h(x) if x ∈ I1
g(x) if x ∈ I2 \ I1
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As we have explained earlier, the algorithm for computing the game value
will be in part iterative, i.e., it will iteratively compute the value of the game over
a certain interval. We will use the override operation, to combine the result of two
subsequent iterations.
We will now introduce three operations on reachability-price games on simple
timed automata. For the purpose of their definitions, we fix an interval I ⊆ [0, 1],
an automaton A, and a reachability-price game Γ on A. As a result of each of the
three operations we will obtain a game reachability-price Γ′ on an automaton A′; the
interval I is unchanged. As it will be explained in Section 3.3, during its execution,
the algorithm for computing the game value will often restrict the game to intervals
I ⊆ [0, 1] — that is why, in the following definitions, we clearly indicate the interval.
Γ[urg(`) := 1] denotes the game Γ′ obtained from Γ by modifying the urgency
mapping of the automaton A so that ` becomes an urgent control location,
i.e., in the automaton A′ we have:
urg′(`′) =

1 if `′ = `
urg(`) otherwise,
and the remaining components remain unchanged. As this operation does not
alter the set of control locations, the partition of the set of control locations,
the set of goal locations, and the assignment of cost functions to goal locations,
remain unchanged in Γ′.
Γ[LF∪`, h] denotes the game obtained from Γ by adding ` to the set of goal locations,
with h being the cost function assigned to `. Formally, to obtain the game Γ′
we set LF′ = LF ∪ {`}, and define the mapping from goal locations to cost
functions as:
CFF
′
(`′) =

h if `′ = `,
CFF(`′) if `′ ∈ LF.
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We do not require that ` ∈ L, i.e., ` can be a fresh control location, however, it
is required that h ∈ CF(I). If ` ∈ L then the automaton A and the partition
of its control locations between players remain unchanged — all components
of A′ and Γ′ have been defined. If, however, ` /∈ L then we complete the
definition of the automaton A′ in the following way:
urg′(`′) =

1 `′ = if `,
urg(`′) otherwise,
and pi′(`′) =

0 `′ = if `,
pi(`′) otherwise,
and the definition of the reachability-price Γ′, by setting LMax′ = LMax ∪ {`}.
Γ[A∪ a] denotes the game obtained from Γ by adding an additional control action
a ∈ L×L in the automaton A. We set A′ = A∪{a}; the remaining components
of the automaton remain unchanged. This operation does not affect any other
components of the reachability-price game.
We now briefly explain the applications of the above-mentioned operations.
In the algorithm for computing the game value, with each recursive call a non-urgent
control location is removed, and the algorithm proceeds to compute the game value
for the new game. Removing a control location of player Max consists of changing
its urgency mapping, so that it becomes urgent — the first operation is being used.
On the other hand, removing a control location of player Min consists of turning
it into a goal location — the second operation is being used. Finally, as we have
explained in the context of the override operation, apart from being recursive, the
algorithm for computing the game value contains an iterative component. We use
the third operation, together with the override operation, to combine the results of
subsequent iterations.
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3.2 Cost functions
In this section we state and prove the key properties of cost functions, which were
introduced in Section 3.1. Cost functions are a central notion when considering
reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata. The theory of cost func-
tions will be used to construct the algorithm for computing the Val function for
reachability-price games on simple timed automata and to prove its correctness.
The main result of this section is Proposition 3.18, which establishes the
key properties of the minC and maxC operators, introduced in this section, that
transform cost functions. This result will be essential in establishing the proofs of
the results presented in Section 3.3.
Recall Definition 3.1, which introduced the notion of a cost function. At
times, we will need to talk about pieces of a cost function, i.e, individual affine
functions. To make this easier, we introduce the following convention. Given an
interval I and a cost function f : I → R, we will write f = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 to denote
the fact that the piecewise-affine function f consists of affine pieces f1, . . . , fk, with
domains If1 , . . . , I
f
k , where k is the smallest integer such that
f(x) =

f1(x) if x ∈ If1
f2(x) if x ∈ If2
· · ·
fk(x) if x ∈ Ifk .
Throughout the chapter, we will be implicitly assuming that I = [b, e], and that
Ifi =
[
bfi , e
f
i
]
, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, with efi+1 = bfi , for i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. The formula
for the individual segment fi will be given by a
f
i · x+ cfi , for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If f is
clear from the context, we will omit the superscript.
Remark 3.13. Notice that a cost function, f = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉, such that Ii admits
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rational end-points, and that afi and b
f
i are rational, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is definable.
Fact 3.14. If f, g : I → R∪ {∞} are cost functions, then their pointwise minimum
and maximum, i.e., functions defined as
x 7→ min{f(x), g(x)} and x 7→ max{f(x), g(x)},
are cost functions as well.
Proof. If one of the functions is equivalent to ∞ over I, then the fact is trivially
true. Otherwise, let m be the total number of pieces in both functions. As each
piece is an affine function, there can be at most m2 intersections. Each function
is piecewise-affine between the two possible subsequent intersections. This assures
both continuity and piecewise-affinity of the pointwise minimum and maximum.
To conclude the proof, we argue that both the pointwise minimum and max-
imum are non-increasing. As there are finitely many intersections, we can finitely
partition I in such a way that on every element of the partition, we have f 6 g
or f > g. Hence, on every element of the partition, the pointwise minimum and
maximum are non-increasing. This together with the fact that we have continuity
finishes the proof.
Fact 3.15. Let S(n,m) denote the maximum number of affine pieces in a point-
wise minimum (maximum) of two piecewise-affine functions with m and n pieces
respectively. We have that S(n,m) 6 2(n+m− 1).
Proof. We clearly have the following S(1, 1) 6 2 and S(n,m) = S(m,n). First we
will prove that S(n, 1) 6 2n, for n > 0. Assume that it is true for n. If we have
n+ 1 pieces, the pointwise minimum (maximum) may split the n+ 1-th piece into
at most two pieces, so we get S(n+1, 1) 6 S(n, 1)+2 6 2n+2, which is the desired
result.
Now we consider the remaining case, i.e., n,m > 1. If we assume that
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S(n,m) 6 2(n + m − 1), then to complete the proof it is sufficient to show that
S(n+ 1,m) = 2(n+m). Let us assume that the first n pieces intersect first k 6 m
pieces. In that case, the new piece, can intersect at most m− k + 1 pieces. So the
maximum number of pieces is S(n, k) +S(1,m− k+ 1). Using inductive hypothesis
we get S(n+ 1,m) 6 2(n+ k − 1) + 2(m− k + 1) 6 2(n+m).
We now introduce two operators, which are key in defining the relationship
between game values in adjacent control locations. This will be later summarised
by Lemma 3.26. Given a function f : [b, e] → R ∪ {∞} and a positive constant c,
we define the following two operators that create new functions, of the same type
as the function f :
minC(f, c) : x 7→ min
06t6e−x
c · t+ f(x+ t)
maxC(f, c) : x 7→ max
06t6e−x
c · t+ f(x+ t).
The following example illustrates the intuition behind the minC and maxC
operators.
Example 3.16. Figure 3.1 gives an intuitive understanding of the minC(f, c) oper-
ator, for a cost function f and a positive real constant c. The cost function is given
as f = 〈f1, . . . , f7〉 (as seen in Figure 3.1a). The slope of f2 and f6 is steeper than
−c; for the remaining components it is shallower. The cost function g = minC(f, c)
is depicted in Figure 3.1b), and is given by 〈g1, . . . , g6〉. All components of g have
a slope shallower than or equal to −c. The formula for g1 is the same as for f1,
however, the domain is a subset (similarly for f4 and g4). The function g3 is equal
to f3 (similarly g6 is equal to f7). Functions g2 and g5, have the slope −c, and were
not present in f .
Similarly, Figure 3.2 illustrates the intuition behind the maxC operator. Cost
function f is given as previously (see Figure 3.2a). The slopes of f1, f3, and f7 are
shallower than −c; for the remaining components it is steeper. The cost function h =
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f1
f2
f3 f4
f5
f6
f7
f1
f3 f4
f7
g1
g2
g3 g4
g5
g6
a) b)
Figure 3.1: a) Cost function f , before applying minC(f, c) operator — dashed lines
have a slope −c; b) cost function g = minC(f, c) — dashed lines denote parts of f
that do not coincide with g.
f1
f2
f3 f4
f5
f6
f7
h2
h3
h4
h1
f5
f6
a) b)
Figure 3.2: a) Cost function f , before applying maxC(f, c) operator — dashed lines
have a slope −c; b) cost function h = maxC(f, c) — dashed lines denote parts of f
that do not coincide with h.
maxC(f, c) is depicted in Figure 3.2b), and is given by 〈h1, . . . , h4〉. All components
of h have a slope steeper than or equal to −c. The formula for h2 and h3 is the
same as that of f5 and f6, respectively. Moreover, the domain of h2 coincides with
the domain of f5, however, the domain of h3 is a strict subset of the domain of f6.
Functions h1 and h4 have the slope −c, and were not present in f .
We now proceed to state and prove the properties of the minC and maxC
operators when applied to cost functions. The key property is that an application
of either of those operators to a cost function is also a cost function.
Lemma 3.17. Let c be a positive constant. If f : [b, e]→ R is a cost function then
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minC(f, c) is a cost functions as well. The same holds for maxC.
Proof. If f is equivalent to∞, over [b, e] then the lemma is trivially true. Therefore,
we concentrate on the remaining case. Clearly minC(f, c) is continuous. We fix
x1 6 x2 ∈ [b, e], and for every x ∈ [b, e] we will use the following notation:
t(x) = max{t∗ : t∗ = arg min06t6e−x c · t+ f(x+ t)}.
To show piecewise-affinity observe the following, if t(x1) > 0 is such that
x1 + t(x1) > x2, then t(x2) = t(x1)− x2 + x1. Moreover,
minC(f, c)(x2) = minC(f, c)(x1)− (x2 − x1) · c,
i.e., minC(f, c) is linear with a slope −c over the interval [x1, x1 + t(x)]. If, on the
other hand, for all x ∈ I ⊆ [b, e] we have t(x) = 0, then minC(f, c)(x) is equal to fi
on the interval I ∩ Ii, and ai > −c.
We will show that minC(f, c) is piecewise-affine in an inductive fashion. Re-
call that f = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉. Our inductive hypothesis is as follows: minC(f, c) is
piecewise-affine on [b, v], and v = bi for some i ∈ 1, . . . , k.
The hypothesis clearly holds for v = b, so lets assume v > b. Let x ∈ [v, e]
be smallest such that t(x) > 0. Clearly, minC(f, c)|[v,x] = f|[v,x], and it is affine on
the interval [x, x+ t(x)] with a slope −c.
We have shown, that minC(f, c)|[v,x+t(x)] is piecewise-affine. It remains to
show that x+ t(x) = bi, for some i 6 k, or that x+ t(x) = e. Lets assume otherwise,
i.e., that x+ t(x) ∈ (bi, ei) for some i 6 k. We know that t(bi) = x+ t(x)− bi > 0,
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which implies that
f(bi) > minC(f, c)(bi)
= c · t(bi) + f(bi + t(bi))
= c · t(bi) + fi(bi + t(bi))
= c · t(bi) + afi t(bi) + f(bi),
which in turn implies that ai 6 −c. If we take t = ei − x, we will get
f(x+ t(x)) > f(x+ t).
This, however, contradicts the definition of t(x), and hence x + t(x) = bi for some
i, or x+ t(x) = e. This finishes the proof of inductive step’s correctness.
It takes at most i inductive steps to prove, that minC(f, c) is piecewise-affine
on [b, bi], and i is bounded by k. This yields that minC(f, c) is piecewise-affine.
We will now proceed to show that minC(f, c) is non-increasing. Fix x1 6
x2 ∈ [b, e]. We will show that for every t(x1), there exists a t ∈ [0, e− x2] such that
c · t+ f(x2 + t) 6 c · t(x1)f(x1 + t(x1)).
If t(x1) ∈ [0, x2 − x1), then t = 0. We have:
c · t(x1) + f(x1 + t(x1)) > f(x1 + t(x1)) > f(x2).
If, on the other hand, t(x1) ∈ [x2 − x1, e− x1], then t = t(x1)− x2 + x1. We have:
c · t(x1) + f(x1 + t(x1)) > c(t(x1)− x2 + x1) + f(x1 + t(x1))
= c(t(x1)− x2 + x1) + f(x2 + (t(x1)− x2 + x1)).
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This finishes the proof.
The following proposition formalises the intuition how the minC (maxC)
operators affect cost functions. The minC (maxC) operator removes all pieces of
a cost function that have slopes steeper (shallower) than −c, and substitutes them
with pieces that have the slope equal to −c. For the remaining pieces, the formula
remains unchanged, but the domain may change. However, the new domain is always
a subset of the domain of the original domain. This property will be instrumental
in proving that the algorithm, presented in Section 3.3.1 terminates.
Proposition 3.18. Let f = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 and let minC(f, c) = 〈g1, . . . , gl〉. We have
that l 6 k, and agj > −c, for all j = 1, . . . , l. Moreover, if agj > −c then there exists
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the formulae of fi and gj are equal and Igj ⊆ Ifi 3 bfi .
For maxC we can prove a similar result, with the only difference that in the
statement of Proposition 3.18, with the only difference that we have agj 6 −c and
agj < −c, respectively.
We conclude this section with the following result, which establishes that
the order in which we take the pointwise minimum and apply the minC operator
(similarly for pointwise maximum and maxC operator) does not matter.
Lemma 3.19. If f, g : [b, e] → R ∪ {∞} are cost functions, and c is a positive
constant, then:
min{minC(f, c),minC(g, c)} = minC(min{f, g}, c)
Similar equality holds if we use max and maxC operator.
Proof. First we treat the case, when one of the functions is equivalent to ∞ over
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[b, e]. Without loss of generality we assume it is f . We then have:
min{minC(f, c),minC(g, c)} = min{f,minC(g, c)}
= minC(g, c)
= minC(min{g, f}, c)
The equalities are a consequence of how +, min, and max operators are defined over
R ∪ {∞}.
It remains to deal with the case where none of the functions is equivalent
to ∞. Fix some x ∈ [b, e], and let t(x) have the same meaning as in the proof of
Lemma 3.17. We start by proving the > inequality. The right hand side is thus
equal to:
c · t(x) + min{f(x+ t(x)), g(x+ t(x))}
Without loss of generality we can assume that this is in fact equal to c · t(x) + f(x+
t(x)). This, however, implies that
t(x) = arg min06t6e−x c · t(x) + f(x+ t(x)),
and that in turn implies that minC(f, c)(x) 6 minC(g, c)(x). This proves that the
left hand side is not smaller than the right hand side. The proof of the 6 inequality
is similar, and hence omitted.
3.3 Solving reachability-price games on simple timed
automata
In this section we present an EXPTIME algorithm for computing the value of
reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata, i.e., the main contribu-
tion of this chapter. The model and the games were introduced in Section 3.1,
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and in Section 3.2 we have introduced the theory of cost functions, that will be
instrumental in establishing the correctness and complexity of the algorithm. This
work extends the work of Bouyer et al. [BLMR06], which established a 3EXPTIME
algorithm for computing upper value of the reachability-price game.
The main results, presented in this chapter, are as follows.
Theorem 3.20. Reachability-price games on simple timed-automata are positionally
determined.
Theorem 3.20 follows from the fact that the algorithm presented in this
section is correct (Theorem 3.33), and from Theorem 3.25, which establishes the
existence of positional almost optimal strategies.
Theorem 3.21. The problem of deciding the value of a reachability-price game on
simple timed automata is in EXPTIME.
Theorem 3.21 follows from the fact that the algorithm, presented in this
section, is correct (Theorem 3.33), and from Theorem 3.38, which establishes that
the running time of the algorithm is at most exponential in the size of the input.
The following assumption underlies every proof and construction introduced
in the remainder of this section. In Section 3.1.1 we have explained why this is
without loss of generality.
Assumption 3.22. In the remainder of this section we assume that the single-clock
timed automaton, over which the reachability-price games is defined, is simple (as
defined in Section 3.1.1).
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. We start this section by
introducing an algorithm for computing the game value of reachability-price games
on single-clock timed automata. We then show that correctness of this algorithm
allows us to establish positional determinacy of the aforementioned games, and
finally proceed to prove that the algorithm is indeed correct, and to that it works
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in exponential time — EXPTIME. The theory of cost functions is an essential
component of both the proof of correctness and of the complexity analysis.
In the following, we will be considering a game Γ and games Γ′ and Γ′′ derived
from it. Furthermore, due to the iterative nature of our algorithm, we will often
restrict the game to an interval I ⊆ [0, 1]. To ensure clarity, we will be writing
ValΓI to explicitly indicate the game Γ and the interval I (if it is of importance), to
which the function refers. Unlike clock constraints, the interval I will usually have
rational endpoints. This, however, does not increase complexity — the endpoints
will naturally arise during the computation.
At times, it will be convenient to treat Val as an element of [L → CF(I)],
rather than an element of [S → R]. We will therefore abuse notation and write
Val(`) to denote the function x 7→ Val(`, x).
3.3.1 Computing the value of reachability-price games on single-
clock timed automata
In this section we present the algorithm for computing the game value of reachability-
price games on single-clock timed automata. This section consists of three parts.
First, we introduce operations and constructions that will be used by the algorithm
to combine the intermediate results of the computation. Second we introduce the
procedure for computing the game value, and discuss how it differs from previ-
ously used approaches. We conclude this section with a result, which states that
if the algorithm correctly computes the game value, then positional almost optimal
strategies can be derived.
The algorithm presented in this section will work recursively with respect to
the number of non-urgent control locations in the timed automaton, over which the
reachability-price game is defined. With each recursive step, a game with one less
non-urgent control location will be considered. This approach will be explained in
full detail in the subsection in which the algorithm is defined. In order to make
104
handling of non-urgent control locations convenient, we introduce the following def-
inition:
NonUrgent(Γ) = {` : ` ∈ L \ LF and urg(`) = 0}.
We start by introducing an operation CostConsistent, that will be used
to combine the results of subsequent iterations in the iterative component of the
procedure SolveRP. Consider two intervals I1 = [b1, e1] ⊆ [0, 1] and I2 = [b2, e2] ⊆
[0, 1] such that r = e1 = b2, and some game Γ. We would like to have an operation,
that allows us to compute ValΓI1∪I2 , i.e., the value of the game Γ restricted to
the interval I1 ∪ I2. Furthermore let’s assume that we have computed ValΓI2 , the
value of the game Γ restricted to I2. The operation CostConsistent produces a
new reachability-price game Γ′I1 = CostConsistent
(
ΓI1 ,ValΓI2
)
, with the following
property, for every ` ∈ L:
ValΓI1∪I2 (`) = ValΓ′I1
(`) .ValΓI2 (`).
The operation is defined as follows:
CostConsistent(ΓI1 ,ValΓI2 ) =(
Γ
[
LF ∪ `′1, x 7→ ValΓI2 (`1, r) + (r − x)pi(`1)
][
A ∪ (`1, `′1)
]
. . .[
LF ∪ `′k, x 7→ ValΓI2 (`k, r) + (r − x)pi(`k)
][
A ∪ (`k, `′k)
])
I1
,
where {`1, . . . , `k} = NonUrgent(Γ).
The intuition behind the CostConsistent operation is as follows. In ΓI1 , the
time can not progress past e1, whereas in ΓI1∪I2 it can; this results in ValΓI1 being
unrelated to (ValΓI1∪I2 )|L×I1 , although, due to the lack of resets, ValΓI2 is equal to
(ValΓI1∪I2 )|L×I2 — the time progression property. To alleviate this, for every non-
urgent control location `, we add a new goal location `′ whose cost functions encodes
the following behaviour: upon entering ` wait till time e1, and then reach goal, from
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the state (`, e1), “optimally” as if ΓI2 was the game being played.
We will also be considering situations where we have already computed
ValΓ(`) (over some interval I ⊆ [0, 1]) for some control location ` of Γ. We will
want to use this fact to compute ValΓ for the remaining control locations. We will
construct a game Γ′ that has the following property
ValΓ′(`′, x) = ValΓ(`′, x),
for every control location `′ ∈ L and every clock valuation x ∈ I. To obtain Γ′ from
Γ, we make ` a goal location. Consider h : I → R>0 defined as h(x) = ValΓ(`, x) for
all x ∈ I. We define Γ′ as
Γ′ = Γ[LF ∪ `, h].
Remark 3.23. Notice that Γ′, as defined above, contains one less non-urgent control
location than the original game Γ.
Algorithm
We will now introduce an algorithm, which given a reachability-price game on a
single-clock timed automaton, computes the Val function, which to every state of
the game graph, assigns the value of the game originating from that state. The use
of word “computes” is meaningful because, as we will prove later, the Val function
is locationwise a cost function and cost functions are definable (see Remark 3.13).
The algorithm will be given in terms of a recursive procedure SolveRP.
The procedure SolveRP takes on input a reachability-price game ΓI , where
I = [b, e] ⊆ [0, 1] and the automaton underlying Γ is simple. Upon termination, the
function outputs the function ValΓI , which is a cost function locationwise.
The algorithm works recursively with respect to the set of non-urgent control
locations. During each recursive call, it identifies a non-urgent control location that
minimises the value of the price function. There are two cases to consider, depending
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on the ownership of the control location but both of them are handled in a similar
fashion. The algorithm modifies the game Γ to have one less non-urgent control
location. In case ` ∈ LMax, we convert ` to be urgent. If ` ∈ LMin, we convert `
to be a goal location that captures the following behaviour: once ` is reached in Γ,
player Min spends all available time there. The intuition behind this is as follows: if
` ∈ LMax, it is unlikely that spending time in that control location will be beneficial
for player Max. Likewise, when ` ∈ LMin, it is likely that it will be beneficial for
player Min to stay as long as possible. There are cases, however, when this intuition
is incorrect, i.e., it is beneficial, respectively, for player Max to wait, and for player
Min to move immediately. This necessitates the iterative procedure, outlined in the
following, employed during each recursive call.
The working assumption is that Val is a cost function locationwise. During
a recursive call, for every control location the algorithm iteratively computes the
result of the minC (maxC) operator applied to the minimum (maximum) of the
cost functions in successor control locations (that are equal to Val). The iterative
procedures in cases 2 and 3 of the algorithm compute the solution over a sequence
of intervals, proceeding from right to left of the time axis. They first assume that
the aforementioned intuition is correct (step 1), and then identify the rightmost
interval, over which it is not (step 2). The next step is to adjust the solution over
that interval (step 2 and 3). It remains to find the solution to the left of the found
interval. This is done in the subsequent iterations.
We now present the recursive procedure SolveRP(ΓI).
First case: NonUrgent(ΓI) = ∅.
Val(`) is a cost function (for every control location `) and can be computed
by solving a finite game in polynomial time. If CFF has p pieces in total, then Val
has at most 2p pieces [BLMR06]. This is a consequence of Fact 3.15.
Second case: LMax 3 `∗ = arg min{pi(`) : ` ∈ NonUrgent(Γ)}.
In the second case of the algorithm, an iterative procedure is applied to
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compute ValΓ over the interval I = [b, e]; in each iteration, the computation is
restricted to the interval [b, r], with r = e in the first iteration.
First, in Step 1, a game Γ′ with one less non-urgent is constructed. We
obtain Γ′ from Γ by making `∗ an urgent control location — this captures the
intuition that, since `∗ minimises the price function, it is beneficial for player Max
to leave `∗ immediately.
Second, in Step 2, the procedure identifies the rightmost interval over which
the function f = ValΓ′(`∗), computed in Step 1, has an affine piece with the slope
strictly shallower than −pi(`∗); the affine piece and the interval are denoted by fi
and [bi, ei], respectively. Third, in Step 2, a new game Γ′′ is constructed; we are
considering this game over the interval [bi, ei]. Like Γ′, the game Γ′′ has one less non-
urgent control location than the game Γ; it is obtained from Γ by turning `∗ into a
goal location with the cost function h = −pi(`∗)(r−x)+ValΓ[r,e](`∗, r) assigned to `∗
— this cost function captures the behaviour contrary to the previously considered
intuition, i.e., that, upon entering `∗ player Max spends all available time there.
The game Γ′′ is used to adjust the solution, to account for states from which the
intuition that leaving `∗ immediately is beneficial for player Max is incorrect. The
slope of fi is shallower than −pi(`∗), and since `∗ minimises the price function, it
means that fi is actually an affine piece of one of the cost functions assigned to goal
locations in the game Γ.
Finally, in Step 3 ValΓ over [bi, e] is being established. It is equal to ValΓ′ over
the interval [ei, r] and to ValΓ′′ over the interval [bi, ei]. The algorithm then proceeds
to the next iteration by setting r = bi; the iterative procedure is completed when
bi = b. The CostConsistent operation is used to assure consistency of solutions
between subsequent iterations.
The procedure is as follows:
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1. Assuming that we have computed ValΓ[r,e] , for some r ∈ I, we set:
Γ′[b,r] =
(
CostConsistent
(
Γ[b,r],ValΓ[r,e]
))
[urg(`∗) := 1] ,
and compute ValΓ′
[b,r]
= SolveRP
(
Γ′[b,r]
)
. Let f = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 = ValΓ′
[b,r]
(`∗).
2. Let i be the smallest natural number such that afi > −pi(`∗) and for all j > i
we have afj 6 −pi(`∗). If i > 0, then we define h : Ifi → R as:
h(x) = −pi(`∗)(efi − x) + fi(efi ),
and we define Γ′′h
bfi ,e
f
i
i as:
Γ′′h
bfi ,e
f
i
i = CostConsistent
(
Γ′h
bfi ,e
f
i
i,ValΓ′
[efi ,r]
)[
LF ∪ `∗, h
]
,
and compute ValΓ[bfi ,efi ]
= SolveRP
(
Γh
bfi ,e
f
i
i).
3. We set
ValΓ[bfi ,e]
= ValΓ′′
[bfi ,efi ]
.ValΓ′
[efi ,r]
.ValΓ[r,e] .
If i = 0 the Γ′′ term is omitted.
We set r = bfi . If r 6= b then goto 1, otherwise output ValΓI .
We initialise the procedure by solving the game Γ′I = ΓI [urg(`
∗) := 1], and setting
r = e. Observe that ValΓ[e,e] = ValΓ′[e,e] .
Third case: LMin 3 `∗ = arg min{pi(`) : ` ∈ NonUrgent(Γ)}.
In the third case of the algorithm, an iterative procedure is applied to com-
pute ValΓ over the interval I = [b, e]; in each iteration, the computation is restricted
to the interval [b, r], with r = e in the first iteration.
First, in Step 1 a game Γ′ with one less non-urgent is constructed. We
obtain Γ′ from Γ by making `∗ a goal location; the cost function h assigned to `∗
109
captures the following behaviour: once `∗ is reached, player Min chooses to spend
all available time there.
Second, in Step 2 the procedure identifies the rightmost interval over which
the function f , computed in Step 1, is strictly smaller than h for at least one
argument; the interval corresponds to an affine segment of f denoted by fi. The
argument, for which the functions f and h are equal, is denoted by x∗ ∈ Ii — such
an argument always exists as f(r) = h(r), by definition. Third, in Step 2 a new
game Γ′′ is constructed. Like Γ′, the game Γ′′ is obtained from Γ by turning `∗ into
a goal location. In this case, however, the cost function assigned to `∗ is fi, and the
game is being considered over the interval [bi, x∗] — the cost function fi captures
the intuition that it is beneficial to leave `∗ immediately. The game Γ′′ is used to
adjust the solution, to account for states from which the intuition that spending
all available time in `∗ is beneficial for player Min is incorrect. The slope of fi is
shallower than that of h, which is equal to −pi(`∗), and since `∗ minimises the price
function, it means that fi is actually an affine piece of one of the cost functions
assigned to goal locations in the game Γ.
Finally, in Step 3 ValΓ over [bi, e] is being established. It is equal to ValΓ′
over the interval [x∗, r] and to ValΓ′′ , over the interval [bi, x∗]. The algorithm then
proceeds to the next iteration by setting r = bi; the iterative procedure is com-
pleted when bi = b. The CostConsistent operation is used to assure consistency of
solutions between subsequent iterations.
The procedure is as follows:
1. Assuming that we have computed ValΓ[r,e] , for some r ∈ I, let h : [b, r] → R
be defined as h(x) = −pi(`∗)(r − x) + ValΓ[r,e](`∗, r), we set:
Γ′[b,r] =
(
CostConsistent
(
Γ[b,r],ValΓ[r,e]
)) [
LF ∪ `∗, h
]
,
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and compute ValΓ′
[b,r]
= SolveRP
(
Γ′[b,r]
)
. We set:
f = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 = min{ValΓ′
[b,r]
(`) : (`∗, `) ∈ A}.
2. Let i be the smallest natural number such that for all j > i we have f(x) > h(x)
over [bfj , e
f
j ]. If i > 0 let x
∗ denote the solution of f(x) = h(x) (over [bfi , e
f
i ]).
We then set:
Γ′′h
bfi ,x
∗
i = CostConsistent(Γ′h
bfi ,x
∗
i,ValΓ′
[x∗,r]
)
[
LF ∪ `∗, fi
]
,
and compute ValΓ′′
[bfi ,x∗]
= SolveRP
(
Γ′′h
bfi ,x
∗
i
)
.
3. We set:
ValΓ[bfi ,e]
= ValΓ′′
[bfi ,x∗]
.ValΓ′
[x∗,r]
.ValΓ[r,e] .
If i = 0 then the Γ′′ term is omitted.
We set r = bi. If r 6= b then goto 1, otherwise output ValΓI .
We initialise the procedure by solving the game Γ[e,e], and setting r = e. Observe
that this can be done in polynomial time.
The following example should provide the intuition behind the iterative pro-
cedure employed during each recursive call of the algorithm.
Example 3.24. Figure 3.3 shows how the iterative procedure in the second case
of the algorithm works to compute ValΓ over the interval I = [b, e]. In diagram a)
we can see that ValΓ has been computed over the interval [r, e]. The function h
(dashed and bold line) denotes the cost function assigned to `∗ in Γ′′, with the affine
segment fi (dotted line), identified in Step 2 of the third case of the algorithm, just
below it. The fine solid line denotes the affine segments of f = ValΓ′, to the right
of fi, as computed in Step 1 of the second case of the algorithm. One can see
that the affine segment fi is such that: over the interval [ei, r] the intuition, which
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indicates that player Max should spend no time in `∗, is correct; and that over the
interval [bi, ei], this intuition is not correct, i.e., it is beneficial for player Max to
spend as much time as possible in `∗. In diagram b) we can see the next iteration
of the algorithm. ValΓ has been computed over [r′ = bi, e]; this iteration follows the
same steps as the previous one. Note that, over the interval [bi, r], ValΓ(`∗) is equal
to f , over the interval [ei, r] and to h, over the interval [bi, ei], as defined in Step 3
of the third case of the algorithm.
Figure 3.4 shows how the iterative procedure in the third case of the algo-
rithm works to compute ValΓ over the interval I = [b, e]. In diagram a) we can see
that ValΓ has been computed over the interval [r, e]. The function h denotes the cost
function assigned to `∗ in Γ′ and the dashed line denotes the function f , as defined
in Step 1 of the third case of the algorithm. One can see that the interval [bi, ei]
and x∗, identified in Step 2 of the third case of the algorithm, are such that: over
the interval [x∗, r] the intuition, which indicates that player Min should spend all
the available time in `∗, is correct; and that over the interval [bi, x∗], this intuition
is not correct, i.e., it is beneficial for player Min to leave `∗ immediately — the
dashed and bold segment of fi denotes the cost function assigned to `∗ in Γ′′. In
diagram b) we can see the next iteration of the algorithm. ValΓ has been computed
over [r′ = bi, e]; this iteration follows the same steps as the previous one. Note that,
over the interval [bi, r], ValΓ(`∗) is equal to h, over the interval [x∗, r] and to fi, over
the interval [bi, x∗], as defined in Step 3 of the third case of the algorithm.
Discussion. We now briefly compare the algorithm presented in this chapter with
that of Bouyer et al. [BLMR06]. The 3EXPTIME algorithm, introduced by Bouyer
et al., differs from the one presented in this chapter in the way the control locations
of player Min are handled. As was explained above, the algorithm presented in
this chapter uses an iterative procedure, similar in spirit to that used for handling
control locations of player Max. The triply-exponential algorithm, on the other
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fi
rb ebi ei
h
fi
r′ = bib eb′i e′i
h
a) b)
Figure 3.3: Iterative computation of ValΓ(`∗) over the interval I = [b, e], where
`∗ ∈ LMax. Diagrams a) and b) depict two subsequent iterations; the grey rectangle
indicates the subinterval for which the ValΓ(`∗) function is being computed during
the given iteration.
fi
x∗ rb ebi ei
h
fi
r′ = bib eb′i
h
x∗′ e′i
a) b)
Figure 3.4: Iterative computation of ValΓ(`∗) over the interval I = [b, e], where
`∗ ∈ LMin. Diagrams a) and b) depict two subsequent iterations; the grey rectangle
indicates the subinterval for which the ValΓ(`∗) function is being computed during
the given iteration.
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hand, exploited the following observation: if the control location ` which minimises
the value of the price function is visited several times, then the player Min would
not be worse off if, upon the first visit, she had waited the whole time that passes
between the first and last visit — this is valid because all other control locations
have a higher value of the price function. This intuition is formally captured by
the algorithm in the following way. Two copies of the original automaton are cre-
ated, with the only difference that in both of them ` becomes a goal location, and
hence both automata have one less non-urgent control location — this duplication
introduces an exponential blowup in complexity. The first automaton captures the
behaviour before ` is entered for the first time, whereas the second copy captures
the behaviour afterwords. In the second copy ` is transformed into a goal location
with a cost function equivalent to positive infinity — this captures the intuition
that it is sufficient to visit ` only once. The algorithm first computes Val for the
second copy. This result is used to compute Val(`) in the first copy (a game with a
single non-urgent control location). Finally, the algorithm computes Val for the first
copy, with Val(`), computed in the previous step, being assigned as a cost function
to `. The sought solution is Val computed for the first copy. The second expo-
nential blowup originated from the construction that allowed to assume that the
clock value is bound by 1. The construction used by Bouyer et al. [BLMR06] used
control locations to encode the integer part of the clock value, and the clock itself
captured only the fractional part of the clock value — this yielded an exponential
blowup, as there had to be a copy of the original control location for every integer
value between 0 and the value of the largest constant provided in the definition of
the automaton (recall, that constants are encoded in binary). Our construction,
presented in Section 3.1.1, avoids this blowup.
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Computing almost optimal strategies
In the previous section we have presented an algorithm that, for a reachability-price
game on a single-clock timed automaton, computes its game value, i.e., a function
from states to real numbers. Although real-valued functions are not necessarily
finitely representable, the function computed by the algorithm is a cost function
locationwise; cost functions can be represented finitely — they are definable (recall
Remark 3.13). In this section we will prove existence of ε-optimal strategies for both
players, and explain how to define them.
The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 3.25. Given a determined reachability-price game Γ on a single-clock
timed automaton, if ValΓ(`) is a cost function for every control location `, then for
every ε > 0, positional ε-optimal strategies exist for both players.
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemmas 3.27–3.28, which establish the existence
of positional ε-optimal strategies for players Min and Max, respectively.
Before we state and prove Lemmas 3.27–3.28, we state the following result,
which captures an essential property of the Val function.
Lemma 3.26. Given a determined reachability-price game Γ and a control location
` ∈ LMin, let:
h(x) = min{Val(`′, x) : (`, `′) ∈ A},
we then have:
Val(`) = minC(h, pi(`)).
If ` ∈ LMax then, if we substitute max for min and maxC for minC, the same equality
holds.
Proof. Note that determinacy of Γ guarantees that both the lower and the upper
values of the game are finite. The lemma could have been strengthened by weak-
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ening the assumptions to require only that the upper and lower values are finite.
Determinacy would then have been a consequence of this proof.
Let Γ be a determined reachability-price game, restricted to the interval I.
We prove the lemma in two steps. First, we will prove that Val∗(`, x) > h(x) − ε,
for all x ∈ I. Second, we prove that Val∗(`, x) 6 h(x) + ε, for all x ∈ I.
The first step is to prove that Val∗(`, x) > h(x) − ε, for x ∈ I. Fix ε > 0,
an ε-optimal strategy of player Max χε, and a state s = (`, x) ∈ SMin. For every
µ ∈ ΣMin, let ω = s t−→ s′ (`,`
′)−−−→ ω′ denote the unique run Run(s, µ, χε) (without loss
of generality we can assume that there is a single continuous transition). We then
have:
P(ω) = t · pi(`) + P(ω′)
> t · pi(`) + Val((`′, x+ t))− ε
> t · pi(`) + min
(`,`′)∈A
Val((`′, x+ t))− ε
> min
06t6e−x
(
t · pi(`) + min
(`,`′)∈A
Val((`′, x+ t))
)
− ε
= minC(h, pi(`))(x)− ε,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that χε is ε-optimal. Due to the
arbitrary choice of µ, we have obtained Val∗(s) > Valχε(s) > h(x)− ε.
The second step of the proof, is to prove that h(x) > Val∗(`, x)− ε.
Fix ε > 0, and µε, an ε-optimal strategy of player Min,. We define µ∗ in the
following way:
µ∗(s′) =

t∗ if s = (`, x),
`∗ if s = (`, x+ t∗),
µε(s′) otherwise,
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where:
t∗ = arg min06t6e−x t · pi(`) + h(x+ t),
`∗ = arg min(`,`′)∈A Val(`
′, x+ t∗).
To finish the proof, we now show that µ∗ is a witness to the h(x) > Val(`, x) − ε
inequality. Consider a run ω = s t
∗−→ s′ (`,`
′)−−−→ ω′ = Run(s, µ∗, χ), for some χ ∈ ΣMax.
We then have:
P(ω) = t∗ · pi(`) + P(ω′)
6 t∗ · pi(`) + Val(`∗, x+ t∗) + ε
= minC(h, pi(`)) + ε.
The inequality is a consequence of the fact that µ∗ is an ε-optimal strategy in a
reachability-price game starting in state (`∗, x+ t∗). The final equality follows from
the definition of the h function and the minC operator. Due to the arbitrary choice
of χ, we have established h(x) + ε > Valµ∗(`, x) > Val∗(`, x).
We have obtained the desired result. Analogous reasoning allows to establish
equality for the control locations of player Max.
Lemma 3.27. Provided that Val is a cost function locationwise, there exists a nat-
ural number K such that for every ε > 0, there exists a positional ε-optimal strategy
µε ∈ ΣMin such that the number of discrete transitions in the run ωStop(ω) is not
greater than K, where ω = Run(s, µε, χ), for every s ∈ S and for every χ ∈ ΣMax.
Lemma 3.28. Provided that Val is a cost function locationwise, for every ε > 0,
there exists a positional ε-optimal strategy χε ∈ ΣMax.
We omit the proof of Lemma 3.28, as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.27,
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with the only difference that we do not need to guarantee a bound on the number
of discrete transitions.
Proof of Lemma 3.27. To construct an ε-optimal positional strategy, we are relying
on the fact that the game is determined and that the value function is a cost function
locationwise.
We will say, that a strategy µ ∈ ΣMin has a step-bound K in state s, if for
every strategy χ ∈ ΣMax and every run ω = Run(s, µ, χ), the number of discrete
transitions in the run ωStop(ω) is less or equal to K. We say that a strategy has a
step-bound K, if it has a step-bound K in every state.
To prove the lemma, we will construct a positional strategy µ∗ ∈ ΣMin, and
prove that it is ε-optimal for some ε > 0, and that it has a step-bound. We assume
that Γ is determined, and that Val(`) is a cost function for every control location
`. This allows us to partition the interval I = [b, e], over which the game is played,
into a finite number of intervals I1, . . . , Ik in such a way that for every i = 1, . . . , k,
and for every ` ∈ L, the function Val(`)|Ii is affine.
We start with the following observation. In runs from states having e as the
clock value only discrete transitions are admissible, i.e., we are dealing with a game
on a finite graph. Clearly (see Section 2.2.2), there exist a natural number K and a
positional ε-optimal strategy µε ∈ ΣMin for every ε > 0, that has a bound K in all
states with clock value e.
We will now define a function D : S → N, which will aid our definition of
the strategy µ∗. Intuitively, the function D measures the “distance” to a goal state,
where the distance measures the necessary number of discrete transitions in a run
induced by an ε-optimal strategy. The key concept behind the definition, formally
captured by Lemma 3.26, is as follows. If the slope of the value function in the given
control location and at the given clock value is equal to the negative of the price of
that control location, then it is beneficial for the player to wait (as long as the slope
remains equal) — the distance does not increase. Only when the slope is different,
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it is beneficial for a player to perform a discrete transition, to a state with the same
game value, but with a smaller distance.
We define a function D : S → N in the following way. For ` ∈ LF, we set
D(`, ·) = 0; for ` ∈ LMin \ LF, we set:
D((`, x)) =

0 if x = e,
1 + min
{
D(`′, x) : (`, `′) ∈ A and
Val(`, x) = Val(`′, x)
} if t∗(`,x) = 0,
D
(
`, x+ t∗(`,x)
)
if t∗(`,x) 6= 0;
and for ` ∈ LMax \ LF, we set:
D((`, x)) =

0 if x = e,
max
{
1 + max
{
D(`′, x) :
(`, `′) ∈ A and Val(`, x) = Val(`′, x)
}
,
D
(
`, x+ t∗(`,x)
)} otherwise,
where
t∗(`,x) = max
{
t : Val(`, x+ t) = Val(`, x)− pi(`) · t and t ∈ T
}
.
The definition of the t∗(`,x) value is similar to that of t
∗, found in the proof of
Lemma 3.26, and characterises the “optimal” time to spend in control location
`, given that the clock value is x. The definition of the D function is different
depending on the ownership of the control location. In the case of player Min, we
assume that she wants to minimise the number of discrete transitions; she chooses
such transitions only when it is strictly necessary. In the case of player Max, we
assume the opposite; he chooses a discrete transition whenever possible, and in such
a way, as to maximise the distance to the goal location — this is consistent with his
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game goal.
We now explain why the D function is bounded. First, observe that its value
is finite for every state s (by Assumption 3.12). Second, observe that, for every
control location `, the value of the function D((`, ·)) is constant over [bi, ei), for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We now define the positional strategy µ∗, as postulated in the lemma state-
ment.
µ∗(`, x) =

µε(`, x) if x = e,(
`, `∗(`,x)
)
if t∗(`,x) = 0,
t∗(`,x) otherwise,
where µε is the positional ε-optimal strategy that has bound K in states states with
clock value e; t∗(`,x) is defined as before; and the value of `
∗
(`,x) is defined as:
`∗(`,x) = arg min`′
{
D(`′, Ii) :
(`, `′) ∈ A,Val(`, x) = Val(`′, x), x ∈ Ii, and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
.
Notice that µ∗ is guided by the distance function. First, it prescribes a
discrete transition only if it is strictly necessary. Second, the discrete transition
prescribed is such that the state reached has the smallest distance possible.
Before we start proving that µ∗ is ε-optimal, and that it has a finite bound, we
discuss its main properties. Recall that Lemma 3.26, together with Proposition 3.18,
establishes that for ` ∈ LMin, the slope of the affine segments of Val(`) are not
steeper than −pi(`). This allows us to establish that for every clock value x ∈ I, if
we set t = t∗(`,x) then the value of the following expression is minimised:
Val(`, x+ t) + pi(`) · t,
and that for t > t∗(`,x) the value of this expression is strictly greater. This allows us
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establish that for every state s ∈ SMin and a transition s µ
∗(s)−−−→ s′, if µ∗(s) ∈ T then
we have:
Val(s) = t∗s · pi(`) + Val(s′),
D(s) = D(s′),
or, if µ∗(s) ∈ A then we have:
Val(s) = Val(s′),
D(s) = 1 +D(s′).
We now proceed to prove that µ∗ is ε-optimal, and that it has a step-bound
of N = sups∈SD(s)+K. Consider a run ω = Run(s, µ∗, χ), starting in some state s,
induced by µ∗ and some strategy χ ∈ ΣMax. For every transition si λi+1−−−→ si+1 we
have that if λi+1 ∈ T then
Val(si) > λi+1 · pi(`) + Val(si),
D(si) > D(si),
or, if λi+1 ∈ A, then:
Val(si) > Val(si+1),
D(si) > 1 +D(si+1).
Let n = min{i : si = (`, e), for some ` ∈ L}. Notice that n 6 D(s). If we
sum up the n inequalities, we obtain
Val(s) > Price(ωn) + Val(sn).
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Using the fact that the clock value in sn is equal to ek, and that µε is ε-optimal, we
obtain:
Val(s) > Price(ωn) + P(Run(ωn, µ∗, χ))− ε = P(ω)− ε.
Notice that ω has at most D(s) + K discrete transitions before a goal state is
reached. This, due to the arbitrary choice of χ, the strategy of player Max, yields
the desired result, i.e., that Val(s) > Valµ∗(s) − ε, and that µ∗ has a step-bound
N = sups∈SD(s) +K. (recall that the function D is bounded).
Corollary 3.29. Positional ε-optimal strategies for both players are definable.
Proof. The Corollary follows from the proofs of Lemmas 3.27–3.28.
3.3.2 Correctness and complexity
In this section we will provide a proof that the algorithm (introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3.1) for computing the value of reachability-price games on single-clock timed
automata is correct, and as a consequence, that these games are positionally deter-
mined. Determinacy of reachability-price games will imply the existence and com-
putability of almost optimal positional strategies for both players (a consequence of
the results introduced in Section 3.3.1).
The main results presented in this section are that the procedure SolveRP,
introduced in Section 3.3.1, correctly computes the value of a reachability-price game
on a single-clock timed automaton (Theorem 3.32), and that the running time of
the algorithm is at most exponential (Theorem 3.38).
The section is organised as follows. First we establish correctness of some
auxiliary operations used by the algorithm. Second, we state and prove Theo-
rem 3.32, i.e., that the algorithm correctly computes game values. Third, we con-
clude this section with the statement and proof of Theorem 3.38, i.e., that the
algorithm runs in exponential time.
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We start by proving the correctness of the CostConsistent operation, intro-
duced in Section 3.3.1. Fix a game Γ and two intervals I1 = [b1, e1] and I2 = [b2, e2]
such that r = e1 = b2. Recall that the purpose of the CostConsistent operation is
to enable us compute ValΓI1∪I2 , provided that we have already computed ValΓI2 . The
intuitive correctness of the CostConsistent operation is formalised by the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.30. If Γ′I1 = CostConsistent(ΓI1 ,ValΓI2 ) then, for every ` ∈ L,
ValΓ′I1
(`) .ValΓI2 (`) = ValΓI1∪I2 (`),
provided that ΓI1 and ΓI2 are determined.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we will first prove that:
ValΓ′I1
(`)(r) = ValΓI2 (`)(r)
and then proceed to prove that:
ValΓ′I1
(`) .ValΓI2 (`) = ValΓI1∪I2 (`),
for ` ∈ L.
We start by proving that:
ValΓ′I1
(`)(r) 6 ValΓI2 (`)(r),
for all ` ∈ L. Clearly, the inequality holds for all ` ∈ LMin because in Γ′ we have
the transition (`, `′) and CFF′(`′)(r) = ValΓI2 (`)(r). It now remains to argue that
the same inequality holds for ` ∈ LMax. First, observe that if for all states (`′′, r)
such that (`, `′′) ∈ A, we have ValΓ′I1 (`
′′)(r) 6 ValΓI2 (`
′′)(r), then ValΓ′I1 (`)(r) 6
ValΓI2 (`)(r). Second, recall that we are considering games where player Min can
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ensure that a goal location can be reached from every control location. These two
observations allow us to iteratively show the sought upper bound for all control
locations ` ∈ LMax. We start by showing the bound for control locations whose
successors are either goal or player Min’s control locations. In subsequent iterations
we show the bound for control locations whose successors are either goal, player
Min’s, or processed player Max’s control locations. We use the first observation to
show the upper bound. The second observation allows us to establish that in each
iteration we process, i.e., show the bound, at least one new control location. If we
could not do this, this would mean that player Max can enforce a cycle on non-goal
control locations, which in turn would contradict the assumption that player Min
can enforce reaching a goal location. This way we have shown that the inequality
holds in all control locations.
To prove the opposite inequality, i.e,
ValΓ′I1
(`)(r) > ValΓI2 (`)(r),
we proceed in a similar fashion as above. However, we need to observe that, unlike
player Max, player Min can potentially form “cycles of control locations”. To alle-
viate this problem, we point out that in a situation where time can not progress,
a cycle is not beneficial for player Min. This allows us to apply the iterative proof
technique used in the proof of the 6 inequality.
From the fact that Γ is simple we have
ValΓI2 =
(
ValΓI1∪I2 )
)
|I2
.
It remains to show that
ValΓ′I1
=
(
ValΓI1∪I2 )
)
|I1
.
We prove this by showing that if in one game a player can choose a strategy that
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assures a certain payoff, then by switching to the other game the payoff would not
improve. We show this through an analysis of game runs. It suffices to consider
runs that visit a state in SI1 ∩ SI2 .
Consider a run ω in the game ΓI1∪I2 , and a state si along that run, such that
si ∈ SI1 and si+1 ∈ SI2 . We can transform ω into ω′ by introducing an additional
state s′i ∈ SI1 ∩ SI2 and substituting the transition si
ti+1−−→ si+1 by si t
′−→ s′i t
′′−→ si+1.
Since ti+1 = t′ + t′′, the price, visited control locations and the final state of ω′ are
the same as of ω. From this we can conclude that in order to establish ValΓI1∪I2 , it is
without loss of generality if we only consider strategies with the following property.
For every state s ∈ SI1 , if a run generated by these strategies visits a state s′ ∈ SI2 ,
then it visits a state in SI1 ∩ SI2 .
Fix ε > 0. Take strategies µε ∈ ΣMin and χε ∈ ΣMax that are ε-optimal
in ΓI1∪I2 for players Min and Max respectively. Given a state s, consider ω =
Run(s, µε, χε). As outlined earlier, we can view ω as a concatenation of two runs ω1
with all states in SI1 and ω2 with all states in SI2 , with the ending state of ω1 (the
initial state of ω2) in SI1 ∩ SI2 — let us denote this state by sω. Thus, for every
state s ∈ SI1 , we have:
ValΓI1∪I2 (s) > PΓI1∪I2 (ω)− ε
> Price(ω1) + PΓI1∪I2 (ω2)− ε
> Price(ω1) + ValΓI1∪I2 (sω)− 2ε
= Price(ω1) + ValΓ′I1
(sω)− 2 · ε
= PΓ′I1 (ω1)− 2 · ε
> ValΓ′I1 (s)− 3 · ε,
We have shown that (ValΓI1∪I2 )|I1(s) > ValΓ′I1 (s), for every state s ∈ S. To finish
the proof, we need to show that (ValΓI1∪I2 )|I1(s) 6 ValΓ′I1 (s), for every state s ∈ S.
We prove this in a similar fashion, by showing that ValΓI1∪I2 (s) 6 ValΓ′I1 (s) + 3 · ε,
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for every state s ∈ S.
The second operation used by the SolveRP procedure is an operation that
allows to compute the Val function for some determined game Γ, provided that
for some control location `, the function has already been computed, i.e., that the
function x 7→ Val(`, x) is known. We now formally establish correctness of this
operation.
Lemma 3.31. Given a determined reachability-price game Γ over an interval I, a
control location `, and a cost function h : I → R>0, if h(x) = ValΓ(`, x), for every
x ∈ I, then:
ValΓ[LF∪`,h](`
′, x) = ValΓ(`′, x),
for every control location `′ ∈ L and every clock valuation x ∈ I.
Proof. Lemma 3.31 is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.26, which characterises the
relation between the game values in adjacent control locations.
We show that the procedure SolveRP is correct, i.e., that if it terminates, the
output is in fact the Val function, and that it indeed terminates. Later, we will also
show that there is an exponential upper bound on the running time of SolveRP.
Theorem 3.32. Given a reachability-price game Γ, the SolveRP(Γ) procedure ter-
minates and outputs the function ValΓ, which is a cost function at every control
location.
We will prove the theorem in two steps. First, we prove that if the iterative
procedure in cases 2 and 3 terminates, it computes Val (Theorem 3.33). Second,
we show that it always terminates (Theorem 3.37), i.e., we first show the partial,
and then the full correctness of the algorithm. Notice that this algorithmic result
implies determinacy of Γ.
Theorem 3.33. Given a reachability-price game Γ, if SolveRP(Γ) procedure termi-
nates, it outputs the function ValΓ, which is a cost function at every control location.
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Proof. The proof is inductive. Fix Γ and let ` be the non-urgent control location
that minimises pi(`). Assume that Γ has n + 1 non-urgent control locations and
that Theorem 3.33 holds for every game Γ′ that has at most n non-urgent control
locations.
If there are only urgent control locations then computing ValΓ amounts to
solving a reachability-price game on a finite graph. It remains to prove the inductive
step. There are two cases to consider: the first case when ` ∈ LMin and the second
case when ` ∈ LMax. The proof of these two cases follows from Lemmas 3.34 and
3.36.
First we consider the case when l ∈ LMax. This case is handled in the same
way as in the algorithm of Bouyer et al. [BLMR06].
Lemma 3.34. Given a reachability-price game in which the control location with
the smallest value of the price function is in LMax, if the second case of SolveRP
procedure terminates, then it outputs ValΓ, which is a cost function at every control
location.
Before we begin the actual proof of Lemma 3.34, we state the following
instrumental fact.
Lemma 3.35. If the reachability-price game Γ is determined, then for every ε > 0
and for every ε-optimal strategy of player Min, we have that for every χ ∈ ΣMax
and every s ∈ S the following holds:
Val(s) + ε > Price(ωk) + Val(sk),
where ω = Run(s, µε, χ) visits a goal state, and k 6 min{Len(ω),Stop(ω)}.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Take ε > 0, and an ε-optimal strategy of player
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Min µε. Let ω = Run(s, µε, χ) for some χ ∈ ΣMax and some state s. We have:
Val(s) + ε > Valµε(s) > P(ω).
For every k 6 min{Len(ω), Stop(ω)}, we have:
Val(s) + ε > P(ω) = Price(ωk) + P(Run(ωk, µε, χ)).
The choice of χ was arbitrary, hence if we take supremum over χ we obtain
Val(s) + ε > Price(ωk) + Valµε(s) > Price(ωk) + Val(s),
which, due to the arbitrary choice of s, yields the desired result.
Now we can complete the proof of Lemma 3.34.
Proof of Lemma 3.34. We will show that the single iteration of the second case of
the algorithm correctly computes ValΓ over the given interval. Without loss of
generality we assume that we are dealing with a single interval I = [b, e] (in the
actual algorithm, it would have been Ii = [bi, ei = r]). Lemma 3.30 allows us to
establish that results computed in subsequent operations are combined correctly.
Let `∗, Γ′, Γ′′, be defined as in the second case of the algorithm. There are
two cases to consider: the first case, in which the slope of ValΓ′(`∗) is steeper than or
equal to −pi(l), and the second case, in which the slope of ValΓ′(`∗) is shallower than
−pi(`∗). In the first case we will show that ValΓ′(s) = ValΓ(s) for every state s, and
in the second case we will show that ValΓ′′(s) = ValΓ(s) for every state s. To achieve
this goal, we will show that ValΓ exists, i.e., that Γ is determined, and that that it
is indeed equal to ValΓ′ and ValΓ′′ , respectively. In particular, this implies that ValΓ
is a cost function at every control location. In the proof we will be relying on the
inductive hypothesis that the games with one less non-urgent control location are
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determined, that the Val function for such games is a cost function at every control
location, and that the algorithm computes the game value correctly for such games.
Note that Γ′ and Γ′′ have one less non-urgent control location than Γ.
The games Γ′ and Γ′′ can be simulated in Γ by choosing an appropriate
strategy χ ∈ ΣMax. In the first case this strategy would leave `∗ immediately, and
in the second case this strategy would spend all available time in `∗. We use this
observation to establish that, depending on the case:
ValΓ′ (s) 6 Val∗Γ(s) or ValΓ′′ (s) 6 Val∗Γ(s),
for every s ∈ S. Recall the definition of Val∗, which states that for every χ ∈ ΣMax,
and every s ∈ S, we have that Valχ(s) 6 Val∗Γ(s).
To show determinacy of Γ, and to prove that ValΓ is indeed computed
correctly, it remains to show that, depending on the case, Val∗Γ(s) 6 ValΓ′(s)
or Val∗Γ(s) 6 ValΓ′′(s) for all states s. To achieve this, in the case of Γ′, we
choose an ε > 0, and we fix a strategy µε ∈ ΣMin, which has some desired prop-
erties, and show that for every χ ∈ ΣMax, and every state s ∈ S we have that
PΓ(Run(s, µε, χ)) 6 ValΓ′(s) + ε. This, due to the arbitrary choice of χ, estab-
lishes that ValΓµε(s) 6 ValΓ′(s) + ε, this in turn, by definition of Val∗, establishes
that Val∗Γ(s) 6 ValΓ′ (s), which yields the desired result. The case of Γ′′ is handled
analogously.
We will restrict the set of states to ({`∗} × I)∩ S, and apply Lemma 3.31 to
establish that the result holds for all states.
There are two cases to consider. We start with the first, i.e., the case when
the slope of ValΓ′(`∗) is steeper than or equal than −pi(`∗) over I. We will show that
Val∗Γ(`∗)(x) 6 ValΓ′(`∗)(x), for x ∈ I.
Before we proceed with the proof, we introduce a simplifying assumption
on the structure of the runs. Observe that a finite number of consecutive continu-
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ous transitions in one control location can be substituted with a single continuous
transition, which bears the same price as the accumulated price of the substituted
transitions — this is a consequence of the fact that the price function is linear with
respect to the duration of a transition. This observation, together with Remark 2.33,
allows us, without the loss of generality, to restrict our consideration to runs which
are alternating sequences of discrete and continuous transitions.
Let K be the upper bound on the number of visits to a control location in
Γ′ postulated in Lemma 3.27. Given ε′ 6 ε/K, let µε′ ∈ ΣMin be an ε′-optimal
strategy, in Γ′ that has a step-bound K. Notice that µε′ is a valid Γ strategy, with
the same step-bound. For every χ ∈ ΣMax in Γ, and for every s ∈ {`∗} × I, let ω
denote the unique run Run(s, µε′ , χ), and let’s assume it visits `∗ exactly m times,
after transitions i1, . . . , im. We then have the following:
PΓ(ω) = Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ(Run(ωim+1, µε′ , χ)
6 Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ′(Run(ωim+2, µε′ , χ)
6 Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sim+2) + ε′
6 Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sim+1) + ε′
6 Price(ωim) + ValΓ′(sim) + ε′,
where si = (`i, xi). The first inequality holds because λim+2 is a discrete transition,
which does not incur a price, and because the suffix of ω starting in sim+2 does not
visit `∗. The second inequality holds because µε′ is an ε′-optimal strategy of player
Min in Γ′. The third inequality holds because, by definition (`∗ is an urgent control
location),
ValΓ′(`∗)(x) = max
(`∗,`)∈A′
ValΓ′(`)(x)
over the interval I. The fourth inequality holds because, in the case being considered,
the slope of ValΓ′(`∗) is steeper than or equal to −pi(`∗) over the interval I.
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If m > 1 then we continue the proof in an inductive fashion. Assume that
we have shown
PΓ(ω) 6 Price(ωij+1) + ValΓ′(sij+1) + (m− j) · ε′,
for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. We then have:
PΓ(ω) 6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗)
+Price
((
Run(ωij+1, µε, χ)
)
ij+1−ij−1
)
+ValΓ′(sij+1) + (m− i) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗)
+Price
((
Run(ωij+2, µε, χ)
)
ij+1−ij−2
)
+ValΓ′(sij+1) + (m− i) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sij+2) + (m− i+ 1) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sij+1) + (m− i+ 1) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + ValΓ′(sij+1) + (m− i+ 1) · ε′
Inequalities 2–5, with the exception of inequality 3, are justified in the same fash-
ion as inequalities 1–4, in the first step of the proof of this case. We now justify
inequality 3. Note that
ω′ = Run(ωij+2, µ
′
ε, χ)ij+1−ij−2
visits `∗ only upon entering sij+1, hence k = ij+1−ij−2 6 min{Len(ω′),StopΓ′(ω′)}
— we can therefore apply Lemma 3.35.
To finish the proof of this case, we observe that Len(ωi1) = 0 and, as a
consequence, PriceΓ(ωi1) = 0. Hence, we have shown that PΓ(ω) 6 ValΓ′(s) + ε.
We now proceed to the second case, i.e., the case when the slope of ValΓ′(`∗)
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is shallower than −pi(`∗), over I. We will show that Val∗Γ(`∗)(x) 6 ValΓ′′(`∗)(x), for
x ∈ I (recall that the slope of ValΓ′′(`∗) is equal to −pi(`∗) over I).
Let K be the upper bound on the number of visits to a control location in Γ′′,
postulated in Lemma 3.27. Given ε′ 6 ε/K, let µε′ ∈ ΣMin be ε′-optimal strategy,
in Γ′′ that has a step-bound K. Notice that µε′ is a valid Γ strategy with the same
step-bound. For every χ ∈ ΣMax in Γ, and for every s ∈ {`∗} × I, let ω denote
the unique run Run(s, µε′ , χ), and let’s assume it visits `∗ exactly m times, after
transitions i1, . . . , im. We then have the following:
PΓ(ω) = Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ(Run(ωim+1, µε′ , χ)
6 Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ′′(Run(ωim+2, µε′ , χ)
6 Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sim+2) + ε′
6 Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sim+1) + ε′
6 Price(ωim) + ValΓ′′(sim) + ε′,
where si = (`i, xi). The first inequality holds because λim+2 is a discrete transition,
which does not incur a price, and because the suffix of ω starting in sim+2 does not
visit `∗. The second inequality holds because µε′ is an ε′-optimal strategy of player
Min in Γ′′. The third inequality holds because, by definition,
ValΓ′′(`∗)(x) > max
(`∗,`)∈A′
ValΓ′(`)(x)
over the interval I. The fourth inequality holds because, in the case being considered,
the slope of ValΓ′′(`∗) is equal to −pi(`∗) over the interval I.
If m > 1, then we continue the proof in an inductive fashion. Assume that
we have shown
PΓ(ω) 6 Price(ωij+1) + ValΓ′′(sij+1) + (m− j) · ε′,
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for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. We then have:
PΓ(ω) 6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗)
+Price
((
Run(ωij+1, µε, χ)
)
ij+1−ij−1
)
+ValΓ′′(sij+1) + (m− i) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗)
+Price
((
Run(ωij+2, µε, χ)
)
ij+1−ij−2
)
+ValΓ′′(sij+1) + (m− i) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sij+2) + (m− i+ 1) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + λij+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sij+1) + (m− i+ 1) · ε′
6 Price(ωij ) + ValΓ′(sij+1) + (m− i+ 1) · ε′
Inequalities 2–5, with the exception of inequality 3, are justified in the same fash-
ion as inequalities 1–4, in the first step of the proof of this case. We now justify
inequality 3. Note that ω′ = Run(ωij+2, µ′ε, χ)ij+1−ij−2 visits `∗ only upon entering
sij+1, hence k = ij+1− ij −2 6 min{Len(ω′),StopΓ′′(ω′)}— we can therefore apply
Lemma 3.35.
Secondly we consider the case when ` ∈ LMin.
Lemma 3.36. Given a reachability-price game in which the control location with the
smallest value of the price function is in LMin, if the third case of SolveRP procedure
terminates, then it outputs ValΓ, which is a cost function, locationwise.
Proof. We will show that the single iteration of the third case of the algorithm
correctly computes ValΓ over the given interval. Without loss of generality, we
assume that we are dealing with a single interval I = [b, e] (in the third case of the
algorithm it would have been Ii = [bi, ei = r]). Lemma 3.30 allows us to establish
that results computed in subsequent operations are combined correctly.
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Let `∗, Γ′, Γ′′, and x∗ ∈ I be defined as in the third case of the algorithm.
There are two cases; we will show that ValΓ′
[x∗,e]
(s) = ValΓ[x∗,e](s) for every state s,
and that ValΓ′′
[b,x∗]
(s) = ValΓ[b,x∗](s), for every state s. To achieve this goal, we will
show that ValΓ exists, i.e., that Γ is determined, and that that it is indeed equal to
ValΓ′ and ValΓ′′ over the designated sets of states. In particular, this implies that
ValΓ is a cost function, locationwise. In the proof, we will be relying on the inductive
hypothesis that the games with one less non-urgent control location are determined;
that the Val function for such games is a cost function, locationwise; and that the
algorithm computes the game value correctly for such games. Note that Γ′ and Γ′′
have one less non-urgent control location than Γ.
The games Γ′ and Γ′′ can be simulated in Γ by choosing an appropriate
strategy µ ∈ ΣMin. In the first case this strategy would spend all available time in
`∗, and in the second case this strategy would leave `∗ immediately. We use this
observation to establish that, depending on the case:
ValΓ′ (s) > Val
∗
Γ(s) or ValΓ′′ (s) > Val
∗
Γ(s),
for every s ∈ S. Recall the definition of Val∗, which states that for every µ ∈ ΣMin,
and every s ∈ S, we have that Valµ(s) > Val∗Γ(s).
To show determinacy of Γ, and to prove that ValΓ is indeed computed
correctly, it remains to show that, depending on the case, Val∗Γ(s) > ValΓ′(s)
or Val∗Γ(s) > ValΓ′′(s) for all states s. To achieve this, in the case of Γ′, we
choose an ε > 0, and we fix a strategy χε ∈ ΣMax, which has some desired prop-
erties, and show that for every µ ∈ ΣMin and every state s ∈ S, we have that
PΓ(Run(s, µ, χε)) > ValΓ′(s)− ε. This, due to the arbitrary choice of µ, establishes
that ValΓχε(s) > ValΓ′(s) − ε, which in turn, by definition of Val∗, establishes that
Val∗Γ(s) > ValΓ′(s), which yields the desired result. The case of Γ′′ is handled
analogously.
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We will restrict the set of states to ({`∗} × I)∩ S, and apply Lemma 3.31 to
establish that the result holds for all states.
There are two cases to consider. We start with the first case, i.e., we will
show that Val∗Γ(`∗)(x) > ValΓ′(`∗)(x) for all x ∈ [x∗, e].
Fix ε > 0 and χε ∈ ΣMax, a ε-optimal strategy of player Max in the game Γ′
(note that Γ and Γ′ admit the same sets of strategies). For every strategy µ of
player Min, and for every state s ∈ ({`∗} × [x∗, e]) ∩ S, let ω denote the unique
run in Run(s, µ, χε), and let’s assume it visits `∗ exactly m times, after transitions
i1, . . . , im. We assume, without loss of generality, that after every such transition, a
continuous one is taken. We then have:
P(ω) = Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ(Run(ωim+1, µ, χε))
> Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ′(Run(ωim+2, µ, χε))
> Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sim+2)− ε
> Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sim+1)− ε
> Price(ωi1) + (xim + λim+1 − xi1) · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′(sim+1)− ε
> Price(ωi1) + (e− xi1) · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′((`∗, e))− ε
= ValΓ′(s)− ε,
where si = (`i, xi). The first inequality holds because λim+2 is a discrete transition,
which does not incur a price, and because the suffix of ω, starting in sim+2, does not
visit `∗. The second inequality holds because χε is an ε-optimal strategy of player
Max in Γ′. The third inequality holds because, by definition,
ValΓ′(`∗)(x) 6 min
(`∗,`)∈A′
ValΓ′(`)(x)
over the interval [x∗, e]. The fourth inequality holds because `∗ minimises the value
of the price function pi. The fifth inequality holds because s = si1 , which implies
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Len(ω) = 0, and because, by definition, the slope of ValΓ′(`∗) is equal to −pi(`∗).
The final equality follows from the definition of ValΓ′(`∗).
We now proceed to the second case, i.e., we will show that Val∗Γ(`∗)(x) >
ValΓ′(`∗)(x) for x ∈ [b, x∗].
Fix ε > 0 and χε ∈ ΣMax, a ε-optimal strategy of player Max in the game
Γ′′ (note that Γ and Γ′′ admit the same sets of strategies). For every strategy µ
of player Min, and for every state s ∈ ({`∗} × [b, x∗]) ∩ S, let ω denote the unique
run in Run(s, µ, χε), and let’s assume it visits `∗ exactly m times, after transitions
i1, . . . , im. We assume, without loss of generality, that after every such transition, a
continuous one is taken. We then have:
PΓ(ω) = Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ(Run(ωim+1, µ, χε′))
> Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + PΓ′′(Run(ωim+2, µ, χε′))
> Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sim+2, µ, χε′))− ε
> Price(ωim) + λim+1 · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sim+1, µ, χε′))− ε
> Price(ωi1) + (xim + λim+1 − xi1) · pi(`∗) + ValΓ′′(sim+1)− ε
> Price(ωi1) + ValΓ′′(si1)− ε
= ValΓ′′(si1)− ε.
where si = (`i, xi). The first inequality holds because λim+2 is a discrete transition,
which does not incur a price, and because the suffix of ω, starting in sim+2, does not
visit `∗. The second inequality holds because χε is an ε-optimal strategy of player
Max in Γ′′. The third inequality holds and because
ValΓ′′(`∗)(x) = min
(`∗,`)∈A′′
ValΓ′′(`)(x)
over the interval [x∗, e]. The fourth inequality holds because `∗ minimises the value
of the price function pi. The fifth inequality holds because, by definition, the slope of
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ValΓ′′(`∗) is shallower than −pi(`∗). The final equality holds because s = si1 , which
implies that Len(ωi1) = 0.
We have proved that the algorithm is partially correct. It remains to prove
its total correctness, i.e., that it terminates.
Theorem 3.37. The SolveRP procedure terminates.
Proof. To prove termination of the algorithm, we need to prove the termination of
the iterative procedures from second and third cases of the algorithm.
Each of the two cases is different, however, they have one thing in common.
In both cases, in each iteration an interval with slope shallower than −pi(`∗) is
processed. Since `∗ minimises pi(`∗), by Proposition 3.18 and by Lemmas 3.17
and 3.26, this interval corresponds to a segment of a goal cost function. We argue
that the number of iterations in each case is bounded by the number of all the
possible intersections of the cost functions assigned to goal locations, which is finite.
More precisely, let Γ′, I, f and i be defined as in the second case of the
algorithm. The slope of fi over Ii is shallower than −pi(`∗), so by Lemmas 3.17
and 3.26, fi coincides with some cost function over Ii — denoted by g. If i > 1, then
there are two possibilities, either bi coincides with an intersection of cost functions
from two different goal locations, or otherwise fi−1 has the slope equal to −pi(`) for
some non-goal control location `.
In the first case, the iteration processed one of the finitely many intersection
points. In the second case, we need to argue that if the procedure processes the
same affine piece of g more than once (but over a different interval), then it must
have also processed at least one of the finitely many intersection points. Let I ′ =
[b′, e′] ⊆ [b, bi) denote the interval over which the procedure encounters the same
affine piece of g again. Assume that the procedure did not process any intersection
points before I ′. This implies that ValΓ′(`∗) > g over [e′, bi], and hence ValΓ′(`∗)
must contain an affine piece that has a slope shallower than g over [e′, z], for some
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z ∈ (e′, bi]. However, such a piece coincides with a piece of a goal cost function, so
an intersection point must have been processed.
So far we have shown termination of the iterative procedure in the second case
of the algorithm. It remains to show the same for the third case of the algorithm.
Let Γ′, f , i, and x∗ be defined as in the third case of the algorithm. We argue that
each affine segment of a goal cost function is processed only once. If i > 1 then fi−1
either coincides with a different piece of a goal cost function, which means we have
processed one of the finitely many intersection points and the fi segment has been
processed, or its slope is equal to −pi(`) for some non-goal control location `. In
the latter case we have that ValΓ′(`∗) has a slope steeper than fi, and hence, it is
strictly greater than fi over [b, bi). This means that in the subsequent iterations, if
fi is to be processed once again (but over a different interval), a piece with a slope
smaller than that of fi needs to occur. However, such a piece would coincide with
a different segment of an outside cost function, which means that an intersection
point would be processed prior to processing fi once again.
We have shown that in each step of the algorithm the iterative procedure
of the second and third case of the algorithm terminates, and hence, the algorithm
terminates.
We have proved that the SolveRP procedure is correct. The question that
remains is its complexity. We have the following result.
Theorem 3.38. The SolveRP procedure terminates in exponential time.
Proof. Given an automaton A, let n denote the number of non-urgent control lo-
cations and p the total number of pieces in CFF. The complexity of computing
the solution, using SolveRP procedure, depends on the number of affine pieces that
constitute ValΓ. Let N(n, p) denote the upper bound on the number of pieces in
ValΓ. We now construct a recursion to characterise N(n, p).
If n = 0 then N(n, p) 6 2p (recall Fact 3.15. If n > 0 then both cases take p
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(as argued in the proof of Theorem 3.37) iterations, and each requires solving two
games whose Val functions comprise of at most N(n−1, p+n) and N(n−2, p+n−1)
affine segments, respectively. We can assume that p > n is the case of real interest,
so we have N(n, p) 6 2pN(n− 1, 2p). It can be easily verified that:
N(n, p) 6 2
(n+1)(n+2)
2 pn+1.
One can easily check that this is the case for n = 0. Assume that it holds for some
n > 0, we have:
N(n+ 1, p) 6 2p ·N(n, 2p)
6 2p · 2 (n+1)(n+2)2 · (2p)n+1
6 2
(n+1)(n+2)
2
+n+2pn+2
6 2
(n+2)(n+3)
2 pn+2.
This establishes that the number of affine pieces that constitutes the ValΓ function
is at most exponential in the size of the game Γ, which in turn establishes that the
procedure SolveRP terminates in exponential time.
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Chapter 4
Games on price-reward graphs
Price-reward game graphs generalise finite doubly-weighted game graphs, as pre-
sented in Section 2.2.2. A finite doubly-weighted game graph is a directed graph
in which the set of states is partitioned between the two players, Min and Max.
The two weights assigned to edges are the price and the reward. The extension
of doubly-weighted game graphs presented in this chapter is obtained by adding
complexity to the pricing (rewarding) mechanism.
We obtain a price-reward game graph by adding a dynamic weighing mech-
anism — the prices (rewards) are no longer predetermined. Each edge is assigned
two sets of inputs, one for each of the two players. Every time an edge is traversed,
players choose their inputs to determine the edge’s price and reward. Additionally,
price-reward game graphs, as presented in this chapter, may be infinite.
As models, price-reward game graphs allow for modelling systems that fea-
ture transitions whose price and reward is dependent on the behaviour of the con-
troller and the environment. Notice that this behaviour affects only the quantitative
aspect of the transition, not its initial or final state.
This chapter is organised as follows: first we introduce price-reward game
graphs and price-reward games; then we proceed to define average-price-per-reward
games on these graphs, followed by an optimality equation characterisation of game
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values; we conclude the chapter with a proof that average-price-per-reward games,
on finite price-reward game graphs, are determined.
This determinacy result is the main result of this chapter, and is obtained
through a “strategy improvement” like argument. Later, in Chapter 5, we will show
that we can reduce average-price-per-reward games on hybrid systems with strong
resets to average-price-per-reward games on finite price-per-reward games.
4.1 Price-reward game graphs
We start this section by defining price-reward game graphs, and then we proceed to
introduce the standard definitions of runs, strategies, payoffs, and game values which
are needed to formally define price-reward games on price-reward game graphs. The
definitions presented here are similar in spirit to those found Section 2.2.2, but
account for the more complex player interaction. We present them in full for the
sake of clarity.
Definition 4.1 (Price-reward game graph). A price-reward game graph Γ is given
by
Γ =
〈
SMin, SMax,E, I,ΘMin,ΘMax, pi, ρ〉 ,
where:
• SMin ∩ SMax = ∅ are the (possibly infinite) sets of states for players Min and
Max respectively,
• 〈SMin ∪ SMax,E〉 is a (possibly infinite) directed graph,
• I is the set of inputs,
• ΘMin : E→ P(I) is player Min’s input function,
• ΘMax : E→ P(I) is player Max’s input function,
• pi : E× I2 → R is the price function,
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• ρ : E× I2 → R is the reward function.
Remark 4.2. The definition of a price-reward game graph does not place any re-
strictions on the price and reward functions. However, as it will be explained in
Section 4.1.2, some global properties, such as divergence and boundedness, will be
required. They are omitted from the definition, as they are semantic rather than
syntactic.
A price-reward game graph Γ is said to be definable if all its components are
definable. When the payoff functions are given, we will refer to Γ as a price-reward
game.
Similarly to the finite game graphs introduced in Section 2.2.2 the game is
played by moving a token from one state to another, with the state owner deciding
which edge to take. In this case, however, once an edge is chosen, both players
choose inputs, which determine the price and reward incurred.
Remark 4.3. If, for every edge, the price and reward are independent of the inputs
chosen, the inputs can be omitted from the specification. In such a case, we obtain
the classical definition of a doubly-weighted game graph.
The following example shows, how the notion of inputs can be used in mod-
elling.
Example 4.4. Arbitrage is a practise of gaining profit by exploiting the difference
of asset valuation between one or more markets. Figure 4.1 models a very simple
arbitrage process. There are to markets: M1, and M2, and each of them can be in
one of the two states of the conjunctural cycle: High (H) and Low (L).
Player Min models a trader, who continuously buys and sells an asset. Buying
happens when she chooses to proceed to state “Bought”. Upon choosing the relevant
edge, both players choose the inputs, which determine the price and reward of the
edge. Player Min chooses the market in which to buy the asset, and player Max,
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who models the environment, chooses the state of the conjunctural cycle. Similar
interaction occurs when player Min decides to sell, by proceeding to the state “Sold”.
Consider the situation where Min does not hold any assets. She proceeds to
buy, and chooses market M1; player Max decides that the markets are currently at
the high state of the conjunctural state. The price and reward of this edge are thus
5 and 1 respectively.
After a while, player Min decides to sell the assets. She chooses to sell at
market M2, but unfortunately there is a downward swing in the market conjuncture,
which is reflected by Max’s choice of Low conjunctural state. The price and reward
of the relevant edge are thus 1 and 2.
In this particular scenario, player Min lost on her arbitrage attempt; she paid
6 and her reward was only 3.
We now introduce some basic definitions for price-reward game graphs. We
start with moves and runs, and then proceed to strategies. The concepts are intro-
duced in the usual way (see Section 2.2.2), with the only difference that we account
for inputs. Moves are labelled with chosen inputs1, and strategies have two compo-
nents: for “choosing edges” and for “choosing edge inputs”.
We write s θ−→ s′ to denote a move, where e = (s, s′) ∈ E and θ ∈ ΘMin(e)×
ΘMax(e). The price of the move is pi(e, θ) and the reward is ρ(e, θ). A run is
a (possibly infinite) sequence of moves ω = s0
θ1−→ s1 θ2−→ s2 · · · . The set of all runs
of Γ is denoted by Runs, and its subset of all finite runs by Runsfin.
A state strategy of player Min is a partial function µS : Runsfin → E which
is defined on all runs ending with some s ∈ SMin. A strategy is called positional
if for every two runs ω, ω′ ∈ Runsfin we have, if ω and ω′ end in the same state
then µ(ω) = µ(ω′), i.e., it can be viewed as a function µS : SMin → E. Given an
edge e, an e-strategy of player Min is an element x ∈ ΘMin(e). An edge strategy µE :
1Note that in this context the labels assigned to moves differ from the labels in a labelled
transition relation. There the label is a part of a transition, whereas here the label is dynamic and
depending on the players choices, the same transition may bear different labels.
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Sold Bought
Min
Max
M1 M2
H
L
5 7
4 2
Min
Max
M1 M2
H
L
5 7
4 2
Min
Max
M1 M2
H
L
1 1
1 1
Price Reward
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M1 M2
H
L
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RewardPrice
Figure 4.1: A simple price-reward game graph modelling arbitrage between to mar-
kets. All states belong to player Min. The matrices annotating the edges show how
the price (reward) of an edge changes depending on players’ inputs. Player Min can
choose between M1 and M2, whereas player Max can choose between L and H.
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Runsfin × E → I of player Min is a partial function, defined on all pairs of finite
runs ω and edges e such that e originates from the ending state of ω, that assigns
an e-strategy. Similarly to state strategies, an edge strategy is called positional if
for every two runs ω, ω′ ∈ Runsfin, if ω and ω′ end in the same state then for every
edge e originating in that state we have µ(ω, e) = µ(ω′, e), i.e., µE can be viewed as
a function µE : E→ I.
A strategy µ of player Min is a pair (µS, µE) of state and edge strategies. We
denote the set of all such strategies by ΣMin. We say that µ is positional if both µS
and µE are positional. We denote the set of all such positional strategies by ΠMin.
The definitions for player Max are analogous.
Given strategies µ and χ of players Min and Max, and a state s, we write
Run(s, χ, µ) to denote the run starting in s that results from the players playing
according to µ and χ.
Price-reward games. The definition of a game on a price-reward game graph
is complete once we have supplied a payoff function. In this context, the payoff
function maps a run of the game to a real value.
Definition 4.5 (Price-reward game). A price-reward game is a pair 〈Γ,P〉 where:
• Γ is a price-reward game graph, and
• P : Runs→ R is a payoff function.
When the payoff function is clear from the context, we will omit it and refer
to Γ as the price-reward game.
Note that we do not mention definability of P. This is because, in most cases,
it will not be definable. However, that will not be a problem, as we will not need to
approximate or decide the value of this function.
We can now introduce the concept of the value of a price-reward game from a
state. We do this by defining a zero-sum game in strategic form (recall Section 2.2.1),
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which is specific to the given state. Note that game value is in fact a partial function
from states to real values.
Given a state s, let as =
〈
ΣMin,ΣMax,P(Run(s, ·, ·))〉 be a zero-sum game in
strategic form. We say that the game Γ is determined from s if as is determined,
i.e., Val∗(as) = Val∗(as), and positionally determined if
Val(as) = inf
µ∈ΠMin
Valµ(as) = sup
χ∈ΠMax
Valχ(as).
We say that the price-reward game Γ is determined if it is determined from every
state.
For simplicity we will write Val(s) rather then Val(as), in the context of
price-reward games, so Val can be viewed as a partial function S→ R.
We will say that a price-reward game Γ is decidable if the partial function
Val : S→ R is decidable (recall Definition 2.17). We emphasise that Val is a partial
function because Γ does not have to be determined from every state.
4.1.1 Average-price-per-reward games
In this section, we introduce average-price-per-reward games, and provide a char-
acterisation of game values using a set of equations, referred to as average-price-
per-reward optimality equations. The key result is Theorem 4.10, which states that
solutions to average-price-per-reward optimality equations coincide with game val-
ues.
The results presented here are general, and will be applied to finite average-
price-per-reward games (Section 4.2) as well as to their hybrid counterparts (Sec-
tion 5.1.1). The fact that, in both cases, the game values are characterised using
average-price-per-reward optimality equations will be used in the proof of the re-
duction from hybrid games to finite games (Section 5.2.2).
An average-price-per-reward game is played on a price-reward graph Γ. This
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game will be the focus of the rest of the chapter. We will abuse the notation, as
explained earlier, and simply write Γ, without specifying the payoff functions, to
denote the average-price-per-reward game.
The goal of player Min in an average-price-per-reward game Γ is to min-
imise the average price-over-reward ratio in a run, and the goal of player Max is to
maximise it.
As explained in Section 2.2.2 we need to resort to lower and upper payoff
functions to properly define an average-price-per-reward game. This is not a prob-
lem, as strategy and game values for a state of Γ are defined using the framework
of zero-sum games in strategic form.
We define the upper and lower payoff functions in the following way:
A∗(ω) = lim sup
n→∞
∑n
i=0 pi(ei+1, θi+1)∑n
i=0 ρ(ei+1, θi+1)
and
A∗(ω) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n
i=0 pi(ei+1, θi+1)∑n
i=0 ρ(ei+1, θi+1)
,
where ω is an infinite run, si
θi+1−−→ si+1 and ei+1 = (si, si+1) for all i > 0. Note that
A∗ 6 A∗, as required in Remark 2.11.
To guarantee that the payoffs, as introduced above, are always well-defined
we introduce the notions of reward divergence, and price and reward boundedness.
Definition 4.6 (Reward divergence). We say that Γ is f(n)-reward divergent with
a constant c > 0 if, for every run ω, there exists N ∈ N such that
n∑
i=0
ρ(ei+1, θi+1) > c · f(n),
for all n > N .
We assume that Γ is n-reward divergent. Linear (i.e., n) reward divergence
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is required in the proof of Theorem 4.10. Notice that in this definition c is global
whereas N is local, i.e., depends on a particular run. In the proofs of Lemmas
4.12–4.13, existence of global c enables us to define ε-positional strategies, however,
to prove that this definition is correct, existence of local N suffices.
Additionally, we require that Γ is both price and reward bounded, i.e., there
exists M ∈ R>0 such that |pi(e, θ)| < M and |ρ(e, θ)| < M for all e ∈ E, and all
θ ∈ I2. This is necessary to ensure that edge games, as introduced below, are
determined. Moreover, without loss of generality, we assume that the games are
non-blocking, i.e., that for every state s there exists a state s′ such that (s, s′) ∈ E.
The divergence requirement can be seen as a generalisation of the non-
Zenoness requirement to rewards (as in the work of Bouyer et al. [BBL08]); we
want to prevent runs that admit finite rewards. We need at least linear divergence
in the proof of Theorem 4.10. Note that if the reward is simply time, then it is
equivalent to the non-Zenoness condition, i.e., that time diverges. Also note that
one can guarantee n-reward divergence by choosing ρ with a strictly positive lower
bound, i.e., such that there exists c > 0 and ρ(e, θ) > c, for all e ∈ E and all θ ∈ I2.
4.1.2 Optimality equations
Proving that game values exist and computing them using their definitions directly
is difficult. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the payoff function is not definable,
which renders our computational framework useless. In this part of the chapter, we
will introduce a way to alleviate both of those problems.
Similarly to Section 2.2.2, we consider two functions G,B : S → R. We
will refer to these functions as gain and bias respectively, and formulate a set of
equations, called average-price-per-reward optimality equations. Those equations
have the property that if gain and bias functions satisfy those equations, then G(s) =
Val(s) for all s ∈ S.
Optimality equations can be seen as a characterisation of game values, and
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their solutions, if they exist, as witnesses to existence of positional ε-optimal strate-
gies for both players. In the book by Puterman [Put94], a variant is used in the
setting of discounted Markov decision problems. On the other hand, one can also
interpret optimality equations as a medium for reducing an infinite duration game
to a one step game. The latter interpretation comes from the fact that optimality
equations characterise globally optimal choices using local conditions.
To introduce average-price-per-reward optimality equations, we need to de-
fine a special edge game. This new game will be using the edge input sets as strategy
sets, and the payoff function will be given by an algebraic expression that involves
the price and reward functions, as well as a special parameter g. The notion of an
edge game is used for technical reasons, however, it also provides insight into the in-
terpretation of average-price-per-reward optimality equations, especially in the case
of hybrid games, introduced in Chapter 5.
When optimising a move in an average-price-per-reward game, one cannot
decide the best choice of inputs locally, i.e., solely on the values of price and reward.
The special parameter g can therefore be seen as the carrier of information about the
global effect of the move. We will see that, if for every edge players play “optimally”
in this newly introduced edge game, then their play is globally optimal, for the given
choices of edges.
Let Γ be an average-price-per-reward game. For every edge e, we introduce
a game
ae(g) =
〈
ΘMin(e),ΘMax(e),Pe(g)
〉
,
where g is a real-valued parameter, and Pe(g) : I2 → R is defined as pi(e, ·, ·) −
ρ(e, ·, ·) · g. We will refer to it as an edge game. In the formulation of average-price-
per-reward optimality equations we will be referring to the values of the edge game,
so it is necessary to assume that these games are determined, regardless of the value
of g. Note that, for every e ∈ E and g ∈ R, we have that ae(g) is definable if Γ is
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definable.
Assumption 4.7 (Edge game determinancy). For the reminder of this section, we
assume that the price-per-reward game Γ is such that, for every edge e, and every
real value g the game ae(g) is determined in pure strategies.
Let G,B : S→ R such that the range of G is finite, and B is bounded. We say
that a pair of functions (G,B) is a solution of average-price-per-reward optimality
equations for Γ, denoted by (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ), if the following conditions hold
for all states s ∈ SMin:
G(s) = min{G(s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E}, (4.1)
B(s) = inf{Val(a(s,s′)(G(s′))) +B(s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E and G(s) = G(s′)}; (4.2)
and if the following two equations hold for all states in SMax:
G(s) = max{G(s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E}, (4.3)
B(s) = sup{Val(a(s,s′)(G(s′))) +B(s′) : (s, s′) ∈ E and G(s) = G(s′)}.(4.4)
Note that we write min and max, instead of inf and sup, in the equations
4.1 and 4.3, respectively. We can do that because we assumed that the range of the
gain function is finite. In finite price-reward game graphs for instance, due to the
finite number of edges, the gain function has to have a finite range.
Remark 4.8. If Γ is definable then OptAvgPR(Γ) is first-order expressible inM.
In the following example, we show why the edge games, as used in the formu-
lation of the average-price-per-reward optimality equations, have to be parametrised.
Example 4.9. Figure 4.2 depicts a simple, one player average-price-per-reward
game. Note that, depending on the state strategy chosen, a different edge strategy is
beneficial for player Min.
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Consider the edge game a(g) corresponding to the horizontal edge. Player
Min has two inputs to choose from, for simplicity we refer to them as “left” and
“right”. Given a parameter g, the payoff function is defined as follows:
P(g)(i) =

2− 0 · g if i = left
0− 2 · g if i = right
Depending on the g chosen, a different input is optimal. For instance, as Figure 4.2
shows, we have:
P
(
−1
3
)
(left) > P
(
−1
3
)
(right),
and
P(−2)(left) < P(−2)(right).
Consider the average-price-per-reward optimality equations for the game in
Figure 4.2. In every solution, to the optimality equations, the value of gain, for every
state, is equal to −2. Notice that, the optimal input in the edge game a(−2),“left”,
is in fact optimal in the whole game, when Min plays optimally in the grey state,
i.e., by playing “up”.
We now present the main result of this section, i.e., that equations 4.1–4.4
indeed characterise the game values of a average-price-per-reward games on price-
reward game graphs.
Theorem 4.10. If (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ) then for every state s, the average-price-
per-reward game Γ from s is determined and we have Val(s) = G(s). Moreover, for
every ε > 0, positional ε-optimal strategies exist for both players.
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13, and their proofs. The
lemmas imply that for all states s, we have Val∗(s) ≤ G(s) and Val∗(s) ≥ G(s).
This in turn implies that Val∗(s) = Val∗(s) = G(s). Moreover, the proofs of the
lemmas are in fact constructive proofs of the existence of ε-optimal strategies.
151
2
0
0
2
or
−4
1
1
1
−4
1+2 = −43
−4+2
1 = −2
2
0
0
2
or
−4
1
1
1
1
1+2 = −13
1+2
1 = 3
a) b)
Figure 4.2: A simple price-reward graph; all edges, except the horizontal one, have
fixed prices and rewards. The price of an edge is written above it, whereas the reward
is written below. The horizontal edge admits two inputs from player Min, and the
set of inputs for player Max is empty. All states belong to player Min. Figure a)
shows the values of the price-per-reward game from every state, depending on the
chosen inputs, when player Min chooses to play “up” from the grey state. Likewise,
Figure b) shows the respective values when player Min chooses to play “down” from
the grey state.
Corollary 4.11. If there exists definable (G,B) such that (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ)
and Γ is definable, then positional ε-optimal strategies are definable.
Proof. Positional strategies, as constructed in the proof of Lemmas 4.12–4.13, are
definable if (G,B), the solution to OptAvgPR(Γ), is definable.
Lemma 4.12. Let (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ). Then for all ε > 0, there is µε ∈ ΠMin
such that for all χ ∈ ΣMax and for all s ∈ S, we have A∗(Run(s, µε, χ)) ≤ G(s) + ε.
Lemma 4.13. Let (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ). Then for all ε > 0, there is χε ∈ ΠMax
such that for all µ ∈ ΣMin and for all s ∈ S, we have A∗(Run(s, µ, χε)) ≥ G(s)− ε.
We omit the proof of Lemma 4.13 as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.12.
Proof of Lemma 4.12. As argued earlier, a solution to average-price-per-reward op-
timality equations can be seen as a witness for existence of positional ε-optimal
strategies. We will now show how to use this solution, if it exists, to construct an
ε-optimal strategy for player Min. The construction is fairly technical and can be
seen to be focused on choosing locally optimal moves.
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Recall that Γ is n-divergent with constant c. Let us fix ε > 0 for the rest of
the proof.
Given an edge e, ε′ > 0 and g ∈ R let x(e, ε′, g) ∈ ΘMin(e) denote the
ε′-optimal strategy of player Min in the game ae(g), i.e.,
Valx(e,ε
′,g)(ae(g)) 6 Val(ae(g)) + ε′.
We will now construct a positional strategy µε = (µSε , µ
E
ε ) for player Min and
then show that it is ε-optimal. We begin by defining an edge strategy µEε . For every
edge e = (s, s′) we require that:
µEε (e) = x
(
e,
c · ε
2
, G(s)
)
If the solutions to the average-price-per-reward optimality equations exist and edge
games are determined, this requirement can be satisfied. We now proceed to defining
a state strategy µSε . For every state s, and µ
S
ε (s) = s
′ we require that:
G(s) = G(s′)
B(s) > Val(ae(G(s)) +B(s′)− c · ε2
where e = (s, s′). Again, if average-price-per-reward optimality equations solutions
exist and edge games are determined, this requirement can be satisfied. Given the
earlier definition of µEε , for every s ∈ SMin the following holds:
G(s) = G(s′)
B(s) > Pe(G(s))(µE(e), y) +B(s′)− c · ε,
for all y ∈ ΘMax(e).
We now proceed to prove, that µε defined in this way is indeed ε-optimal
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for player Min. For that purpose, let us fix a state s and some arbitrarily chosen
strategy of player Max, χ ∈ ΣMax. Let si θi+1−−→ si+1 be the (i + 1)-th move of
Run(s, µε, χ), and let ei+1 = (si, si+1).
From the definition of µε, regardless of χ, we have:
G(si) > G(si+1)
Therefore, since the range of G is finite, there exists a K ∈ N such that for all i > K,
we have G(si) = G(sK). We will use g = G(sK) in the rest of the proof.
Let L > K. Our definition of µε assures, that regardless of χ, for all i =
K, . . . , L− 1, the following holds:
B(si) > Pei+1(g)(θi+1) +B(si+1)− c · ε.
If we sum up the L−K inequalities (recall that Pe(g)(θ) = pi(e, θ)− ρ(e, θ) · g), we
get:
L−1∑
i=K
B(si) >
L∑
i=K+1
pi(ei, θi)− g ·
L∑
i=K+1
ρ(ei, θi) +
L∑
i=K+1
B(si)− (L−K) · c · ε
That simplifies to:
B(sK)−B(sL)∑L
i=K+1 ρ(ei, θi)
+ g >
∑L
i=K+1 pi(ei, θi)− (L−K) · c · ε∑L
i=K+1 ρ(ei, θi)
Recall that B is bounded, which implies that the left hand side converges to g as
L → ∞. Due to n-reward divergence of Γ (with a constant c), there exists an N
such that for all L > N we have:
(L−K) · c · ε∑L
i=K+1 ρ(ei, θi)
6 ε.
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If we take L to the limit we obtain the following:
g > A∗(Run(s, µε, χ))− ε
This, due to the arbitrary choice of s and χ, yields the desired result.
4.2 Finite average-price-per-reward games
In this section we state and prove the main results of this chapter, i.e., that finite
average-price-per-reward games are determined (Theorem 4.14) and decidable2. We
start by showing determinacy of average-price-per-rewards on finite price-reward
game graphs of out-degree one, i.e., game graphs in which the players only decide
on their edge strategies. To establish this result we use the fact that game values
are characterised using average-price-per-reward optimality equations. We conclude
this section by using strategy improvement to establish determinacy in the general
case.
The rest of this section is committed to the proof of Theorem 4.14. Its proof
follows from Corollary 4.20 and Theorem 4.10, and Theorem 4.22.
Theorem 4.14. Average-price-per-reward games on finite price-reward graphs are
positionally determined and decidable.
To guarantee uniqueness of the constructions, and for technical convenience,
we fix a linear order on the states of the game graph. Given a subgraph S ⊆ Γ,
min(S) denotes the smallest state in S.
4.2.1 Finite game graphs of out-degree one
We prove the following: average-price-per-reward games on finite price-per-reward
game graphs of out degree one are determined. We start by introducing some
2By finite, we mean that the directed graph 〈S,E〉 is finite.
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auxiliary notation regarding strategy subgraphs, and then proceed to establish the
aforementioned result.
Strategy subgraphs. Let Γ be a finite price-reward game graph. Let µS be
a positional state strategy for player Min. Such a strategy induces a subgraph of Γ,
where the E relation is substituted by Eµ defined as
Eµ = {(s, s′) : s ∈ SMin and µE(s) = s′, or s ∈ SMax}.
We denote this game graph by ΓµS . For simplicity, we will write ΓµSχS instead of
(ΓµS)χS .
A finite connected price-reward game graph of out-degree one is called a sun.
Such a graph contains a unique cycle, referred to as the rim. States which are on
the rim are called rim states and the remaining ones are called ray states.
Remark 4.15. If µ ∈ ΠMin, χ ∈ ΠMax, and Γ is a price-reward game graph,
then ΓµSχS is a union of suns with disjoint rims.
Game graphs of out-degree one. In price-reward game graphs of out-degree
one, strategies of both players are reduced to edge-strategies only. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the finite price-reward game Γ is defined on a single
sun. We now provide a characterisation of upper and lower game values using the
values of the rim edge games.
Lemma 4.16. Let Γ be finite average-price-per-reward game defined on a sun, and
let e1, . . . , ek denote the edges that form the rim of that sun. Given a parameter
p ∈ R, the following is true for every state s:
• If ∑ki=1 Val(aei(p)) > 0, then p 6 Val∗(s),
• If ∑ki=1 Val(aei(p)) 6 0, then p > Val∗(s).
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Strict inequalities on the left hand side imply strict inequalities on the right hand
side.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13. We only sketch the
proof of the first statement, as the other is symmetric.
Let χ be a strategy of player Max such that it is c · ε-optimal for every edge
game aei(p), for some ε > 0 and i = 1, . . . , k. If µ is a strategy of player Min, then
for every edge ei:
pi(ei, χ(ei), µ(ei))− ρ(ei, χ(ei), µ(ei)) · p+ c · ε > Val(aei(p))
If we add up the k inequalities, we get:
k∑
i=1
pi(ei, χ(ei), µ(ei))−
k∑
i=1
ρ(ei, χ(ei), µ(ei)) · p+ k · c · ε > 0
which gives: ∑k
i=1 pi(ei, χ(ei), µ(ei))∑k
i=1 ρ(ei, χ(ei), µ(ei))
+ ε > p
This, due to the arbitrary choice of ε and µ, finishes the proof.
Theorem 4.17. On finite graphs of out-degree one, solutions to average-price-per-
reward optimality equations exist.
Proof. Let Γ be a finite average-price-per-reward game on a graph of out-degree one,
and let S be one of the suns. For every state, both the upper and lower values are
finite (recall that Γ is price-reward bounded and linearly reward divergent). Using
binary search, together with Lemma 4.16, it follows that they are indeed equal.
Let g be the value of the game on sun S. We set the gain of all states to
g, and the bias of min(S) to zero. The bias of the remaining states is set to the
weight of the shortest path to min(S), assuming Val(ae(g)) to be the weight on the
edge e. Gain and bias defined in this way satisfy average-price-per-reward optimality
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equations.
4.2.2 The general case
We have proved that games on graphs of out-degree one are determined. We will
now use this result to prove determinacy in the general case.
When both players fix their positional state strategies, the game becomes a
game on a graph of out degree one. We already know that we can define the solutions
of average-price-per-reward optimality equations for this class of games. We also
know that we can compare the values of gain and bias for different states. This will
allow us to use a strategy improvement technique to find the optimal pair of state
strategies. Subsequent strategies will be strictly better than previous ones (gain
and bias will be used to compare strategies). A pair of strategies that can not be
improved yields gain and bias that satisfy the average-price-per-reward optimality
equations. Such a pair of strategies must exist because the sets of state strategies
are finite, In the following we formalise this intuition.
We fix some finite average-price-per-reward game, Γ for the remainder of this
section. Let µS and χS be state strategies for players Min and Max respectively,
and let (G,B) be gain and bias functions such that (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(ΓµSχS).
Remark 4.18. The solution to the average-price-per-reward optimality equations
OptAvgPR(ΓµSχS) is not unique. However, in the remainder of this section, for tech-
nical convenience (proof of Theorem 4.19), by a solution we will mean a particular
solution, i.e., a solution constructed as in the proof of Theorem 4.17. This solution
has the following property, for every sun S, the bias of the vertex min(S) is equal to
zero.
Given s ∈ SMin and e = (s, s′) ∈ E \ EµSχS , we say that e is an improvement
of µS, with respect to χS, if:
1. G(s) > G(s′), or
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2. G(s) = G(s′) and B(s) > Val(ae(G(s)) +B(s′).
A strategy µ′S is an improvement of µS with respect to χS if for every state s, either
µS(s) = µ′S(s), or µ′S(s) = s′ and (s, s′) is an improvement of µS with respect to χS.
An improvement is strict if µS 6= µ′S. An improvement of χS is defined similarly.
We say that χS, a state strategy for player Max, is a best response to µS,
a state strategy of player Min, if there are no possible improvements of χS with
respect to µS.
To prove the existence of mutual best response strategies we apply Theorem
4.19 and the fact that the set of edge strategies is finite, to average-price-per-reward
games, in which all the states belong to only one player.
Theorem 4.19. Let µS be a state strategy of player Min, χS a best response strategy
of player Max, and (G,B) gain and bias such that (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(ΓµSχS).
If µ′S is an improvement of µS with respect to χS, χ′S is a best response to µ′S, and
(G′, B′) |= OptAvgPR(Γµ′Sχ′S), then the following holds:
1. G(s) > G′(s), for all s ∈ S, and G(s) > G′(s) for some s ∈ S, or
2. G(s) = G′(s) and B(s) > B′(s), for all s ∈ S.
Moreover, if µS 6= µ′S then (G,B) 6= (G′, B′).
Proof. Consider the game graph Γµ′Sχ′S . For every edge e = (s, s′), either i) G(s) >
G(s′), or ii) G(s) = G(s′) and B(s) > Val(ae(G(s))) +B(s′).
We start by proving point 1. Observe that, for every edge (s, s′) in Γµ′Sχ′S ,
we have G(s) > G(s′). This implies that for every edge (s, s′), if G(s) > G(s′),
then s is a ray state. This observation allows us to use the same argument as in
Lemma 4.12 to prove that G(s) > G′(s), for every state s. In particular, if an edge
(s, s′), in Γµ′Sχ′S , is such that G(s) > G(s′), or B(s) > Val(ae(G(s))) + B(s′) and s
is a rim state, then G(s) > G′(s).
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It remains to prove point (2). We know that G(s) = G′(s) for all s ∈ S. Let
s be a vertex, and let S be a sun in Γµ′Sχ′S such that, s ∈ S. If s0, . . . , sk is the path
from s to min(S) then, for every (si, si+1),
B(si) > Val
(
a(si,si+1)(G(s))
)
+B(si+1).
From the proof of point (1), we can assume that the sun S existed in the graph
ΓµSχS , and hence B′(min(S)) = B(min(S)) = 0. Hence, if we sum up and simplify,
the k inequalities, we get:
B(s0) > Σk−1i=0 Val(a(si,si+1)(G(s)) +B(sk) = B′(s0),
as sk = min(S). To complete the proof, notice that if µS 6= µ′S, then B(s) >
Val(a(si,si+1)(G(s))) +B(si+1), for some i, and hence B(s) > B
′(s).
Corollary 4.20. A solution to optimality equations for finite average-price-per-
reward games exist.
Proof. The set of edge strategies for both players is finite. This, together with
Theorem 4.19, guarantees the existence of mutual best response edge strategies.
The rest follows from Theorem 4.17.
Corollary 4.21. In finite definable price-per-reward games, ε-optimal strategies
are computable, provided that, under the optimal state strategies, every edge game
admits rational ε-optimal moves.
Proof. Corollary 4.20 ensures that the solutions to the average-price-per-reward
games exist, and by Remark 4.8 this solution is definable. From this, by Corol-
lary 4.11, we obtain definability of ε-optimal strategies. The existence of rational
ε-optimal moves allows us to apply Proposition 2.7, to obtain the postulated com-
putability result.
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Theorem 4.22. Finite definable average-price-per-reward games are decidable.
Proof. The set of equations OptAvgPR(Γ) is finite, thus the set of solutions is a set of
finite-dimensional vectors over the reals. Remark 4.8 ensures that (G,B), such that
(G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ), is definable. This implies decidability (Proposition 2.5).
161
Chapter 5
Games on hybrid automata with
strong resets
Hybrid automata with strong resets are a subclass of hybrid automata, with strong
restriction on discrete transitions. The restriction is that upon each discrete tran-
sition all continuous variables are reset to a value from some predefined set. In this
chapter we will present a slightly different definition of a hybrid automaton with
strong resets that is better geared towards the quasi-concurrent game setting. We
will also formalise the notion of a quasi-concurrent game on a hybrid automaton
with strong resets, referred to as a hybrid game with strong resets (Section 5.1).
However, the main goal of this chapter is to show that certain hybrid games with
strong resets are determined and decidable. The games in question are average-
price-per-reward games (see Sections 2.2.2 and 5.1.1) and reachability-price games
(see Sections 2.2.2 and 5.1.2).
We start this chapter by formally introducing hybrid automata with strong
resets and hybrid games that are defined using the quasi-concurrent approach (see
Section 2.3.3). The automata considered in this chapter will be double-weighted, and
we will argue that a hybrid game with strong resets can be viewed as a game on an
infinite price-reward game graph (introduced in Chapter 4). As a consequence, the
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standard notions such as: strategies, runs, game values, etc., will be introduced using
the methodology adopted in Chapter 4. In particular, for the case of average-price-
per-reward hybrid games, we will argue that Theorem 4.10 is applicable. We will also
prove the reachability-price analogue of this theorem, Theorem 5.14, which states
that there is an optimality equation characterisation of game values for reachability-
price games on hybrid automata with strong resets.
We conclude this chapter by presenting the two main results, i.e., that
average-price-per-reward games (Theorem 5.18) and reachability-price games (The-
orem 5.19) on hybrid automata with strong resets are determined and decidable.
These two results are obtained in two steps. First, in Section 5.2.1, we introduce a
finite equivalence relation on the state space of the hybrid automaton, and then use
it to construct a finite price-reward game graph. Sections 5.2.2–5.2.3 are committed
to showing, that solutions to the optimality equations for the respective games on
the finite price-reward game graphs can be used to obtain solutions for the opti-
mality equations for the respective games on the hybrid automata. This establishes
that hybrid games, considered in this chapter, can be reduced to their finite graph
counterparts.
5.1 Games on hybrid automata with strong resets
We introduce hybrid automata with strong resets and define games on these au-
tomata, and show how infinite price-reward game graphs can be used to interpret
the quasi-concurrent hybrid game with strong resets. After defining the standard
notions such as strategies, runs, etc., we proceed to define the two games of inter-
est. In Section 5.1.1 we introduce the average-price-per-reward games on hybrid
automata with strong resets, and explain how to apply Theorem 4.10 to the hybrid
setting. In Section 5.1.2 we introduce reachability-price games, and prove Theo-
rem 5.14, i.e., that values of the reachability-price games on hybrid automata with
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strong resets, if they exist, are characterised by optimality equations.
Our definition of a hybrid automaton with strong resets varies from that used
in [LPS00; BBC06; BBC09] and described in Section 2.3.1, as we hide the continuous
dynamics of the automaton into guard functions. This approach allows for cleaner
and more succinct notation and exposition, without loss of generality [BBJ+08;
JLR09; RLJ10]. Additionally, we generalise the notion of a control action. We no
longer require it to be an edge connecting two control locations in the control graph.
We simply require that the set of control actions is finite.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the games considered are non-
blocking, i.e., the hybrid automaton and the hybrid game are defined in such a way
that at every stage of the game both players can make a move (see Definition 5.5).
Hybrid automata with strong resets. As explained in Section 2.3, a hybrid
automaton is an extension of a finite automaton, obtained through the addition of
real-valued variables. The state of a hybrid automaton has two components, the
control location of the underlying finite automaton, known as the control graph,
and the valuation of the real-valued variables. Similarly, there are two kinds of
transitions: discrete changes of control locations and continuous changes to vari-
able values. Discrete transitions are immediate and their availability is subject to
the current control location and the valuation of the real-valued variables, whereas
continuous changes span over time and are governed by a control location-specific
flow function.
Definition 5.1 (Hybrid Automaton with Strong Resets). A a doubly-weighted
hybrid automaton with strong resets (HASR), or simply a hybrid automaton with
strong resets, H is given by 〈X, L,A,G,R, pi, ρ〉 where,
• X is the set of n real-valued continuous variables (for some fixed n ∈ N),
• L is the finite set of control locations,
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• A is the finite set of control actions,
• G : A→ 2S×T is the control action guard function,
• R : A→ 2S is the control action reset function,
• pi : S× (A× T)→ R is the price function,
• ρ : S× (A× T)→ R is the reward function,
where S = L× Rn denotes the set of states (a state is a control location and the set
of values for the variables in X), and T = R>0 denotes the set of time delays.
We say that a HASR is definable if all its components are definable.
As mentioned earlier, the definition of the hybrid automaton, as presented in
this chapter, differs from the one presented in Section 2.3. It was constructed under
the assumption that we will be considering transition semantics of hybrid automata
with strong resets, and that the set of admissible runs will be restricted to alternating
sequences of continuous and discrete transitions (timed action semantics). The
latter restriction comes from the fact that we will be considering games in the
quasi-concurrent setting (see Section 2.3.3).
The semantics of a HASR, H, will be given in terms of a transition system
TH (as seen in Section 2.3.1). As was the case with the definition of the hybrid
automaton with strong resets, the definition of the transition system differs from
that seen in Section 2.3, as it reflects the assumptions on the admissible executions
of the hybrid automaton.
Definition 5.2 (Timed Action with Strong Resets Semantics). Given a hybrid
automaton with strong resets H, the doubly-weighted labelled transition system TH
consists of:
• the set of states S ⊆ L× Rn,
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• the set of transition labels Λ ⊆ A×T, and a transition relation, → ⊆ S× (A×
T) × S. The label τ = (a, t) ∈ Λ is called a timed action, and the transition
s
a−→t s′ (or simply s τ−→ s′) is admissible if (s, t) ∈ G(a) and s′ ∈ R(a).
• the price and reward functions are defined as pi(s, τ) and ρ(s, τ), for every
transition s τ−→ s′, respectively.
Note that for a transition s a−→t s′, s′ depends only on a and not on s or t. This is
the strong reset property. Also note that the price and reward of a transition are
independent of the successor state.
An execution of a hybrid automaton is modelled by a run of its transition
system (see Section 2.2.2 for the definitions relating transition systems).
Remark 5.3. Definition 5.1 does not place any restrictions on the continuous com-
ponents of the hybrid automaton. In particular there are no non-negativity nor
continuity requirements regarding the price and reward functions. It will be required,
however, that the hybrid automaton is such that the price and reward functions
are bounded, and the hybrid game, as introduced in Definition 5.5, is n-reward di-
vergent1. This is required by Theorem 4.10. Choosing ρ(s, τ) > c > 0, for all
(s, τ) ∈ S × (A × T), where c is a constant, is a simple way of ensuring n-reward
divergence.
To conclude the introduction of hybrid automata, we will briefly explain
how our definition differs from that widely used in the literature, as introduced in
Section 2.3.
Remark 5.4. Traditionally, the continuous changes to the real-valued variables are
governed by the control location-specific flow and inv predicates. See Definition 2.35
for the traditional definition of a hybrid automaton with strong resets, and Defini-
tion 2.36 for the traditional definition of its transition semantics.
1The notion of n-reward divergence was introduced in the context of price-reward game graphs,
but as we argue later, a hybrid game with strong resets can be viewed as a game on an infinite
price-reward game graph.
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We now show how the strong reset property and the timed action semantics
enable us to hide the complex dynamics of the hybrid automaton in the guard set of
a control action.
Consider a timed action (a, t) admissible from a state s = (`, x), i.e., (s, t) ∈
G(a) and s′ = (`′, x′) ∈ R(a), where a = (`, `′). In the classical definition, this would
mean that the following two transitions are admissible: s t−→ s′′ and s′′ a−→ s′. Under
the strong reset property, this gives:
• (s, t) ∈ G(a) iff there exists a differentiable function f : [0, t] → Rn, with the
first derivative f˙ : (0, t) → Rn, such that: (1) f(0) = x and f(t) = x′′, and
(2) for all 0 6 t′ 6 t the predicates inv(l)[X := f(t′)] and flow(l)[X, X˙ :=
f(t′), f˙(t′)] are true;
• s′ ∈ R(a).
If the strong reset property was not in place, we would not be able to define the guard
and reset sets independently, and hence to hide the dynamics in the guard set.
Hybrid games with strong resets. Hybrid games with strong resets are played
on hybrid automata with strong resets. The rules of the game reflect the intended
application of the model. Player Min models the role of the control program, and
player Max models the worst-case behaviour of the environment, i.e., the factors
that are out of control. We are considering the quasi-concurrent game setting, i.e.,
the game is played in rounds, and each round consist of three steps that model the
interaction of the controller with the environment. If a system is in some state,
the control program chooses to execute a certain timed action, this constrains the
possible behaviour, and the final transition is determined by the environment.
Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 emphasise the mechanics of the hybrid automaton.
However, we will need a notation that is better geared towards the game setting;
that puts more emphasis on actions available to players. For that purpose we define
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the move function M : S→ 2A×T as M(s) = {(a, t) : (s, t) ∈ G(a)}. Note that M is
definable if G is definable.
Definition 5.5 (Hybrid Game with Strong Resets). A hybrid game with strong
resets (HGSR), or simply a hybrid game, Γ =
〈H,MMin,MMax〉 consists of:
• a HASR H = 〈X, L,A,G,R, pi, ρ〉,
• a Min-move function MMin : S→ 2A×T,
• a Max-move function MMax : S× (A× T)→ 2A×T, and
• a payoff function P : Runs→ R.
We require that for all s ∈ S, we have MMin(s) ⊆ M(s), and that for all τ ∈ MMin(s),
we have MMax(s, τ) ⊆ M(s). Without loss of generality, we assume that Γ is non-
blocking, i.e., for all s ∈ S, we have MMin(s) 6= ∅, and that for all τ ∈ MMin(s), we
have MMax(s, τ) 6= ∅. If H and the move functions are definable, then we say that Γ
is definable.
A quasi-concurrent hybrid game is played in rounds (as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3.3). In every round, the following three steps are performed by the two
players Min and Max from the current state s ∈ S.
1. Player Min proposes a timed action τ ∈ MMin(s).
2. Player Max responds by choosing a timed action τ ′ = (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, τ).
This choice determines the price and reward contribution of the round (pi(s, τ ′)
and ρ(s, τ ′), respectively).
3. Player Max chooses a state s′ ∈ R(a′), i.e., such that s τ ′−→ s′. The state s′
becomes the current state for the next round.
A play of the game Γ from state s is a (possibly infinite) sequence ℘ =
s0
τ1,τ ′1−−−→ s1 τ2,τ
′
2−−−→ s2 · · · such that s0 = s, and for all i ≥ 0, we have τi+1 ∈ MMin(si),
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and τ ′i+1 ∈ MMax(si, τi+1), and si+1 ∈ R(a′i+1), where τ ′i+1 = (a′i+1, t′i+1). Note that
if ℘ = s0
τ1,τ ′1−−−→ s1 τ2,τ
′
2−−−→ s2 · · · is a play of the hybrid game Γ, then the sequence
ω = s0
τ ′1−→ s1 τ
′
2−→ s2 · · · is a run of the hybrid automaton H.
Remark 5.6. Our definition of the game round generalises the definition found in
Section 2.3.3, where actions available to players are given through a partition of the
set of control actions. We will show how the classical definition can be captured
using the one presented in this chapter. Suppose that we have a partition of the set
of control actions, given by A = AMin ∪ AMax. Given a state s, we would define the
player Min’s move function, MMin(s), as {(a, t) : a ∈ AMin and (s, t) ∈ G(a)} and
the player Max’s move function, MMax(s, (a, t)), as {(a′, t′) : a′ ∈ AMax and t′ 6
t} ∪ {(a, t)}, where (a, t) ∈ MMin(s).
We now define the standard notions such as strategies, game values, and
determinacy. Although these definitions are similar to the ones introduced in Sec-
tions 2.2.2 and 4.1, they account for the quasi-concurrent game setting. We present
them in full to assure the clarity of the presentation. Later in this section we will ex-
plain how strategies in a hybrid game relate to strategies on an infinite price-reward
games graphs (see Section 4.1).
A strategy of player Min is a function µ : Runsfin → A × T such that,
µ(ω) ∈ MMin(s), where ω is a finite run ending in s. We say that µ, a strategy
of player Min, is positional if for every two runs ω, ω′ ∈ Runsfin we have, if ω and
ω′ end in the same state then µ(ω) = µ(ω′), i.e., it can be viewed as a function
µ : S → A × T. We will write ΣMin for the set of all strategies of player Min, and
ΠMin for the subset of all positional strategies.
A strategy of player Max is a function χ : (Runsfin×(A×T))→ ((A×T)×S)
such that if µ(ω, τ) = (τ ′, s′), then τ ′ ∈ MMin(s, τ) and s′ ∈ R(a), where ω is a
finite run ending in s, and τ = (a, t). We say that χ, a strategy of player Max, is
positional if for every two runs ω, ω′ ∈ Runsfin we have, if ω and ω′ end in the same
state s, then χ(ω, τ) = χ(ω′, τ) for every τ ∈ MMin(s), i.e., it can be viewed as a
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function χ : (S × (A × T)) → ((A × T) × S). We will write ΣMax for the set of all
strategies of player Max, and ΠMax for the subset of all positional strategies.
Given µ ∈ ΣMin and χ ∈ ΣMax, let ℘ = s0 τ1,τ
′
1−−−→ s1 τ2,τ
′
2−−−→ s2 · · · be the
unique play from the state s0. We will write Run(s0, µ, χ) to denote the unique run
ω = s0
τ ′1−→ s1 s
′
2−→ · · · arising from the play ℘.
We can now introduce the concept of the value of a hybrid game from a state.
We do this by defining a zero-sum game in strategic form , which is specific to the
given state (recall Section 2.2.2).
Given a state s, let as =
〈
ΣMin,ΣMax,P(Run(s, ·, ·))〉 be a zero-sum game in
strategic form. We say that the game Γ is determined from s if as is determined,
i.e., Val∗(as) = Val∗(as), and positionally determined if
Val(as) = inf
µ∈ΠMin
Valµ(as) = sup
χ∈ΠMax
Valχ(as).
We say that the price-reward game Γ is determined if it is determined from every
state.
For simplicity we will write Val(s) rather then Val(as), in the context of
price-reward games, so Val can be viewed as a partial function S→ R.
We will say that a price-reward game Γ is decidable if the partial function
Val : S→ R is decidable (recall Definition 2.17). We emphasise that Val is a partial
function because Γ does not have to be determined from every state.
Infinite price-reward game graphs. A hybrid game with strong resets can be
viewed as a game on an infinite price-reward game graph, with fixed costs and
rewards assigned to edges (see Chapter 4). The graph consists of three groups of
states: states of the hybrid automaton, states that represent the choice of player Min
in the first step of the round, and states that represent the response to that choice
of player Max in the second step of the round. The edges reflect the admissible
choices, that the players can make at every step.
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To distinguish the HGSR Γ from its corresponding price-reward game graph,
we will use a prime, i.e, Γ′. We will write S′ to denote the set of states of this game
graph, and we have:
S′ ⊆ S ∪ (S× (A× T))︸ ︷︷ ︸
choices of player Min
∪ (A× T)︸ ︷︷ ︸
responses of player Max
The set S′ is equal to the minimum set that contains S, and all the states reachable
from S using the edge relation E′. The set E′ is the minimum set such that:
Step 1 for every s ∈ S and τ ∈ MMin(s) there is an edge (s, (s, τ)) ∈ E′,
Step 2 for every (s, τ), and τ ′ ∈ MMax(s, τ) there is an edge ((s, τ), τ ′),
Step 3 for every τ ′ = (a′, t′), and s′ ∈ R(a′) there is an edge (τ ′, s′).
Now we can define Γ′ = 〈S,S′ \ S,E′, pi′, ρ′〉. An edge e = ((s, τ), (a′, t′))
has price pi′(e) = pi(s, t′) and reward ρ′(e) = ρ(s, t′). These edges correspond to
the price and reward determining aspect of the actual transitions of the hybrid
automaton. The remaining edges have both the price and reward equal to zero;
they only represent the steps of a game round.
Remark 5.7. For all (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ S′, if a = a′ then the sets of states reachable
from those two states, with respect to E′, are equal. This is a consequence of the
strong reset property of H.
Remark 5.8. It is clear that plays of Γ directly correspond to runs on Γ′. Moreover,
any run of Γ′, starting in S, uniquely determines a play in Γ, and hence a run of H.
On the other hand, one should observe that in general strategies in Γ′ are stronger
than those in Γ, as they act on plays of Γ, rather than just runs of Γ — one can
infer a run from a play, but the converse is not true. However, positional strategies
in both Γ and Γ′ are equally expressive. This is sufficient, as we will show that the
hybrid games of interest are positionally determined.
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Remark 5.8 will enable us to lift the concepts introduced for price-reward
games to hybrid price-reward games. We will say that the hybrid game Γ has
a property P if Γ′ has this property.
5.1.1 Hybrid average-price-per-reward games
In the following, we lift the concept of average-price-per-reward games, as defined
in Chapter 4, to hybrid games with strong resets.
As was the case with price-per-reward games on transition systems (see Sec-
tion 2.2.2 and price-per-reward games on price-reward game graphs (see Chapter 4),
we need to define both the upper and lower payoffs. The payoff of the game depends
on the actual execution of the automaton, which arises from a play of a hybrid game.
We now recall the definition of the average-price-per-reward payoffs, as de-
fined in Section 2.2.2. Note that, the transition system is defined as in Definition 5.2,
as we have adopted the timed action semantics. The lower and upper payoffs are
defined as follows. For a run ω = s0
τ1−→ s1 τ2−→ s2 · · · of H, we define the lower
payoff A∗ and the upper payoff A∗ as
A∗(ω) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n−1
i=0 pi(si, τi+1)∑n−1
i=0 ρ(si, τi+1)
,
and
A∗(ω) = lim sup
n→∞
∑n−1
i=0 pi(si, τi+1)∑n−1
i=0 ρ(si, τi+1)
.
Note that the payoffs for the hybrid version of price-per-reward game are
exactly the same as the average-price-per-reward payoffs for runs starting in S ⊆ S′
in Γ′.
Similarly to average-price-per-reward games on finite game graphs (see Sec-
tion 2.2.2) and price-reward game graphs (see Section 4.1.1) we will provide an
optimality-equation characterisation of game values.
We will also say that OptAvgPR(Γ′), the set of average-price-per-reward op-
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timality equations for the price-reward game Γ′ induced by Γ, is the set of average-
price-per-reward optimality equations for the hybrid game Γ, which is denoted by
OptAvgPR(Γ). Let G,B : S ∪
(
S× (A×T)) ∪ (A×T)→ R. The average-price-per-
reward optimality equations for Γ′ take the following form: if s ∈ S, then
G(s) = min{G(s, τ) : τ ∈ MMin(s)}, (5.1)
B(s) = inf{B(s, τ) : τ ∈ MMin(s) and G(s, τ) = G(s)}; (5.2)
if s ∈ S and τ ∈ MMin(s), then
G(s, τ) = max{G(a′) : (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, τ)}, (5.3)
B(s, τ) = sup{pi(s, a′, t′)− ρ(s, a′, t′) ·G(a′) +B(a′) :
(a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, τ) and G(a′) = G(s, τ)}; (5.4)
and if a ∈ A, then
G(a) = max{G(s) : s ∈ R(a)}, (5.5)
B(a) = sup{B(s) : s ∈ R(a) and G(s) = G(a)}. (5.6)
The last pair of equations is a generic pair of equations for all states (a, t) ∈ S′. This
is valid by Remark 5.7. We have written the equations taking into account the fixed
price and rewards in Γ′. In particular, edge games, which were used to introduce
average-price-per-reward optimality equations in Section 4.1.2, do not appear in the
above equations.
Remark 5.9. As noted above, Remark 5.7 implies that, if (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ),
then the value of gain and bias in a state (a, t) ∈ S′ depends solely on a ∈ A. For
this reason, we will often abuse notation, and treat the gain and bias functions as
functions of the following type: G,B : S ∪ (S× (A× T)) ∪ A→ R.
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We conclude with the following remark, which establishes the average-price-
per-reward optimality equation characterisation of game values.
Remark 5.10. Requiring Γ to be Ω(n)-divergent and price convergent enables us to
use the optimality equation characterisation, and Theorem 4.10 in particular, from
Section 4.1.2. Using Remark 5.7 and the fact that A is a finite set, we guarantee
that gain has a finite range, and that bias is bounded. The fact that the range of gain
is finite justifies the use of min and max, instead of inf and sup, in the equations
5.1, 5.3, and 5.5.
Average-price games. In hybrid average-price games [BBJ+08], a variant of
hybrid average-price-per-reward games, the price of a timed action is averaged over
the total number of timed actions. In other words, it is an average-price-reward game
in which the reward of a timed action is constant and equal to 1. The respective
payoff functions look as follows:
A∗(ω) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
pi(si, τi+1),
and
A∗(ω) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
pi(si, τi+1).
As we will explain in Section 5.2.2, hybrid average-price games are simpler
than hybrid average-price-per-reward games. This, however, makes them more suit-
able for example purposes.
Example 5.11. We provide a simple example of a hybrid automaton that will be
used, later in the chapter, to illustrate our techniques. The automaton consists of
two continuous variables, a single control location and two control actions. We
define the hybrid automaton H = 〈X, L,A,G,R, pi〉 to consist of the following:
• the set of variables X = {x, y},
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• the set of control locations L = {`},
• the set of control actions A = {a, b},
• the control action guard function given by
G(c) =

(V3 × I3) ∪ (S× I1) if c = a, and
(V3 × I2) if c = b,
• the control action reset function given by R(c) = L× V1, where c ∈ A,
• the price function given by pi(x, y, (c, t)) = −(t+ x2 + y2), where c ∈ A,
• the reward function, ρ ≡ 1,
where the set of states, S, of H is equal to {`} × R2, and the sets used in the
definition, V1, V2, V3, I1, I2, and I3, (see Fig 5.1 for the graphical interpretation of
the components of H) are defined as follows:
V1 = {(x, y) : x+ y > 10},
V2 = R2 \ V1,
V3 = {(x, y) : y2 + x2 6 0},
I1 = (1, 2),
I2 = (3, 4), and
I3 = (5, 6).
We now define a hybrid game Γ on H. First, recall that M(s) = {(c, t) :
(s, t) ∈ G(c)}. Second, we define Γ = 〈H,MMin,MMax,A〉, an average-price game
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(the reward is constant and equal to 1), by setting:
MMin(s) = M(s) ∩ ({a} × T) =

{a} × (I3 ∪ I1) if s ∈ V3,
{a} × I1 otherwise,
and
MMax(s, (a, t)) =

{(a, t)} if t ∈ I1
{(a, t)} ∪ ({b} × I2) if t ∈ I3.
The payoff function, A, is the average-price-per-reward payoff function, as intro-
duced in this section.
An example game round of Γ looks as follows. Suppose that the current state
of H is s = (`, (1,−2)) ∈ ({`} × V3), and that player Min proposes a timed action
τ = (a, 5.5) ∈ ({a} × I3) ⊆ MMin(s). This choice, of player Min, allows player Max
to choose between complying, i.e., executing τ , or choosing a different timed action
from the set ({b}× I2) ⊆ MMax(s, τ). Suppose that he decides to override the choice
of player Min by choosing τ ′ = (b, 3.5) ∈ ({b}×I2) ⊆ MMax(s). To complete the game
round player Max must choose a new state s′ ∈ R(b), say s′ = (`, (5, 5)) ∈ ({`} ×
V1) = R(b). This game round resulted in a transition (`, (1,−2)) b−→3.5 (`, (5, 5)) and
incurred a price of pi((`, (1,−2)), (b, 3.5)) = −(3.5+12 +(−2)2) = −7.5 and a reward
of 1.
To conclude this example, we will present the average-price-per-reward op-
timality equations, OptAvgPR(Γ), for Γ. The equations look as follows. For s ∈
({`} × V3) we have:
G(s) = min
{
G(s, (a, t)) : t ∈ I1 ∪ I3
}
B(s) = inf
{
B(s, (a, t)) : t ∈ (I1 ∪ I3) and G(s, (a, t)) = G(s)
}
.
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For s ∈ ({`} × (S \ V3)) we have:
G(s) = min
{
G(s, (a, t)) : t ∈ I1
}
B(s) = inf
{
B(s, (a, t)) : t ∈ I1 and G(s, (a, t)) = G(s)
}
.
For s = (`, x, y) ∈ ({`} × V3) and τ = (a, t), with t ∈ I3, we have:
G(s, τ) = min{G(a), G(b)}
B(s, τ) =

max
{−(t+ x2 + y2)−G(a) +B(a),
sup
t′∈I2
−(t′ + x2 + y2)−G(b) +B(b)
} if G(a) = G(b),
supt′∈I2 −(t′ + x2 + y2)−G(b) +B(b) if G(b) = G(s, τ),
−(t+ x2 + y2)−G(a) +B(a) if G(a) = G(s, τ).
For s = (`, x, y) ∈ S, and t ∈ I1 we have:
G(s, (a, t)) = G(a)
B(s, (a, t)) = −(t+ x2 + y2)−G(a) +B(a).
For c ∈ A = {a, b} we have:
G(c) = sup{G(s) : s ∈ {`} × V1}
B(c) = sup{B(s) : s ∈ ({`} × V1) and G(a) = G(s)}.
In Section 5.2.2 we will show how to compute the solutions to the average-price-per-
reward optimality equations Opt(Γ).
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T
Figure 5.1: The hybrid automaton H discussed in Example 5.11. a) Graph structure
underlying H. b) State space of H. c) Guard function of H.
5.1.2 Hybrid reachability-price games
In the following, we lift the concept of reachability-price-per-reward games, as de-
fined in Section 2.2.2, to hybrid games with strong resets. The key result of this
section is Theorem 5.14, which establishes an optimality equation characterisation of
game values in a hybrid reachability-price game. We will use it to prove determinacy
of hybrid reachability-price games, by showing that solutions to the reachability-
price optimality equations exist (see Section 5.2.3).
As was the case with reachability-price games on transition systems (see
Section 2.2.2) we need to define a single payoff function. The payoff of the game
depends on the actual execution of the automaton, which arises from a play of a
hybrid game.
A hybrid reachability-price game with strong resets (Γ,F) consists of a hybrid
game with strong resets Γ and of a (definable) set F ⊆ S of final states.
We now recall the definition of the reachability-price payoff, as defined in
Section 2.2.2. Note that, the transition system is defined as in Definition 5.2, as we
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have adopted the timed action semantics. For a run ω = s0
τ1−→ s1 τ2−→ s2 · · · of H,
we define
Stop(ω) = inf{n : sn ∈ F}.
The reachability-price payoff, P is defined as
P(ω) =

∑Stop(ω)−1
i=0 pi(si, τi+1) if Stop(ω) <∞,
∞ otherwise.
As in the case of finite reachability-price games (see Section 2.2.2), we will now
provide an optimality equation characterisation of game values. Let P : S ∪ (S ×
(A×T)) ∪ A→ R and let D : S ∪ (S× (A×T)) ∪ A→ N. We will call the functions
price and distance, respectively.
We say that a pair of price and distance functions, (P,D), is a solution of
reachability-price optimality equations, denoted by (P,D) |= OptReach(Γ,F), if the
following conditions hold for all states s ∈ S. If s ∈ F then P (s) = D(s) = 0. If
s 6∈ F then the we have:
P (s) = inf
{
P (s, τ) : τ ∈ MMin(s)
}
, (5.7)
D(s) = min
{
1 + d :
P (s) = inf
{
P (s, τ) : D(s, τ) = d and τ ∈ MMin(s)
}}
; (5.8)
if τ ∈ MMin(s), we have:
P (s, τ) = sup
{
pi(s, (a′, t′)) + P (a′) : (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, τ)
}
, (5.9)
D(s, τ) = max
{
1 + d :
P (s, τ) = sup
{
pi(s, (a′, t′)) + P (a′) :
D(a′) = d and (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, τ)
}}
; (5.10)
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and if τ ′ = (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, τ), we have:
P (a′) = sup
{
P (s′) : s′ ∈ R(a′)
}
,
D(a′) = max
d′∈N
{
1 + d′ : P (a′) = sup
{
P (s′) : D(s′) = d′ and s′ ∈ R(a′)
}}
.
Remark 5.12. If Γ is definable then OptReach(Γ) is first-order expressible inM.
Remark 5.13. Notice that the optimality equations for reachability-price games on
hybrid automata refer directly to the hybrid game Γ, without resorting to the induced
price-reward game graph Γ′, as was the case with average-price-per-reward games on
hybrid automata. There, it was convenient since it enabled us to use the results from
Chapter 4, whereas here these results are not applicable.
As we have explained in Section 2.2.2, we can not apply the optimality equa-
tion characterisation to all the states of the hybrid automaton because not all states
admit a finite value. First, we need to introduce two sets, WMax ⊆ S, the set all
of states from which player Max can prevent reaching F, and WMin ⊆ S \WMax,
the set all of states from which player Min can assure reaching F and from which
the value of an average-price game is negative. Second, as argued in Section 2.2.2,
for all states s ∈ WMax we have Val(s) = ∞, and for all states s ∈ WMin we have
Val(s) = −∞.
Let Sfin = S \ (WMax ∪WMin), and let Γfin be obtained from Γ by restricting
the state space2 to Sfin. The key result, which establishes that reachability-price
optimality equations characterise the values of the hybrid reachability-price game,
is as follows.
Theorem 5.14. If (P,D) |= OptReach(Γfin,F) then for every state s ∈ Sfin, the
hybrid reachability-price game (Γfin,F) from state s is determined and we have
Val(s) = P (s). Moreover, for every ε > 0, positional ε-optimal strategies exist
2Note that in this case the superscript fin means, like in Section 2.2.2, that the value of the
game exists, rather than that the set of states is finite — it does not have to be.
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for both players.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is similar to that of Theorem 4.10, and follows from
Lemmas 5.16 and 5.17. The lemmas imply that for all states s, we have Val∗(s) 6
P (s) and Val∗(s) > P (s). This in turn implies that Val∗(s) = Val∗(s) = P (s).
Moreover, the proofs of the lemmas are in fact constructive proofs of the existence
of ε-optimal strategies.
Corollary 5.15. If there exists (P,D) such that (P,D) |= OptReach(Γfin,F) and Γfin
is definable, then positional ε-optimal strategies are definable.
Proof. Positional strategies, as constructed in the proof of Lemmas 5.16–5.17, are
definable if (P,D), the solution to OptReach(Γfin,F), is definable.
Lemma 5.16. If (P,D) |= OptReach(Γfin,F), then for all ε > 0, there is µε ∈ ΠMin,
such that for all χ ∈ ΣMax and for all s ∈ Sfin, we have P(Run(s, µε, χ)) ≤ P (s)+ε.
Lemma 5.17. If (P,D) |= OptReach(Γfin,F), then for all ε > 0, there is χε ∈ ΠMax,
such that for all µ ∈ ΣMin and for all s ∈ Sfin, we have P(Run(s, µ, χε)) ≥ P (s)− ε.
We omit the proof of Lemma 5.17 as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.16.
Proof of Lemma 5.16. We argue that a solution to reachability-price optimality
equations can be seen as a witness for existence of positional ε-optimal strategies
— we show how to use a solution of the reachability-price optimality equations to
construct an ε-optimal strategy for player Min. The construction is fairly technical
and can be seen to be focused on choosing locally optimal moves.
Before we start the actual proof, we formalise the notion of local optimality
by introducing the concept of an ε′-optimal timed action. This concept will be used
to construct the ε-optimal strategy, µε for player Min. We write ε′ to distinguish
it from ε. Given an ε′ > 0 and a state s ∈ Sfin we will say that a timed action
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τ ∈ MMin(s) is ε′-optimal, if the following hold:
P (s) > P (s, τ)− ε′,
D(s) = 1 +D(s, τ).
We will now construct a positional strategy µε for player Min and then show
that it is ε-optimal. For every state s, we choose τ = µε(s) to be a timed action
that is ε
2D(s)+1
-optimal, i.e.,
P (s) > P (s′, τ)− ε
2D(s)+1
D(s) = 1 +D(s, τ).
The fact that there exists a solution to the reachability-price optimality equations,
OptReach(Γfin), ensures that such a timed action exists.
We now proceed to prove, that µε defined in this way is indeed ε-optimal
for player Min. For that purpose, let us fix a state s and some arbitrarily chosen
strategy of player Max, χ ∈ ΣMax. Let si τi+1−−→ si+1 be the (i + 1)-th move of the
Run(s, µε, χ), where τ = (ai+1, ti+1) ∈ MMax(si, µε(s))). From the definition of µε,
regardless of χ, we have:
P (si) > P (si, µε(si))− ε2D(si)+1 ,
P (si, µε(si)) > pi(si, (ai+1, ti+1)) + P (ai+1),
P (ai+1) > P (si+1),
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and
D(si) > 1 +D(si, µε(si)),
D(si, µε(si)) > 1 +D(a),
D(a) > 1 +D(si+1).
As a consequence, because D(s) was finite, there exists a K ∈ N such that D(sK) =
P (sK) = 0, i.e., sK ∈ F. If we sum up the 3 ·K inequalities for P we get:
K−1∑
i=0
P (si) +
K−1∑
i=0
P (si, µε(si)) +
K−1∑
i=0
P (ai+1) >
K−1∑
i=0
P (si, µε(si))−
K−1∑
i=0
ε
2D(si)+1
+
K−1∑
i=0
pi(si, (ai+1, ti+1)) +
K−1∑
i=0
P (ai+1) +
K−1∑
i=0
P (si+1).
The summations
∑K−1
i=0 P (si, µε(si)) and
∑K−1
i=0 pi(si, (ai+1, ti+1)) occur on both
sides on the inequality; summations
∑K−1
i=0 P (si) and
∑K−1
i=0 P (si+1) differ by single
term. This allows the inequality above to be simplified to:
P (s0) > −ε
K−1∑
i=0
1
2D(si)+1
+
K−1∑
i=0
pi(si, (ai+1, ti+1)) + P (sK) >
− ε
∞∑
i=0
1
2i+1
+ P(Run(s, µε, χ)).
To obtain the second inequality, we apply the definition of the reachability-price
payoff P and the fact that P (sK) = 0. Additionally observe that, the value of
the infinite summation, in the term adjacent to ε, is 1, and hence we obtain the
following:
P (s) > P(Run(s, µε, χ))− ε.
This, due to the arbitrary choice of s and χ, yields the desired result.
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5.2 Solving hybrid games with strong resets
So far we have introduced hybrid games with strong resets, games on hybrid au-
tomata with strong resets, in general, and discussed the hybrid of versions average-
price-per-reward and reachability-price games in detail. The two main results of
this section are as follows:
Theorem 5.18. Average-price-per-reward games on hybrid automata with strong
resets are positionally determined and admit ε-optimal positional strategies.
Theorem 5.19. Reachability-price games on hybrid automata with strong resets are
positionally determined and admit ε-optimal positional strategies.
The proof of these theorems follows from optimality equation characterisa-
tions of game values, as presented in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, respectively, as well
as from the results presented in this section, which establish that solutions to the
optimality equations indeed exist.
This section is organised as follows. First, in Section 5.2.1, we introduce a
finite equivalence relation ∼ and explain how to use it to construct a special finite
price-reward game graph. Second, in Section 5.2.2, we show that a solution to the
optimality equations for the average-price-per-reward game on this special graph
correspond to the solutions to the optimality equations for the average-price-per-
reward game on a hybrid automaton with strong resets. Third, in Section 5.2.3, we
establish a similar correspondence of optimality equations solutions for reachability-
price games.
5.2.1 A finite abstraction
We now introduce a finitary equivalence relation over the state space of the hy-
brid game Γ. It is used to construct a finite price-reward game graph Γ̂. We later
show that, solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ̂) and to OptReach(Γ̂, F̂) coincide with the solu-
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tions to OptAvgPR(Γ) and to OptReach(Γ,F) respectively (Theorems 5.26 and 5.31
respectively).
In the hybrid game Γ, each step of a round has a hybrid nature, i.e., consists
of both a discrete and a continuous component. In the first two steps, players Min
and Max interact to make a discrete choice of a control and a continuous choice of
time. The last step consists only of a continuous choice of a member of the reset set.
Our aim is to separate these two aspects of a game round. This will enable us to
construct a finite price-reward game graph whose structure will reflect the possible
discrete choices, whereas the continuous choices will be modelled using edge games.
Finite equivalence. We start by introducing some auxiliary notation, so that it
is easier to talk separately about the discrete and continuous behaviours of players.
For s ∈ S and (a, t) ∈ MMin(s), we define
AMax(s, (a, t)) = {a′ ∈ A : (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, (a, t)) for some t′ ∈ T},
i.e., AMax(s, (a, t)) is the set of control actions a′ ∈ A, such that there is a valid
response (a′, t′) ∈ A × T of player Max to the proposal (a, t) of player Min. For
s ∈ S and t ∈ T, let
AMinMax(s, t) = {(a,AMax(s, (a, t))) : (a, t) ∈ MMin(s)},
i.e., the set AMinMax(s, t) is the set of all pairs (a,A) ∈ A × 2A, such that player
Min can propose the timed action (a, t) from state s, and the set of control actions,
appearing in valid responses of player Max to the proposal (a, t) of player Min, is
exactly A.
Our intention is to treat two states as equivalent if they admit the same
discrete steps in a game round. We will also need to discriminate between states
that belong to different reset regions, despite admitting the same discrete steps. In
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the case of reachability-price games, we will also have to account for the membership
in the set of goal states, F.
Definition 5.20 (Finite Equivalence). Let R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} be such that Ri ⊆
S for all i. States s, s′ are said to be equivalent, denoted by s ∼R s′, iff
• AMinMax(s,T) = AMinMax(s′,T), and
• s ∈ Ri iff s′ ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We will use R = {R(a) : a ∈ A} for average-price-per-reward games, and
R = {R(a) : a ∈ A} ∪ {F} for reachability-price games. If the set R is understood
from the context, or if for the purpose of our discussion the exact identity of the set
R is not important then, we often write simply ∼ instead of ∼R.
Remark 5.21. Note that the first condition in the Definition 5.20 states that the
functions AMinMax(s, ·),AMinMax(s′, ·) : T→ A×2A have the same ranges. Therefore,
if Q ∈ S/∼, then it makes sense to set AMinMax(Q,T) to be the range of the function
AMinMax(s, ·) for any s ∈ Q.
Remark 5.22. Observe that ∼ is an equivalence relation on the set of states S, and
that there are finitely many equivalence classes of ∼. Moreover, if Γ is definable
then every equivalence class is also definable.
From Γ to the finite game. The construction of Γ̂ is built upon an idea to
separate the discrete and continuous choices of both players. This separation is
achieved by reconstructing the round of a game in such a way that first players
make their discrete choices (in three steps) and then they make their continuous
choices, which must be sound with respect to the discrete choices made earlier.
In Γ̂, the discrete steps (1-3) of the reconstructed round are encoded by the
choices of edges. The continuous choices (3a-3c) are encoded in the controllable and
uncontrollable inputs, that are associated with the edges. Fix R, as explained in
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a) a)
b)
Figure 5.2: Numbers 1,2, and 3 represent the three steps of a game round in a hybrid
game with strong resets. a) the order in which the steps are carried out in the game
Γ. b) the order in which the steps are carried out in the game Γ̂.
this section. Let a′′ ∈ A be the current control action — a state in the finite game
graph Γ̂. The players start with the following discrete choices
1. Max chooses Q ∈ S/∼R such that Q ⊆ R(a′′).
2. Min chooses a pair (a,A) ∈ AMinMax(Q,T).
3. Max chooses a control action a′ ∈ A, which becomes the current control action,
and the players make their continuous choices:
(a) Max chooses s ∈ Q.
(b) Min chooses t ∈ T such that (a, t) ∈ MMin(s) and AMax(s, (a, t)) = A.
(c) Max makes a choice of t′ ∈ T such that (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, (a, t)).
The choices made by the players in steps 3, 1, and 2 of the hybrid game Γ are mapped
to steps 1 and (a), 2 and (b), and 3 and (c) of the finite game Γ̂. Additionally, the
order of steps in the finite game is shifted with respect to the hybrid game (see
Figure 5.2). Later in the chapter, we will prove that this shift in the game round
order is valid (see Propositions 5.29 and 5.34).
The above finitary abstraction of choices made by players in every round of
the hybrid game Γ is formalised by the following finite price-reward game graph
Γ̂ = (Ŝ, Ê, Î, Ĉ, Û , pi, ρ̂). The finite graph (Ŝ, Ê) is given by:
Ŝ = A ∪ S/∼R ∪
{
(Q, a,A) : Q ∈ S/∼ and (a,A) ∈ AMinMax(Q,T)} ,
Ê =
{
(a,Q) : Q ⊆ R(a)
}
∪{(
Q, (Q, a,A)
)
: (a,A) ∈ AMinMax(Q,T)
}
∪
{(
(Q, a,A), a′
)
: a′ ∈ A
}
.
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In Γ̂, as in the infinite price-reward game graph Γ′, only one type of edge
incurs a price and reward. The set of inputs for these edges reflects the possible
continuous choices made by players during a round of the game. For the sake of
simplicity, we will omit the specification of the input sets for the remaining edges;
their price and reward is fixed, and equal to zero. Player Min’s continuous choice
consists of choosing the proposed time for every state. On the other hand, player
Max’s choice is slightly more complex. It consist of a choice of time, for every Min’s
choice, and a choice of the reset state. Formally the set of inputs is
Î = [S→ A× T]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Min’s inputs
∪S× [A× T→ A× T]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Max’s inputs
.
Edges of the form e = ((Q, a,A), a′) will be the ones that incur the price and reward.
These edges represent the discrete component of the actual transition of the original
hybrid automaton. The remaining edges will bear a fixed price and reward equal to
zero, making inputs obsolete.
Let e = ((Q, a,A), a′) ∈ Ê. The set of inputs for player Min is
Ĉ(e) ⊆ [Q→ A× T] (recall that Q ⊆ S)
such that for every s ∈ Q and f ∈ Ĉ(e) , we have that
f(s) ∈ MMin(s) and AMax(s, f(s)) = A,
i.e., the continuous choice f(s), of player Min, is consistent with the agreed discrete
choices. The set of inputs for player Max is
Û(e) ⊆ Q× [A× T→ A× T]
such that for every (s, f) ∈ Û(e), and τ ∈ MMin(s), consistent with the discrete
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choices, we have that
s ∈ Q, f(τ) ∈ MMax(s, τ) and f(τ) ∈ {a′} × T,
i.e., the continuous choice (s, f), of player Max, is consistent with the agreed choices.
Let f ∈ Ĉ(e) be the input chosen by player Min and (s, f ′) ∈ Û(e) the input
chosen by player Max. The price and reward of the edge e are then
pi(e)(f, (s, f ′)) = pi(s, f ′(f(s))), and
ρ̂(e)(f, (s, f ′)) = ρ(s, f ′(f(s))).
For the remaining edges we set Ĉ and Û equal to ∅; their price (reward) is fixed and
equal to 0.
We define the finite price-reward game graph
Γ̂ =
(
Ĥ, ŜMin, ŜMax, Î, Θ̂Min, Θ̂Max
)
,
where (ŜMin, ŜMax) is a partition of Ŝ, given by ŜMin = S/∼R and ŜMax = Ŝ \ ŜMin.
Theorem 5.23. If the hybrid price-reward game graph Γ is definable then the finite
price-reward game graph Γ̂ is also definable.
Proof. If the hybrid price-reward game graph Γ is definable we have the following:
• each of the finitely many equivalence classes of ∼ is definable,
• the sets of inputs and player inputs in Γ̂ are definable,
• price and reward functions in Γ̂ are definable.
This renders Γ̂ definable.
Remark 5.24 (Reachability-price games). A reachability-price game on a HASR
is given as (Γ,F), and in this case the set R, from the definition of ∼R, accounts
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for the goal states. The set of goal states F̂, for the finite reachability-game (Γ̂, F̂),
consists of those equivalence classes that are contained in F. If F was definable, then
so is (Γ̂, F̂).
The following example should establish the intuition behind the construction
of Γ̂.
Example 5.25. Recall the hybrid automaton, H, introduced in Example 5.11, and
the respective average-price game Γ. We will show how to construct the finite game
graph Γ̂.
We start by constructing the equivalence ∼R, where R = {R(a),R(b)}, as
required for average-price-per-reward games.
The reset function, R, is defined as constant, over the set of control actions
A, and its value is L × V1. As a consequence, the requirement that two equiva-
lent states belong to the same elements of R, introduces at least two equivalence
classes: L × V1 and L × V2. On the other hand, for all states s ∈ (S \ (L × V3))
we have that AMinMax(s,T) = {(a, {a})}, and for all states s ∈ (L × V3) we have
that AMinMax(s,T) = {(a, {a}), (a, {a, b})}. The set V1 is partitioned into two equiv-
alence classes: Q1 = L × V3 and Q2 = L × (V1 \ V3) — it is required that all states
within a single equivalence class admit the same AMinMax(·,T) set. The remaining
equivalence class is Q3 = L× V2.
The finite priced game graph Γ̂ obtained from Γ using ∼R is depicted on
Fig 5.3. Notice that the prices are fixed, and that we did not specify the input sets.
We have done this because the reward function is constant and equal to 1, i.e., we are
considering an average-price game for which the input mechanism is not necessary
(see Section 5.2.2 and Example 5.30).
The fixed price of an edge ((Q, a,A), b), where Q ∈ S/ ∼, and (a,A) ∈
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AMinMax(Q,T), and b ∈ A is equal to the value of the following expression:
pi
(
(Q, a,A), b
)
= sup
s∈Q
inf
t∈TMin
s,(a,A)
sup
t′∈TMax
s,(a,t),b
pi(s, (b, t′)), where
TMins,(a,A) = {t ∈ T : (a, t) ∈ MMin(s) and A = AMax(s, (a, t))},
TMaxs,(a,t),b = {t′ ∈ T : (b, t′) ∈ MMax(s, (a, t))}.
We will explain, however, how to construct the input sets, to help establish
the intuition behind the construction of Γ̂.
Consider the edge e = ((Q1, a, A2), b) in the price-reward game graph Γ̂. The
set of inputs Θ̂Min(e), for player Min, is equal to I3 — the maximum set such that
AMinMax(s, I3) = (a,A2) for every s ∈ Q1. The set of inputs Θ̂Max(e), for player
Max, is (L× V1)× [I3 → I2].
To show how the choice of player Max affects the admissible inputs, con-
sider defining inputs for the edge e′ = ((Q1, a, A2), a), instead of the edge e =
((Q1, a, A2), b) — Max chooses control action a instead of b. The set of inputs
Θ̂Min(e′), for player Min, is equal to I3 — the same as before. However, the set
of inputs Θ̂Max(e′), for player Max, is (L × V1) × {id} — the difference is in the
function specification; it reflects that, if Max chooses the control action chosen by
Min, he has to choose the same time delay as well.
We conclude this example by showing how a choice of player Min affects the
input sets. Consider the edge e′′ = ((Q3, a, A1), a). The set of inputs Θ̂Min(e′′) is
equal to I1 — the maximum set such that AMinMax(s, I1) = (a,A1) for every s ∈ Q3.
The set of inputs Θ̂Max(e′′), of player Max, is equal to (L× V1)×{id} — the set A1
does not contain control actions other than the one chosen by Min.
5.2.2 Solving hybrid average-price-per-reward games
This section is committed to showing that hybrid average-price-per-reward games
are positionally determined, decidable and admit positional ε-optimal strategies. To
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Figure 5.3: The price-reward game graph Γ̂ obtained, from Γ introduced in Exam-
ple 5.11, using the finite abstraction ∼. A1 stands for {a} and A2 for {a, b}. Edge
price is omitted when it is equal to zero. Edges are annotated with constant prices
(if omitted, it is equal to 0); the rewards are omitted, as they are constant and equal
to 1.
achieve this, we first characterise the game values, of the average-price-per-reward
game Γ̂, using average-price-per-reward optimality equations from Section 2.2.2, and
then proceed to prove that solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ̂) coincide with the solutions to
OptAvgPR(Γ) (Theorem 5.26). This, together with the results from Section 4.2
proves that hybrid average-price-per-reward games are determined. As a side note,
we explain why in the case of average-price games, price-reward graphs with fixed
prices and rewards are sufficient.
First, we will present the average-price-per-reward optimality equations in a
form that better reflects, compared to the generic form found in Section 4.1.2, the
structure of the game graph Γ̂. For the remainder of this section we assume that R
in ∼R is equal to {R(a) : a ∈ A}, and hence omit it.
For Q ∈ S/∼ = ŜMin, we have:
Ĝ(Q) = min
{
Ĝ (Q, a,A) : (Q, (Q, a,A)) ∈ Ê
}
,
B̂(Q) = min
{
B̂ (Q, a,A) : (Q, (Q, a,A)) ∈ Ê and Ĝ(Q) = Ĝ (Q, a,A)
}
;
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for (Q, a,A) ∈ (S/∼× A× 2A) ⊆ ŜMax, we have:
Ĝ (Q, a,A) = max
{
Ĝ (Q, a,A) :
(
(Q, a,A) , a′
) ∈ Ê} ,
B̂ (Q, a,A) = max
{
Val
(
a((Q,a,A),a′)
(
Ĝ
(
a′
)))
+ B̂
(
a′
)
:(
(Q, a,A) , a′
) ∈ Ê and Ĝ (Q, a,A) = Ĝ (a′)} ;
and for a ∈ A ⊆ ŜMax, we have:
Ĝ(a) = max
{
Ĝ(Q) : (a,Q) ∈ Ê
}
,
B̂(a) = max
{
B̂(Q) : (a,Q) ∈ Ê and Ĝ(a) = Ĝ(Q)
}
.
Recall that only edges of the form ((Q, a,A), a) have non-empty input sets. The
remaining edges have fixed prices and rewards equal to 0, which gives us:
Val
(
a(Q,(Q,a,A))
(
Ĝ (Q, a,A)
))
= Val
(
a(a,Q)
(
Ĝ (Q)
))
= 0,
and hence, we omit these expressions in the equations for B̂(Q) and B̂(a′).
The game a((Q,a,A),a′)(g) is in fact a finite duration perfect information game,
and therefore it is determined. Determinacy follows from a simple backwards in-
duction argument applied to, the possibly infinite, finite depth game tree.
The main result, Theorem 5.26, states that the solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ̂) can
be used to obtain the solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ).
Theorem 5.26. Let Γ be a hybrid average-price-per-reward game and let (Ĝ, B̂) |=
OptAvgPR(Γ̂). If G,B : S ∪
(
S × (A × T)) ∪ A → R are such that G(a) = Ĝ(a)
and B(a) = B̂(a) for all a ∈ A, and satisfy equations (5.1–5.4), then (G,B) |=
OptAvgPR(Γ).
Corollary 5.27. Definable average-price-per-reward hybrid games with strong resets
are decidable.
193
Proof. The price-reward game graph Γ̂ is finite and definable, hence (Ĝ, B̂) is defin-
able (Remark 4.8). If Theorem 5.26 holds, by Proposition 5.29, functions(G,B) |=
OptAvgPR(Γ) are definable. This, together with Theorem 4.10, yields decidability
(Proposition 2.5).
Corollary 5.28. If Γ is a definable hybrid game with strong resets and if in the
average-price-per-reward game a player can always make a rational ε-optimal move,
then ε-optimal strategies are computable.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 4.21. The only difference is
that we use Theorem 5.26 (instead of Corollary 4.20) to establish the existence of
solutions to the average-price-per-reward optimality equations. Definability of the
solutions follows from Proposition 5.29.
Our goal is to show that a solution (Ĝ, B̂) of OptAvgPR(Γ̂) can be used to
obtain a solution (G,B) of OptAvgPR(Γ). Recall that a solution of average-price-
per-reward optimality equations OptAvgPR(Γ) for a hybrid average-price-per-reward
game is a pair (G,B) of functions G,B : S ∪ (S× (A× T)) ∪ A→ R.
Before we start the proof of Theorem 5.26, we introduce a simple observa-
tion, on the structure of the solutions to the average-price-per-reward optimality
equations OptAvgPR(Γ), which will be helpful in the proof of the actual theorem.
Proposition 5.29. If Γ is a hybrid average-price-per-reward game, then for all
states s ∈ S and for all τ ∈ MMin(s), the values G(s), B(s), G(s, τ), and B(s, τ)
satisfying equations (5.1–5.4), respectively, are uniquely determined and first-order
definable (provided Γ is definable) from the (finitely many) values {G(a), B(a) : a ∈
A}.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Remark 4.8.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 5.26.
194
Proof of Theorem 5.26. The proof is based on the non-trivial observation that the ∼
equivalence facilitates a separation of discrete and continuous components of each
player’s moves. Players can first choose their discrete moves in the same order as
in a game round, and later choose in a similar fashion corresponding continuous
components.
We need to prove that, if for all a ∈ A, G(a) = Ĝ(a) and B(a) = B̂(a), then
indeed (G,B) |= OptAvgPR(Γ) (recall that, by Proposition 5.29, this assignment
uniquely determines the functions G and B). Average-price-per-reward optimality
equations, OptAvgPR(Γ), can be expanded so that the conditions for G(a) and B(a)
are given in terms of G|A and B|A, i.e., in terms of the gain and bias functions whose
domain is restricted to the set A. We will show, that the solution (G,B), pos-
tulated in the theorem statement, satisfies the average-price-per-reward optimality
equations in the expanded form.
We expand the equation for B̂(a) with respect to OptAvgPR(Γ̂):
B̂(a) = maxbG(a)= bG(Q),
Q⊆R(a)
B̂(Q)
= maxbG(a)= bG(Q),
Q⊆R(a)
minbG(Q)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
(a′,A′)∈AMinMax(Q,T)
B̂(Q, a′, A′)
= maxbG(a)= bG(Q),
Q⊆R(a)
minbG(Q)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
(a′,A′)∈AMinMax(Q,T)
maxbG(a′′)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
a′′∈A′
Val
(
a((Q,a′,A′),a′′)(Ĝ(a′′))
)
+ B̂(a′′) (5.11)
If we expand the definition of Val(a((Q,a′,A′),a′′)(Ĝ(a′′))), we get:
sup
(s,f)∈bΘMax((Q,a′,A′),a′′)
inf
f ′∈bΘMin((Q,a′,A′),a′′)
pi
(
s, f
(
f ′ (s)
))− ρ (s, f (f ′ (s))) · Ĝ (a′′) .
Recall that choosing inputs, in the edge game, is in fact choosing the continuous
components of the reconstructed game round (see Section 5.2.1) that match the
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discrete ones, encoded in the edge. As a consequence, the expression for the game
value can be rewritten as:
sup
s∈Q
inf
(a′,t′)∈MMin(s),
A′=AMax(s,(a′,t′))
sup
(a′′,t′′)∈MMax(s,(a′,t′))
pi
(
s,
(
a′′, t′′
))− ρ (s, (a′′, t′′)) · Ĝ (a′′) ,
which allows us to rewrite expression 5.11, for B̂(a), as:
maxbG(a)= bG(Q),
Q⊆R(a)
minbG(Q)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
(a′,A′)∈AMinMax(Q,T)
maxbG(a′′)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
a′′∈A′
sup
s∈Q
inf
(a′,t′)∈MMin(s),
A′=AMax(s,(a′,t′))
sup
(a′′,t′′)∈MMax(s,(a′,t′))
pi
(
s,
(
a′′, t′′
))− ρ (s, (a′′, t′′)) · Ĝ (a′′)+ B̂(a′′).
Observe that, the choice of s ∈ Q depends only on Q, and that the choice (a′, t′) ∈
MMin(s) depends only on s ∈ Q and (a′, A′) ∈ AMinMax(Q,T). This allows us to
rewrite the last equation in the following way:
maxbG(a)= bG(Q),
Q⊆R(a)
sup
s∈Q
minbG(Q)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
(a′,A′)∈AMinMax(Q,T)
inf
(a′,t′)∈MMin(s),
A′=AMax(s,(a′,t′))
maxbG(a′′)= bG(Q,a′,A′),
a′′∈A′
sup
(a′′,t′′)∈MMax(s,(a′,t′))
pi
(
s,
(
a′′, t′′
))− ρ (s, (a′′, t′′)) · Ĝ (a′′)+ B̂(a′′),
which simplifies to:
sup
G(s)=G(a),
s∈R(a)
inf
G(s,τ)=G(a).
τ∈MMin(s)
max
G(a′′)=G(s,τ)
(a′′,t′′)∈MMax(s,τ)
pi(s, a′′, t′′) − ρ(s, a′′, t′′) · G(s, τ) + B(a′′),
as Ĝ(a′′) = G(a′′) and B̂(a′′) = B(a). We can now contract the expression for B̂(a),
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in the following way:
B̂(a) = sup
G(s)=G(a),
s∈R(a)
inf
G(s,τ)=G(a).
τ∈MMin(s)
B(s, τ)
= sup
G(s)=G(a),
s∈R(a)
B(s)
= B(a).
We have shown that the values B̂(a) and Ĝ(a), for all a ∈ A, satisfy the
average-price-per-reward optimality equations OptAvgPR(Γ), which, together with
Proposition 5.29, yields the desired result.
Average-price games. As explained earlier (see Section 5.1.1) In an average-
price games of a timed action is averaged over the total number of timed actions.
In other words, it is an average-price-reward game in which the reward of a timed
action is constant and equal to 1. We will now show, that in this special case the
input mechanism is not necessary, and that we can reduce to finite doubly-price
game graphs.
Let ((Q, a,A), a′) be an edge bearing a non-zero price (and reward) in the
game graph Γ̂. Recall that the expression for Val(a((Q,a,A),a′)(Ĝ(a′))) is:
sup
(s,f)∈bΘMax((Q,a,A),a′) inff ′∈bΘMin((Q,a,A),a′)pi
(
s, f
(
f ′ (s)
))− ρ (s, f (f ′ (s))) · Ĝ (Q, a,A) ,
however, the reward is equal 1, for all the inputs, so the expression can be simplified
to the following form:
(
sup
(s,f)∈bΘMax((Q,a,A),a′) inff ′∈bΘMin((Q,a,A),a′)pi
(
s, f
(
f ′ (s)
)))− Ĝ (Q, a,A) .
The value of the expression in brackets is well defined, and does not depend on
any external parameters. As such, it can be assigned as the the fixed priced of the
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edge ((Q, a,A), a′). This, together with the fact that the reward is fixed, facilitates
the reduction from average-price hybrid games to average-price games on doubly-
weighted game graphs. The correctness of the reduction follows from Theorem 5.26.
We conclude with an example, which shows how solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ̂)
allow to establish the solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ).
Example 5.30. Recall the game graph Γ̂ from Example 5.25. Fig 5.4 depicts the
optimal choices of both players in the average-price game and the solution to the
average-price-per-reward optimality equations for finite average-price games. The
value of the game from every state is −2/3, because (Ĝ, B̂) |= OptAvgPR(Γ̂).
We use the solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ̂) to obtain solutions to OptAvgPR(Γ).
We set G ≡ −23 , B(a) = B̂(a) = 0 and B(b) = B̂(b) = 0. The remaining values are
uniquely determined by these. One can see that the value of the average-price game
on Γ is −23 and that the players have ε-optimal strategies as follows: from every
state in Q1 player Min should play (a, 6− ε), and from every state in Q2 ∪Q3, Min
should play (a, 2−ε). Player Max on the other hand has always to play Min’s choice
unless he is in the state (s, a, t) and t > 5, when he should make the move (b, 3 + ε).
From every state in A, Max should choose choose to play (0, 0) ∈ Q2.
5.2.3 Solving hybrid reachability-price games
In this section we show that hybrid reachability-price games are positionally deter-
mined, decidable and admit positional ε-optimal strategies. To achieve this, we first
characterise the game values, of the reachability-price game Γ̂, using reachability-
price optimality equations from Section 2.2.2, and then proceed to prove that so-
lutions to OptReach(Γ̂) coincide with the solutions to OptReach(Γ) (Theorem 5.31).
This, together with the classical results presented in Section 2.2.2 proves that hybrid
reachability-price games are determined.
First, we will present the reachability-price optimality equations in a form
that better reflects, compared to the generic form found in Section 2.2.2, the struc-
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Ĝ = −2
3
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Ĝ = −2
3
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Figure 5.4: Solid arrows denote the optimal strategies of both players. Above each
vertex one can find its gain and bias.
ture of the game graph Γ̂. For the remainder of this section we assume that R in ∼R
is equal to {R(a) : a ∈ A} ∪ {F}, and hence omit it.
It will be sufficient to consider Γ̂ with fixed prices and no rewards, i.e., a
finite weighted game graph (see Section 2.2.2). Similar approach has been used
in the context of average-price games (see the end of Section 5.2.2). The weight
function pi : Ê→ R is defined as follows. For ((Q, a,A), a′) ∈ Ê we have:
pi
(
(Q, a,A), a′
)
= sup
s∈Q
inf
t∈TMin
s,(a,A)
sup
t′∈TMax
s,(a,t),a′
pi(s, (a′, t′)), where
TMins,(a,A) = {t ∈ T : (a, t) ∈ MMin(s) and A = AMax(s, (a, t))},
TMaxs,(a,t),a′ = {t′ ∈ T : (a′, t′) ∈ MMax(s, (a, t))};
and for the remaining edges it is equal to 0.
The following are the reachability-price optimality equations for the finite
reachability-price game (Γ̂, F̂). If ŝ ∈ F̂ then P̂ (ŝ) = D̂(ŝ) = 0. Otherwise, the
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following hold. For Q ∈ S/∼ = ŜMin, we have:
P̂ (Q) = min
{
P̂ (Q, a,A) : (Q, (Q, a,A)) ∈ Ê
}
,
D̂(Q) = min
{
1 + D̂(Q, a,A) : P̂ (Q) = P̂ (Q, a,A) and (Q, (Q, a,A)) ∈ Ê
}
;
for (Q, a,A′) ∈ (S/∼× A× 2A) ⊆ ŜMax, we have:
P̂ (Q, a,A) = min
{
pi
(
(Q, a,A), a′
)
+ P̂ (a′) : ((Q, a,A), a′) ∈ Ê
}
,
D̂(Q, a,A) = min
{
1 + D̂(a′) :
P̂ (Q, a,A) = pi
(
(Q, a,A), a′
)
+ P̂ (a′) and ((Q, a,A), a′) ∈ Ê
}
;
and for a ∈ A ⊆ SMax, we have:
P̂ (a) = max
{
P̂ (Q) : (a,Q) ∈ Ê
}
,
D̂(a) = max
(a,Q)∈bE
{
1 + D̂(Q) : P̂ (a) = P̂ (Q) and (a,Q) ∈ Ê
}
.
We assume that the value of a reachability-price game in every state of Γ̂
is finite (this implies that the values of the hybrid counterpart are finite too). In
Section 2.2.2, we have explained how to determine the set of states, ŴMax, that
admit∞, and the set of states, ŴMin, that admit −∞, as game values. By applying
Proposition 5.34 (defined later in this section) we can establish definability of the
respective sets of states in the hybrid reachability-price game Γ.
As in the case of average-price hybrid games the solutions to the reachability-
price optimality equations for the finite game (Γ̂, F̂) coincide with the solutions to
the reachability-price optimality equations for the hybrid game (Γ,F). The main
results is as follows, and is proved in a similar fashion as Theorem 5.26.
Theorem 5.31. For a hybrid reachability-price game Γ, let (P̂ , D̂) |= OptReach(Γ̂).
If for all a ∈ A, it holds that P (a) = P̂ (a) and D(a) = D̂(a), then P,D : S ∪ (S×
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(A× T)) ∪ A→ R are uniquely determined and (P,D) |= OptReach(Γ).
Corollary 5.32. Definable reachability-price hybrid games with strong resets are
decidable.
Proof. The finite weighted game graph Γ̂ and the set of goal states F̂ are definable,
hence (P̂ , D̂) is definable (Remark 5.12). If Theorem 5.31 holds, by Proposition 5.34,
functions (P,D) |= OptReach(Γ,F) are definable. This, together with Theorem 5.14,
yields decidability (Proposition 2.5).
Corollary 5.33. If Γ is a definable hybrid game with strong resets and if in the
reachability-price game a player can always make a rational ε-optimal move, then
ε-optimal strategies are computable.
Proof. By Corollary 5.15, the existence of (P,D) |= OptReach(Γ) implies definability
of ε-optimal strategies of both players, provided that F is definable. Theorem 5.31
ensures that such a pair of functions, (P,D), indeed exists.
Our goal is to show that a solution (P̂ , D̂) of OptReach(Γ̂, F̂) can be used to
obtain a solution (P,D) of OptReach(Γ,F). Recall that a solution of reachability-price
optimality equations OptReach(Γ,F) for a hybrid reachability-price game is a pair
(P,D) of functions P : S∪ (S×(A×T))∪A→ R and D : S∪ (S×(A×T))∪A→ N.
Before we start the proof of Theorem 5.31, we introduce a simple observa-
tion, on the structure of the solutions to the reachability-price optimality equations
OptReach(Γ,F), which will be helpful in the proof of the actual theorem.
Proposition 5.34. If (Γ,F) is a hybrid reachability-price game then for all states
s ∈ S and for all τ ∈ MMin(s), the values P (s), D(s), P (s, τ), and D(s, τ) satisfying
equations (5.7–5.10), respectively, are uniquely determined and first-order definable
(provided that Γ definable ) from the (finitely many) values {P (a), D(a) : a ∈ A}.
Proof. The same as of Proposition 5.29.
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We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 5.31.
Proof of Theorem 5.31. The proof is based on the non-trivial observation that the ∼
equivalence facilities of discrete and continuous components of each player’s moves.
Players can first choose their discrete moves in the same order as in a game round,
and later choose in a similar fashion corresponding continuous components.
We need to prove that, if for all a ∈ A, P (a) = P̂ (a) and D(a) = D̂(a),
then indeed (P,D) |= OptReach(Γ,F). (recall that, by Proposition 5.34, this assign-
ment uniquely determines the functions P and D). Reachability-price optimality
equations, OptReach(Γ), can be expanded so that the conditions for P and D are
given in terms of P|A and B|A. We will show, that the solution (P,D), postulated in
the theorem statement, satisfies the reachability-price optimality equations in the
expanded form.
We start by expanding the equation for P̂ (a) with respect to OptReach(Γ̂).
P̂ (a) = max
Q⊆R(a)
P̂ (Q)
= max
Q∈R(a)
min
(a′,A′)∈
AMinMax(Q,T)
P̂ (Q, a′, A′)
= max
Q∈R(a)
min
(a′,A′)∈
AMinMax(Q,T)
max
a′′∈A′
P̂ (a′′) + pi
((
Q, a′, A′
)
, a′′
)
= max
Q∈R(a)
min
(a′,A′)∈
AMinMax(Q,T)
max
a′′∈A′
P̂ (a′′) + sup
s∈Q
inf
t′∈TMin
s,(a′,A′)
sup
t′′∈TMax
s,(a′,t′),a′′
pi(s, (a′′, t′′))
Notice that, the choice of s ∈ Q depends only on Q, and that the choice t ∈ TMins,(a′,A′)
depends only on s ∈ Q and (a′, A′) ∈ AMinMax(Q,T). This allows us to rewrite the
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last equation in the following way (recall that P (a′′) = P̂ (a′′)):
P̂ (a) = max
Q∈R(a)
sup
s∈Q
min
(a′,A′)∈
AMinMax(Q,T)
inf
t′∈TMin
s,(a′,A′)
max
a′′∈A′
sup
t′′∈TMax
s,(a′,t′),a′′
P (a′′) + pi(s, (a′′, t′′))
= sup
s∈R(a)
inf
(a′,t′)∈
MMin(s,(a′,t′))
sup
(a′′,t′′)∈
MMax(s,(a′,t′))
P (a′′) + pi(s, (a′′, t′′))
= sup
s∈R(a)
inf
(a′,t′)∈
MMin(s,(a′,t′))
P (s, (a′, t′))
= sup
s∈R(a)
P (s)
= P (a)
We deal with the D function in the similar fashion. This allows us to establish
that the functions (P,D), as postulated in the theorem statement, indeed satisfy
the reachability-price optimality equations OptReach(Γ).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis we have considered games for optimal controller synthesis on hybrid
automata. In Chapter 3, we have studied reachability-price games on single-clock
timed automata. In Chapter 4, we have introduced and studied average-price-per-
reward games on a novel class of graphs, the so called price-reward game graphs. In
Chapter 5, we have studied average-price-per-reward and reachability-price games
on hybrid automata with strong resets.
In Chapter 3, we studied the problem of computing the values for reachab-
ility-price games on single-clock timed automata. Our work improves on the earlier
results of Bouyer et al. [BLMR06]. For this problem, we have lowered the com-
putational complexity upper-bound from 3EXPTIME to EXPTIME. However, the
bound is not known to be tight, as the best lower bound known is PTIME — the
complexity of computing the value of a reachability-price games on a finite graph.
There are several possible future research directions. The first, and obvious
direction would be to close the complexity gap. We have studied several simple
examples which suggest that the problem is EXPTIME-complete, but we did not
manage to prove this. The second direction would be to study two-clock timed au-
tomata. In this case, the problem of computing the value of a reachability-time game
was shown to be EXPTIME-complete [JT07]. However, the problem of computing
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the value of a reachability-price game in general remains open. Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that the ideas used in Chapter 3 can be used to address this problem, as
they rely heavily on the assumption that the automaton has only one clock. The
third research direction would be to study reachability-price games on general timed
automata. Bouyer et al. [BBM06], prove that the problem of deciding whether there
exists an optimal strategy in a reachability-price game on a timed automaton with
at least three clocks is undecidable. However, the question whether it is possible to
decide the value of the reachability-price game is still open.
The motivation for the work presented in Chapter 4 was the problem of
solving average-price-per-reward games on hybrid automata. However, we believe
that the class of price-reward game graphs is interesting in its own right, and to
the best of our knowledge, this model has not been considered before. To establish
our results that average-price-per-reward games on price-reward game graphs are
determined, we use a combination of two techniques: optimality equations and
strategy improvement. These techniques have been known in the literature [JT07;
BV07; Put94; FV97] but they were used differently — optimality equations were
used to prove that a strategy improvement algorithm indeed computes the value of a
game. We have used the fact that the values of an average-price-per-reward game, if
they exist, are characterised using optimality equations, to prove determinacy (i.e.,
existence of game values). Strategy improvement enabled us to lift the determinacy
of average-price-per-reward games on graphs of out-degree one, to all graphs. We
believe this approach is novel, and could be applied to other problems.
In Chapter 5, we have proved that average-price-per-reward and reachability-
price games on hybrid systems with strong resets are determined. To achieve this,
we have reduced the problem of solving a hybrid game to a problem of solving a finite
game. In the case of average-price-per-reward games, we reduced to the analogous
problem on finite price-reward graphs (introduced in Chapter 4), and in the case
of reachability-price games we reduced to the analogous problem on finite weighted
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graphs.
When hybrid automata with strong resets were first introduced [LPS00;
BM05], they were advertised as allowing for rich continuous dynamics at the cost
of the strong reset property. The strong resets made decoupling of discrete and
continuous components possible. Additionally, the fact that continuous components
were defined using first-order logic over an o-minimal structure, was used to prove
existence of finite bisimulations [LPS00; BM05]. The o-minimality requirement was
crucial in establishing these results. In this context the semantics of the automaton
allowed for an arbitrary number of continuous transitions prior to a discrete one.
This is in contrast to the game setting, where like in this thesis, an execution of the
hybrid automaton is an alternating sequence of continuous and discrete transitions.
In the game setting, the emphasis is placed on the interaction of the controller and
the environment, rather than on the rich continuous dynamics of the continuous com-
ponents [BBJ+08; BBC06; BBC09]. This is reflected by the timed-action semantics
and the steps of the game round. This change of emphasis reduced the continuous
behaviours of the automaton to “parameters” of an execution that determine its
quantitative properties. For average-price and reachability-price games on hybrid
systems with strong resets, the optimal “parameters” can be determined a priori
— there is a reduction from hybrid games to their finite counterparts [BBJ+08].
Average-price-per-reward games are more complex, and the optimal choice of “pa-
rameters” depends on the discrete behaviour chosen by the players. This is the
reason for reducing to average-price-per-reward games on finite price-reward graphs.
In the light of the above, there are two possible directions for future research.
One is to look for new ways of modelling the controller-environment interactions that
allow for richer continuous behaviours. The other direction is to work on models
without the strong reset property, e.g., STORMED hybrid automata [VPVD08;
VPVD09].
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 3.10
The proof of the theorem follows from the Lemmas A.1–A.3. The first lemma es-
tablishes an exponential time Turing-reduction from single-clock timed automata
to single-clock timed automata without positive prices on control actions. The sec-
ond lemma establishes a further polynomial-time Turing-reduction to [0, 1]-bounded
single-clock timed automata. The final lemma establishes a further polynomial time
Turing-reduction to simple timed automata.
We now proceed to prove the aforementioned Lemmas A.1–A.3, which estab-
lish that restricting to simple timed automata can be done without loss of generality.
Lemma A.1. The problem of deciding the value of a reachability-price game on
single-clock timed automata is exponential time Turing-reducible to the analogous
problem on single-clock timed automata without positive prices on control actions.
Proof. We assume that reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata
without positive prices on control actions are determined, that the Val function
for such games is computable, and that it is a quasi-cost function at every control
location.
To prove the lemma, we will construct a sequence of reachability-price games
based on the original game Γ, but defined on single-clock timed automata without
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positive prices on control actions. The game value of the i-th game in the sequence
will denote the value of the original game Γ, provided that the players were allowed
to take at most i discrete transitions that correspond to control actions with a
positive price. The (i+ 1)-th game will be defined in terms of the original game and
the Val function of the i-th game; its size will be polynomially larger than the size
of the original game Γ. To decide the value of a reachability-price game, it will be
sufficient to consider only a finite number of elements in this sequence since every
control action with a positive price has a price of at least one.
We start by defining the first element of the aforementioned sequence. The
initial game will be played on the automaton with all control actions admitting
positive prices removed — by assumptions, we can compute the Val function for
such games.
Given a reachability-price game Γ defined on an automaton A, we define a
new game Γ0 that is played on an automaton A0, obtained from the original one by
removing all control actions that admit a positive price, i.e., price of 1 or greater.
All components of the automaton A0 are inherited from the automaton A, with the
exception of the set of control actions, which is defined as follows.
A0 =
{
a : a ∈ A and pi(a) = 0
}
.
The set of control locations in the automaton A0 is inherited from the automaton A,
and as a consequence the definition of the game Γ0 is the same as the definition of
the original game (recall that the definition of a game consists of: a partition of
the set of control locations, a set of goal locations, and a function that assigns a
quasi-cost function to every goal location).
We now explain how to construct the (i + 1)-th game, given that we have
computed the Val function for the i-th game in the sequence. Once again, both
the i-th and (i + 1)-th game are without discrete transitions admitting positive
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prices, and hence, by assumptions, we can compute the Val function for such games.
Intuitively, we take the automaton A and remove all control actions that have
positive prices. For every removed control action, which led from control location
` to control location `′, we add a new goal location, and a new control action that
leads from control location ` to this new goal location. The quasi-cost function in
this new goal location encodes the quasi-cost of reaching goal from `′ in Γi, increased
by the price of the control action.
Let Γi denote the reachability-price game defined over the automaton Ai. We
define the automaton Ai+1 and the game Γi+1, assuming that we have computed
ValΓi . As starting points, we take the games Γ and Γ0, and automata A and A0. The
timed automaton Ai+1 = 〈{x}, Li+1,Ai+1, invi+1,urgi+1, pii+1〉 is defined in terms
of the previously introduced automata A and A0. The set of control locations Li+1
is defined as:
Li+1 = L ∪
{
a : a ∈ A and pi(a) > 0
}
;
the set of control actions, Ai+1, is defined as:
Ai+1 = A0 ∪
{
(`, I, Z, a) : ` ∈ L and a = (`, I, Z, `′) ∈ Li+1 ∩ A
}
;
the invariant condition, invi+1 : Li+1 → B([0,M ]), is defined as:
invi+1(`) =

inv(`′′) if ` = (`′, I, Z, `′′) ∈ Li+1 ∩ A
inv(`) if ` ∈ L;
the urgency mapping, urgi+1 : Li+1 → {0, 1}, is defined as:
urgi+1(`) =

0 if ` ∈ Li+1 ∩ A
urg(`) if ∈ L;
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and the price function, pii+1 : Li+1 → N, is defined as:
pii+1(`) =

0 if ` ∈ Li+1 ∩ A
pi(`) if ` ∈ L.
The reachability-price game,
〈
Γi+1,Fi+1, piFi+1
〉
, on the single-clock timed automa-
ton Ai+1, is defined as in Definition 3.6, according to the following specification:
the set of control locations is partitioned as follows LMini+1 = LMin and LMax =
Li+1 \LMini+1; the set of goal locations is defined as LFi+1 = LF∪ (Li+1∩A); and the
function, CFF
i+1
: LFi+1 → CF([0,M ]), that assigns a quasi-cost function to every
goal location is defined as:
CFF
i+1
(`) =

x 7→ ValΓi((`′′, 0)) + pi(`) if ` = (`′, I, {x}, `′′) ∈ Li+1 ∩ A
x 7→ ValΓi((`′′, x)) + pi(`) if ` = (`′, I, ∅, `′′) ∈ Li+1 ∩ A
piF(`) if ` ∈ LF.
Let c be the real constant mentioned in the definition of the reachability-
price decision problem. In order to decide, whether ValΓ(s) 6 c for every state s, it
suffices to compute the function ValΓc∗ , where c
∗ = min{c′ : c′ > c and c′ ∈ N} —
recall that if the price of a control action is positive it is at least 1. This establishes
the EXPTIME complexity of the reduction (constants are encoded in binary).
Lemma A.2. The problem of deciding the game value of a reachability-price game
on single-clock timed automata, without positive prices on control actions is polyno-
mial time Turing-reducible to the analogous problem on [0, 1]-bounded single-clock
timed automata without positive prices on control actions.
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary bounded timed automaton without positive prices on
control actions — in this context it is natural to assume that the price function
has the type L → N, as opposed to L ∪ A → N in the general definition. In this
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proof we assume that reachability-price games on [0, 1]-bounded single-clock timed
automata are determined. To prove the lemma, we will construct a sequence of
timed automata, which are mutually equivalent, with the final automaton being
[0, 1]-bounded. With this hindsight in mind, it will be justified to assume that
reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata without positive prices on
control actions are determined.
For the purpose of this proof, we will use a notion of equivalence that relates
to the game value. More formally, two timed automata A and A′ are equivalent if
there exist two functions h1 : S → S′ and h2 : S′ → S and two reachability-price
games Γ and Γ′, such that ValΓ(s) = ValΓ′(h1(s)) and ValΓ′(s′) = ValΓ(h2(s′)) for
every s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, where Γ and Γ′ are reachability-price games on A and A′
respectively. To show such equivalence, it is sufficient to show that strategies from
one game can be adapted to the other one, and that they yield the same results.
Before we start the actual proof, we will introduce two auxiliary notions,
which will simplify the presentation. Let I = [b, e] be an interval. Unless we
clearly state otherwise, it can be open on either of its endpoints; we will write I to
denote the closure of the interval I, i.e., the smallest closed interval containing I.
If we construct a new interval I ′ based on I, unless stated otherwise, it inherits the
“openness” properties of I. We also introduce a special function δ : R>0 → R>0
defined, as follows:
δ(x) =

x if x < 1,
1 otherwise.
Finally, consider the set, C = {c0, c1, . . . , cn}, of all the constants appearing in the
guards of control actions and in the invariant condition, i.e., the set of interval end-
points. Without loss of generality, we assume that c0 = 0, and that ci < ci+1 for
every i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
The purpose of the first construction is to obtain an automaton that has the
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following property: for every two control actions (`1, I1, Z1, `′1) and (`2, I2, Z2, `′2)
we have either I1 = I2, or I1 ∩ I2 = ∅, or I1 ∩ I2 = {c}, for some c ∈ C. For
future reference, we will call such a single-clock timed automaton a type-1 timed
automaton.
We obtain the type-1 timed automaton A′ by redefining the set of control
actions in A. For every control action (`, [b, e], Z, `′) ∈ A, consider {b = ci0 , . . . , cik =
e} = C ∩ [b, e], and assume that cij 6 cij+1 for every j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. If k > 1,
we define A′ to include every (`, Ij , Z, `′), where Ij = [cij , cij+1 ], for every j ∈
{0, . . . , k−1}. Moreover, the “left openness” of the interval I0, and “right openness”
of Ik are consistent with that of [b, e]; on the remaining interval end-points, the Ij
intervals are closed. Otherwise, if k = 1, A′ contains just the original transition
of A.
The automaton A′ is a type-1 timed automaton, and it is polynomially larger
than A; the transitions systems of both automata have the same state space. More-
over, from every state the set of reachable states and the price of reaching them are
the same as in A. The definition of the game relies solely on the partition of the
set of control locations, so we define Γ′ in the same way as Γ. We use the identity
mapping to establish equivalence of A and A′.
The purpose of the next construction is to obtain a type-1 timed automaton
equivalent to the original, that has a transition system with a special property. The
property states that there exists a function f : L→ {I0, . . . , In−1} such that, if (`, x)
is the state of the transition system, then x ∈ f(`). In other words, for every state
the control location encodes the closed interval Ii = [ci, ci+1], for i ∈ 0, . . . , n− 1, to
which the clock value belongs. A single-clock timed automaton with this property
will be referred to as a type-2 timed automaton.
We construct the type 2-timed automaton A′ from a type-1 timed automa-
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ton A in the following way. The set of control locations is defined as follows
L′ =
⋃
`∈L
{(`, Ii) : 0 6 i < n− 1},
and the set of control actions is defined as follows
A′ =
{
((`, Ii), I, ∅, (`′, Ii)) : (`, I, ∅, `′) ∈ A and I ⊆ Ii
}
∪{
((`, Ii), I, {x}, (`′, I0)) : (`, I, {x}, `′) ∈ A and I ⊆ Ii
}
∪{
((`, Ii), Ii ∩ Ii+1, ∅, (`, Ii+1)) : 0 6 i 6 n− 2
}
.
We define the invariant condition inv((`, I)) as inv(l) ∩ I, the urgency mapping
urg′((`, I)) as urg(`), and the price function pi′((`, I)) as pi(`).
The timed automaton A′ is clearly type-1, and, due to the definition of the
invariant condition, it indeed does encode the interval Ii within the control location
— the requested function can be trivially defined as f((`, I)) = I. Additionally, the
timed automaton A′ is only polynomially larger than the original timed automa-
ton A.
To define the game Γ′, we partition L′ into the sets of control locations of
player Min and player Max, according to the partition of L, i.e., the membership of
(`, I) in one of the two sets depends on the membership of ` in those sets in the game
Γ. The set of goal locations is determined in a similar manner. The assignment of
quasi-cost functions to goal locations, CFF
′
((`, I)), is defined as CFF(`)|I , for every
(`, I) ∈ L′.
Consider the mapping h2 : S′ → S, defined as follows: h2(((`, I), x)) = (`, x).
Given a state s ∈ S′, for every transition s θ−→ s′ in A′ there exists a transition
h2(s)
θ′−→ h2(s′) in A that has the same price. Conversely, consider a mapping
h1 : S → S′ that satisfies the following: h1((`, x)) = ((`, I), x), where x ∈ I. For
every s ∈ S and every transition s θ−→ s′, with a price p, there exists a sequence of
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transitions h1(s)
θ1−→ s1 . . . sk−1 θk−→ h1(s′) in A′ with the same total accumulated
price p, where sj = ((`, Iij ), xi), for every 1 6 j < k (note that all sj belong the
set of states of the same player). We then trivially have that ValΓ′(((`, I), x)) =
ValΓ(h2(((`, I), x))) and ValΓ((`, x)) = ValΓ′(h1((`, x))). This implies equivalence of
A and A′.
We can further convert a type-2 timed automaton A, to obtain an automaton
A′ that has the following property: in a control location (`, [b, e]) the clock value
always satisfies the clock constraint [0, e− b]. Such a single-clock timed automaton
will be referred to as type-3 timed automaton. In a type-3 time automaton, the
control location encodes the interval, and the valuation of the clock encodes the
value of the clock relative to the interval’s beginning, i.e., a state ((`, [b, e]), x) of TA
corresponds to a state ((`, [b, e]), x− b) in TA′ .
We construct A′ by redefining the set of control actions and the invariant
condition of A. Given an interval I = [b, e], we write I−c to denote the interval [b−
c, e−c]. For every control location (`, [b, e]) we define inv′((`, [b, e])) = inv((`, [b, e]))−
b. Furthermore, the new set of control actions is defined as follows:
A′ =
{(
(`, [b, e]), I ′′ − b, {x}, (`′, I ′)) : ((`, [b, e]), I ′′, Z, (`′, I ′)) ∈ A and I 6= I ′}
∪
{(
(`, [b, e]), I ′′ − b, ∅, (`′, [b, e])) : ((`, [b, e]), I ′′, ∅, (`′, [b, e])) ∈ A},
where Z ⊆ {x}. The set of control locations in the timed automaton A′ is the same
as in the timed automaton A, and hence Γ′ inherits the partition of control locations
and the set of goal locations form the game Γ. To complete the definition of Γ′ we
define the mapping from goal locations to quasi-cost functions CFF
′
as:
(`, [b, e]) 7→
(
x 7→ CFF((`, [b, e]))(x+ b)
)
.
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We then have:
ValΓ(((`, [b, e]), x)) = ValΓ′(((`, [b, e]), x− b)).
This establishes the equivalence of A and A′, as the mapping x 7→ x−c is a bijection.
Furthermore, the size of A′ is polynomially larger than the size of A′′.
In a type-3 timed automaton every control action that leads to a control
location that encodes a different interval contains a reset. Moreover, every control
action originating from a control location (`, [b, e]) has a guard equal to [0, 0], [0, e],
or [e, e]. In the next transformation, we will transform a type-3 timed automaton
A into an equivalent [0, 1]-bounded timed automaton A′. Every interval [0, e] will
be encoded in the interval [0, 1]. To maintain equivalence, the price of a control
location will be multiplied by the length of the original interval, encoded by that
control location.
We will use the δ function, defined in the beginning of the proof, to aid the
definition of A′. The set of control locations, and the urgency mapping remain
unchanged. We define the new set of control actions as follows:
A′ =
{
(`, [δ(b), δ(e)], Z, `′) : (`, [b, e], Z, `′) ∈ A′
}
.
For every control location (`, I) ∈ L = L′, we set inv′((`, I)) = [0, δ(e)], where
inv((`, I)) = [0, e], and we define the price function pi′((`, [b, e])) as (e−b)·pi((`, [b, e])).
As in the transformation from a type 2 to a type 3 timed automaton, we
have not altered the set of control locations, so the game Γ′ inherits the partition of
control locations from Γ. We only need to redefine the mapping from goal locations
to quasi-cost functions in the following way:
CFF
′
((`, [b, e]))(x) = CFF((`, [b, e]))((e− b) · x).
The [0, 1]-bounded timed automaton A′ is only polynomially larger than A.
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Moreover we have:
ValΓ (((`, [b, e]) , x)) = ValΓ′
((
(`, [b, e]) ,
x
e− b
))
,
which establishes the equivalence of A and A′.
To summarise, given an arbitrary bounded timed automaton A without pos-
itive prices on control actions, using the four transformations we have constructed
a polynomially larger [0, 1]-bounded timed automaton A′ without positive prices on
control actions, which is equivalent to A. This finishes the proof.
Lemma A.3. The problem of deciding the value of a reachability-price game on
single-clock [0, 1]-bounded timed automata, without positive prices on control actions,
is polynomial time Turing-reducible to the analogous problem on simple single-clock
timed automata.
Proof. We assume that reachability-price games on simple-single-clock timed au-
tomata are determined. The proof that this is indeed the case will be provided in
Section 3.3.
In a transition system of a single-clock timed automaton, the set of states
reachable through a clock resetting transition, i.e., a transition labelled with a fol-
lowing label (`, I, {x}, `′), is finite. If L is the set of control locations, then this set
(of states) is contained in L × {0}. This implies that if an automaton has n clock
resetting transitions, then every run consisting of at least n + 1 such transitions
has to revisit some state at least once. Furthermore, since all the prices are non-
negative, visiting a non-goal state more than once is not beneficial for player Min
in a reachability-price game. If, however, player Max can enforce such a multiple
visit, then he can enforce a cycle that does not visit a goal state. The proof that
restricting to simple timed automata can be done without loss of generality will
exploit this intuition.
Given a [0, 1]-bounded timed automaton A with n clock-resetting transitions,
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we will construct a special timed automaton A′ that will use control locations to
count the number of resetting transitions in a run of its transition system. Once the
count exceeds n, the automaton will enter a special state. In every other respect,
this new automaton will behave exactly like the original one. The game Γ′ on, A′,
will be naturally defined in terms of the game Γ, on A, as we will explain further in
this sketch of a proof. The only difference is the designated r control location, to
which CFF
′
assigns a quasi-cost function equivalent to ∞.
The automaton A′ will consist of n+ 1 “copies” of A. Intuitively, the game
starts in the first copy, and each time a clock resetting transition occurs, it progresses
to the next copy. If the game is in the (n + 1)-th copy, and a resetting transition
occurs, then it enters the special goal state mentioned earlier. There are no clock
resetting transitions within a single copy — a simple timed automaton.
It will be clearly visible that the value of the game from the states belonging
to the first “copy” of A, in the game Γ′, is equal to the value of the game Γ. In
order to compute the value of the game for the i-th copy (for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), we
first compute it for the (i + 1)-th copy, and then alter the i-th copy so that the
clock resetting transitions lead to specially created goal locations. The quasi-cost
functions, assigned to those control locations, encode the value of the game from
relevant control locations in the (i+ 1)-th copy.
Formally, we define A′ in the following way:
L′ = L× {0, . . . , n} ∪ {r}, where r /∈ L.
The distinguished control location r is the aforementioned special control location
that is reached after the (n + 1)-th clock resetting transition. The set of control
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actions is defined as:
A′ =
{(
(`, i), I, ∅, (`′, i)) : (`, I, ∅, `′) ∈ A and 0 6 i 6 n}
∪
{(
(`, i), I, {x}, (`′, i+ 1)) : (`, I, {x}, `′) ∈ A and 0 6 i < n}
∪
{
((`, n), I, {x}, r) : (`, I, {x}, `′) ∈ A} ∪ {(r, [0, 1], {x}, r)}.
For every control location (`, i), we define the invariant condition as inv′((`, i)) =
inv(`), the urgency mapping as urg((`, i)) = urg(`), and the price function as
pi′((`, i)) = pi(`).
We now give the definition of the game Γ′ in terms of the game Γ. Given
a control location (`, i) ∈ L′ its membership in LF′, LMin′ and LMax′ depends on
the membership of ` in LF, LMin and LMax. For every goal location (`, i), we define
CFF
′
((`, i)) = CFF(`). Finally, we set inv′(r) = [0, 1], and CFF′(r) ≡ ∞.
We now show how to compute ValΓ′ in the i-th component, provided that
we have computed it in the (i + 1)-th component. Let {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ A′, where
aj = ((`j , i), Ij , {x}, (`′j , i + 1)), for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, be the set of all control actions
leading from the i-th to the (i + 1)-th copy of A, in A′. We will substitute every
clock resetting control action with a control action leading to special goal location,
whose quasi-cost function encodes the value of the game should the actual clock
resetting control action had been taken.
Let Γ′′ be the natural restriction of Γ′ to the automaton A′′ whose set of
control locations is restricted to L′ ∩ (L× {i+ 1}), and let
gj(x) = ValΓ′′
(
((`′j , i+ 1), 0)
)
We define the simple timed automaton A′′′ and the reachability-price game Γ′′′ in
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the following way:
L′′′ = L′′ ∪ {(`′1, i+ 1), . . . , (`′k, i+ 1)},
with the partition of L′′′, into the sets of control locations of players Min and Max, be-
ing consistent with that of L′′. Additionally, we define LF′′′ as LF′′∩L′′′∪{`′1, . . . , `′k}.
We define the set of control actions as
A′′′ = A′′ ∪ {((`j , i), I, ∅, (`′1, i+ 1)) : 1 6 j 6 k}.
With inv′′′, urg′′′, pi′′′, and CFF′′′ being consistent with their counterparts in A′′ and
Γ′′ over L′′. Additionally, CFF′′′((`′j , i+ 1)) = gj , and inv
′′′((`′j , i+ 1)) = inv
′((`′j , i+
1)), for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
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